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1. Motivation
After more than sixty years of international cooperation towards development and ex-
tensive developmental assistance, the African continent is still in many aspects being left
behind by the rest of the world. From an economic, political, humanitarian and eco-
logical perspective, Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind the other regions of the globe. Out
of forty-two countries that have been classified as having the lowest scores in the Human
Development Indicators for 2010, thirty-five are in Africa. In other words, a mere twelve
out of fifty-two African states are not listed among the least developed countries in the
world.1
Figure 1.1.: World map of the Human Development Index in 2010
Source: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/hd_map/
The international community has taken important steps in fighting extreme poverty
and famine, low levels of education and sanitation, as well as serious diseases and epi-
demics. A joint attempt to foster development on the global scale is documented in the
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Regardless for many countries having managed
to substantial progress in achieving the aforementioned goals, the 2010 MDG report con-
tinuously identified a number of targets that prove to be out of reach for Sub-Saharan
Africa. Still more than half of the Sub-Saharan population was living on less than $1.25 a
day in 2005, which demonstrates a very slow reduction since 1990. The young population
of the region appears to suffer most from this situation of extreme poverty: Sub-Saharan
Africa has the highest incidence of child undernourishment, the lowest school enrollment
rates, and the highest child mortality among all of the developing countries. Access to
1Five African countries are not included in the Index due to incomplete and missing data.
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sanitation and vital medical care are particularly scarce in the rural areas of the continent.
After roughly half a century of independence, many African people are still unable to
enjoy political freedom and execute their civil rights. We may observe advancements in
the area of democratization in some African countries, such as Ghana and Liberia. Never-
theless, many African countries still have autocratic regimes: twenty-seven African coun-
tries have been listed as such in the 2010 Democracy Index prepared by the Economist
Intelligence Unit.2 Numerous African countries have been, or still are, going through
long periods of civil and ethnic wars which lead to significant numbers of the residents
being forced to flee from their indigenous lands.
The economic, humanitarian and political situation in Sub-Saharan Africa makes the
countries of the region particularly vulnerable to any kind of economic disturbances. Ad-
ditionally, the African continent has been severely impacted by climate change, facing
droughts, medium temperatures' rise and deforestation. The continent is not properly
equipped to tackle these challenges and adapt to the environmental transformations of
the planet.
From the perspective of Sub-Saharan Africa, the history of developmental aid is mostly
a recollection of drawbacks and failures, although few success stories can be told as well.
Over the last thirty years, many countries have received abundant developmental assis-
tance, yet they are still struggling to reach adequate levels of human development. This
experience is equally true for those countries that demonstrated honest attempts to fulfill
their conditional agreements, reform their administration and fight poverty, hunger and
undernourishment. Given the scarce developmental resources, especially in the times of
economic crisis, and the challenging international reform agenda, economists should work
hard to try to understand the mechanisms behind spending, usage and effects of develop-
ment assistance. Many researchers, journalists and politicians, both from Africa and the
Western countries, call for a substantial reformulation and reform of the international
development aid framework. Aid is often seen as being a disease rather than a cure for
the African states.3 Consequently, research on the effects of developmental aid is crucial
in the process of designing an informed new development agenda. There is a wide range
of areas where developmental aid is needed and shows a lot of promise. At the same
time it is important to understand how additional investments could operate and which
effects are probable or possible for each of the specific fields. Additional indirect effects,
may they be positive or negative, should be taken into account.
This dissertation aims at providing insights into the aspects listed above by integrating
development assistance and sector development programs into adequate economy-wide
models for Sub-Saharan African states. The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
2See http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf for details.
3E.g. Easterly [2006] and Moyo [2010].
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methodology belongs to the standard toolkit of economic policy consulting. Even though
it should not be considered to be the only possible instrument, it is capable of providing
important and valuable insights in development policy as well as many other different
policy areas. CGE models have a long tradition in development economics but their
usage has been limited to a rather small community so far and they have not been used
extensively in the field of aid-financed development programs during recent times.
This thesis comprises three different CGE models complemented by an econometric
study. The models elaborate on various aspects of aid-financed development programs.
The here-presented models are an important contribution to the respective modeling
literature and add detail to their existing counterparts, especially in regards to the mod-
eling of government behavior and the endogenous households' skill choice for their child
members. The third model is a recursive-dynamic model which integrates educational
production as well as the choice between child labor supply and schooling. It is also
the first implementation of a recursive-dynamic model based on the International Food
Policy Research Institute's (IFPRI) Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) structure as Mixed
Complementarity Problem (MCP) using the MPSGE (Mathematical Programming Sys-
tem for General Equilibrium) modeling syntax.
The second chapter in this dissertation focuses on the direct spending effect resulting
from development aid being paid to the government of an African state. It investigates
whether so called Dutch Disease effects from aid are possible and probable, yet it goes
beyond the Dutch Disease literature. The named phenomenon evolves mainly due to
the distinctive government spending pattern favoring non-tradeable products. Increased
aid leads to growth in these non-tradeable sectors, while a reduction of exports can be
financed by the inflow of foreign exchange. The model and the analysis distinguish be-
tween different aid-spending strategies on the one hand and the possible second-round
effect on productivity on the other. It thus combines the aspects of the Dutch Disease
literature with a welfare analysis and possible compensation for Dutch Disease by in-
creased productivity. The paper presents an application of the model to Zambia and
subsequently incorporates the notion of enclave sectors in the economy (which is often
the case in countries with large natural resources). The model presented in this paper
has been applied in a specific evaluation project in Zambia by the Amsterdam Institute
for International Development.4
The second chapter shows a necessity for productive investment. Of the following three
chapters each concentrates on distinctive areas where development aid might be invested
in a way that fosters productivity. The third and fifth chapter use CGE models as well,
whereas chapter four consists of an econometric study.
Chapter three shows how the effects of infrastructure improvements can be explicitly
4See http://www.aiid.org/page.php?id=40&project=10.
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captured in a CGE model setup. In contrast to many other studies, the paper depicts
infrastructure as a transport cost-reducing element which improves market access by
providing a low cost alternative to transportation services. The general modeling ap-
proach is demonstrated by means of a small illustrative model, tested econometrically,
and then transferred onto a realistic model with full economic detail. The model is
applied with a stylized Zambian SAM. The paper emphasizes the positive effect of an
improved road network for market access, as well as its effects on home consumption and
small-scale farming. Surprisingly, the model does not predict growth in the marketing
of the agricultural products but an increased importance of the non-agricultural goods
in the consumption bundle instead. Furthermore, it has been shown that the effects of
infrastructure investment on income distribution strongly depend on the model assump-
tions. The effects are proportional to the increase in infrastructure; the model does not
show decreasing returns.
Chapter four extends the econometric analysis of infrastructure in the third chapter
and elaborates further on the econometric relationship between transport costs and the
status of the road network. The paper combines input-output data, road network data,
meteorological as well as geographical data in order to analyze the key factors determin-
ing transport costs across countries in a pooled estimation. The paper contributes to the
transportation literature by developing and applying a new measure for transport costs.
It uses the transport margin, i.e. the relative importance of transportation in overall sec-
toral production costs, as an internationally comparable and broadly available proxy for
transport costs, whilst making a distinction between sector-specific and country-group-
specific effects. Noteworthy differences between developed and developing countries are
identified, which leads to the conclusion that evidence on the success of road network
projects in industrialized countries cannot be easily transferred to the developing coun-
tries. Transport costs in industrialized states are strongly influenced by the road network
density, the population density and urbanization, whereas these variables are of minor
importance in the developing countries. For the latter, weather conditions and corrup-
tion are the most important determinants.
The last paper explores yet another important area of development policy: educa-
tional policy. It embeds the labor force effects from increased enrollment under different
circumstances within a very detailed recursive-dynamic CGE model. The main advance-
ment, as compared to other CGE studies in this field, lies in the explicit modeling of
the educational process itself. The analysis includes the production of human capital in
schools, the households' decision on time allocation for work and education respectively,
as well as the skill choice between different skill levels. The model carefully considers the
short term requirements in terms of skilled staff and physical schooling facilities, which
require financing in order to increase enrollment, as well as the long term effects of the
above on skilled labor provision. Moreover, the paper looks into the trade-off between
current foregone earnings from child labor and future possible returns from higher edu-
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cation, doing so by including child labor into the model. This is a major improvement
in comparison to other sequential dynamic educational models. The results of the model
simulations show that welfare and production effects from better education arise only if
both, schooling facilities and teachers, are available. Finally, the higher employment of
high-skilled personnel in the public sector is detrimental to the other sectors. Households
face an intertemporal trade-off as their short term income is indeed higher with lower en-
rollment and a positive effect from increased school attendance arises only in the medium
term. I have developed and applied a very elaborate robustness testing procedure which
is described in the paper in question.
The thesis concludes with the general lessons from the different applications hereby
shown. It emphasizes the contributions that the models make in the area of CGE mod-
eling for the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
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The West spent $2.3 trillion on foreign aid over the last five decades
and still had not managed to get twelve-cent medicines to children to
prevent half of all malaria deaths.
William Easterly, The White Man's Burden, 2006
2.1. Introduction
The question whether international aid is an effective instrument to foster sustainable
economic development has been on the agenda for a long time [see Friedman, 1958; Bauer,
1972, and others]. This debate gained momentum with Boone [1994] who surprisingly
found that aid had no impact on economic growth in developing countries. More recently,
Easterly [2003] and Rajan & Subramanian [2008] provide empirical evidence in the same
direction. In a comprehensive meta-study of the aid effectiveness literature Doucouliagos
& Paldam [2008] conclude that international aid has no significant influence on growth
in the recipient countries. Nonetheless, the discussion is far from being settled. A large
number of studies find positive effects from aid or at least positive conditional effects
[e.g. Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Hansen & Tarp, 2000]. Doucouliagos & Paldam [2010]
however, do not find reliable support for a positive conditional relationship either.
In search for a possible explanation for the fact that many aid recipients, especially
in Africa have not shown significant growth, several studies suggest that Dutch Disease
effects weaken the impact of aid on growth [see e.g. Elbadawi, 1999; Rajan & Subra-
manian, 2005; Fielding, 2007; Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009].1 Aid inflows tend to be
accompanied by an appreciation of the real exchange rate, a loss of international compet-
itiveness and a corresponding contraction of the export sector. On the other hand recent
studies by Adam & Bevan [2006] and Agenor et al. [2008] argue that these Dutch Disease
effects may be overstated. They may disappear in a dynamic context if they are more
than offset by large positive supply side effects. This holds as long as international aid
is channeled into investment in the public capital stock and allows for productivity and
output increases in the future. Moreover, Dutch Disease might depend on the production
structure of the recipient country. [See Bandara, 1995]
The econometric finding of aid ineffectiveness, the potential role of Dutch Disease ef-
fects as well as different possible spending patterns of development aid call for a more
disaggregate analysis. Against this background we explore the effects of additional aid
flows in a Computable General Equilibrium model. The CGE framework allows for a
detailed sectoral analysis. The simulations in this paper discriminate between different
spending strategies (i.e. using aid for recurrent expenditure, capital expenditure, sub-
sidies or transfer schemes) and consider different dimensions of aid effectiveness. Apart
from that the setup clearly distinguishes between the negative side effects from a real-
1Other studies explain the observed ineffectiveness of development aid with absorption problems [see
e.g. Heller, 2005; Torvik, 2001]. In general, the effectiveness of aid is likely to decrease with the degree
of aid dependency [see e.g. Lensink & White, 1999, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004].
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location of resources at the sectoral level (i.e. Dutch Disease effects) and the potential
positive effects from increased productivity.
CGE models have a long tradition in economics in general, and in development eco-
nomics in particular. Nevertheless, the list of references with respect to the effects of
international aid in these models is surprisingly short. Bandara [1995], Vos [1998], Adam
& Bevan [2002, 2006] and Agenor et al. [2008] use CGE models to investigate the effects
of large capital inflows to specific countries. These studies concentrate either on the
demand or the supply side. They typically focus on only one specific use of aid most
often public investment. All studies find evidence for aid-induced Dutch Disease effects
but differ in their assessment of the strength of these effects.
Bandara [1995] shows in a static model for Sri Lanka that the effects of aid depend
on the flexibility of the production structure in the receiving economy. He considers
different degrees of factor mobility across sectors which explain different sectoral output
and price responses. Vos [1998] uses a four sector dynamic general equilibrium model for
Pakistan with an integrated capital market. He finds that the strength of Dutch Disease
depends on the nature of the international transfer. It is more severe if aid takes the
form of grants and is directly transferred to the government compared to the effects of
foreign direct investment (FDI) or international loans. Adam & Bevan [2002, 2006] use
a four sector two factor dynamic model for Uganda. They conclude that initial Dutch
Disease effects could be overturned over time if all aid is productively invested and leads
to productivity gains but only if these favor the nontradeable sector. In addition, Adam
and Bevan find negative distributional effects. Agenor et al. [2008] use a dynamic one-
sector-one-household approach with a very elaborate government sector. Most aspects of
Dutch Disease are excluded from their model design as the highly aggregated setup does
not account for sectoral reallocation. Nevertheless, they conclude that negative effects
from aid could be avoided if the supply response is sufficiently large and the absorptive
capacity of the recipient country is sufficiently high. However, the underlying macro
model with only one representative household and one sector is clearly restrictive.
This paper provides a comprehensive account of the issues in a detailed CGE model
based on a real world data set. The simulation results are generated by an 11-sector-
5-household static CGE for Zambia. Zambia is one of the 50 least developed countries
and will probably receive substantially more aid in the near future [see OECD & AfDB,
2007]. The possible effects of these additional aid flows are analysed in a sequence of
simulations. We add to the aforementioned literature by explicitly modeling different
possible spending strategies available to the Zambian government.
In order to clearly discriminate between the immediate effects from spending and the
long-run productivity effects from public capital formation we adopt a two-stage ap-
proach. The first stage only covers demand effects, the second stage adds productivity
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effects. It is shown that the specific structure of the Zambian economy induces large sec-
toral shifts in production and makes the Zambian export sector very vulnerable if factors
are assumed to be mobile across sectors. Countries with similar economic profiles are
likely to experience comparably negative Dutch Disease effects from international aid.
Dutch Disease effects might be lower if the production factors in exporting sectors are
immobile. Furthermore, depending on the spending scenario, international aid may have
adverse effects on income distribution and make poor households worse off, not only in
relative but also in absolute terms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section defines the term
aid and outlines different dimensions of aid effectiveness. Section 3 describes the model.
Section 4 gives an overview of the data and describes the parametrisation. Section 5 mo-
tivates and describes the different spending scenarios. Section 6 presents the simulation
results. Section 7 concludes.
2.2. Aid and Aid Effectiveness
Most macroeconomic studies do not distinguish between different forms of aid as the
underlying data on its specific uses are typically unavailable. The data set in our CGE
model defines international aid as the amount of foreign grants reported in the govern-
ment budget. Hence the CGE model only covers official development assistance (ODA)
being paid to the government and reported in the budget.2 This covers only a part, but
still the majority of aid given to Zambia (about 70-80% of aid in recent years).3
Aid can be used for public consumption, public investment or for payments to the pri-
vate sector (social transfers and investment subsidies). Most previous CGE studies and
also most theoretical analyses on aid effectiveness assume that aid is used for productive
capital investment and increases public capital accumulation. However, a growing pro-
portion of aid is provided as direct budgetary support [see OECD & AfDB, 2006, p. 525]
and does not necessarily increase public capital accumulation. Fagernäs & Roberts [2004]
show that increased aid has a positive influence on recurrent expenditure and a negative
influence on tax disciplice in the receiving economy. For this reason this paper compares
five different spending scenarios. The benchmark case refers to the actual composition of
the government budget in Zambia in 2001 and assumes that aid is spent correspondingly.
The respective shares of the three possible uses of aid are then modified in order to focus
on the different spending strategies.
Our CGE model is a static model and captures mainly the steady state impact of aid,
2The aid variable does not cover private aid, humanitarian aid, technical assistance or tied aid and does
not explicitly account for military aid and short-term credits even though parts of the base year aid
might have belonged to these categories.
3This is not a major concern as the volume of base-year aid is only a scaling factor. In order to account
for this measurement problem, different increases in aid have been simulated in robustness checks.
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Figure 2.1.: Disentangling the different effects from increased aid
leaving aside the adjustment dynamics.4 It is based on a real data set from the base year
(2001).
The effectiveness of aid is measured in most macroeconomic studies only with respect
to economic growth [see Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2008]. This paper broadens the per-
spective and evaluates three different types of indicators. The simulations illustrate the
effects of increased aid on sectoral and aggregate production, the trade balance as well
as on welfare and income distribution. Following this broader assessment aid will be
considered effective as long as it promotes growth and international trade and leads to
(over-proportional) increases of the income of poor households, i.e. in the case of Zam-
bia the income of small farmers and self-employed. It will be shown that there exists a
trade-off between these objectives for Zambia.
Figure 2.1 provides a brief overview of the different types of aid effects. A first dis-
tinction can be drawn between demand and supply side effects. Demand side effects are
mainly direct effects from the spending of aid in the recipient country. Governments tend
to use aid mainly for the purchase of non-tradeable goods. The first and most direct effect
from aid will be increased demand for non-tradeables. This increase in domestic demand
leads to rising domestic prices of non-tradeables relative to tradeables' prices that are
4CGE models with a focus on development issues are often specified as static models partly because
of generally low savings and investment rates in those countries. For this reason endogenous private
capital accumulation plays a smaller role and the simulation results from a static model provide to
a first approximation a broadly reliable guide to the ultimate long-term effects of development aid.
Nevertheless, the paper needs to introduce some aspects of (quasi)-dynamics in order to evaluate the
impact of the different spending scenarios on a comparable basis. The impact of spending may be
short-term (such as on public consumption) or of a longer-term nature via the stock of public capital
which generates lasting productivity effects. Jensen [2009] provides a disaggregated perspective on
the investment-productivity link for one specific form of public capital, roads,
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fixed on world markets, i.e. to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The receiving
government can use aid either for recurrent or for capital expenditure, recurrent spending
normally comprises only non-tradeable goods (public services). The share of imported
goods increases with the importance of capital investment in the aid-financed expendi-
ture. Alternatively, the government could transfer inflowing aid to the private sector
where it allows for higher consumption or higher investment. The resulting increase in
imports again depends on the type of spending as consumption is dominated by domestic
goods whereas investment requires imports. In general, the size of the demand-driven
Dutch Disease effects might be limited if factors are not fully mobile between tradeable
and non-tradeable sectors.
The supply side effects mostly arise from productive public investment and increased
public capital accumulation. The government may use the additional funds for public
capital accumulation as Adam & Bevan [2006] assume in their model of aid effectiveness.
Aid may be invested in health and education programs which increase labor productivity.
Or it may be used for infrastructure investment which increases total factor productivity
[see Agenor et al., 2008; Jensen, 2009]. Aid could also be transferred to private investors
and hence add directly to private capital accumulation. These productivity effects have
the potential to increase domestic supply and to reduce Dutch Disease effects. In general,
the spending of additional aid incurs sectoral shifts in production. The direction of these
sectoral reallocations depends on differences in factor intensity, the share of imported
intermediates and productivity effects from aid [see Heller, 2005].
Distributional effects from aid result from changes in the relative goods and factor
prices. Undesirable distributional effects might occur as increased demand and prices
might lead to a rise in the return to high-skilled labor which is mainly an income source
of wealthy households. The rise in domestic prices could be to the detriment of the
poor. The overall distributional consequences can only be captured in an CGE model
which keeps track of all changes in goods and factor prices. Furthermore household
specific consumption patterns, also with respect to subsistence agriculture, can fully be
addressed.
2.3. The Computable General Equilibrium Model
The model draws partly on the Tanzania model and the MPSGE version of the IFPRI
model by Thomas Rutherford [see Rutherford, 2003] but it has been completed by a
number of new features and aid-specific elements. It is written in GAMS/MPSGE vec-
tor syntax [see Rutherford, 1999]. Compared to standard developing country CGEs the
model has a very detailed government account and allows for different uses of aid. More-
over, it includes a productivity parameter which depends endogenously on the amount
of aid spent on public investment. In the following we describe the basic features of the
Zambia model and its parametrisation.
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Figure 2.2.: Nesting structure of domestic production xd(i)
2.3.1. Production
Production in Zambia is disaggregated into eleven sectors of production, three of which
are agricultural, five industrial and three are services. In each sector output is produced
from a specific combination of intermediate inputs, capital, land and two different types
of labor.
xdi = xdi
∑
j
+
intj,i,
+
fdi(skl, unskl, cap, land)
 (2.1)
where intj,i is the intermediate demand for good j in sector i and fdi is the demand
for factors (skilled labor, unskilled labor, capital and land) in sector i. In the baseline
specification, labor and capital are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors. The
production process is modeled using a nested production function as shown in figure 2.2.
Skilled labor and capital are imperfect substitutes in a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion with a corresponding elasticity of substitution (s=1). We assume the substitutability
between unskilled labor and skilled labor/capital to be more limited (s=0.5). The com-
bination with land takes the form of a Leontief production function (s=0). Substitution
between different intermediates or between intermediates and factors of production is
again ruled out by the assumption of Leontief functions (s=0).5
Domestic production is either sold on (domestic or foreign) markets (xi) or directly
consumed at home (hci,h):
xdi = xi +
∑
h
hci,h (2.2)
Zambia is modeled as an Armington economy. Domestic goods are imperfect sub-
5Note that other nesting structures have been examined in robustness checks and do not have an
influence on the qualitative simulation results.
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stitutes for foreign goods. Domestically produced goods are combined with imported
supply in a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function to form the Armington
aggregate which is sold on domestic markets. Domestically produced goods may also be
exported, but production of exports differs from production for local markets. This is
implemented using a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function.
ai = ai
(
+
xdomi ,
+
imi
)
(2.3)
xi = x
dom
i (
+
pdi) + exi(
+
pwi) (2.4)
where xdomi is the part of domestic production which is sold domestically and imi and
exi are imports and exports in sector i respectively. The structure of the supply side is
shown in figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3.: Production, marketing and consumption the economy
2.3.2. Demand
Domestic demand consists of household demand, government consumption, investment
and intermediate demand. Intermediate demand is linearly linked to the quantity of out-
put. Household demand and government spending and investment are described below.
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The model has five household types which differ in their main source of income, their
level of income, their income tax rate6 and in their marginal propensity to save. House-
holds generate income from labor, capital, land and entrepreneurial activities. Apart
from these income sources households receive transfers from other households, from the
government and from abroad. Income is used for tax payments, consumption, transfer
payments and savings7:
yh = yh
∑
f
+
fsf,h · pff ,
+
enth · pe,
∑
g
+
transg,h,
+
govtransh,
+
ftransh
 (2.5)
ch = ch
(
+
yh,
−
sh,
∑
g
−
transh,g,
−
tdh,
∑
i
+
hci,h,
−
pch
)
(2.6)
Where yh is the income of household h, fsf,h is the factor supply of factor f by house-
hold h, with pf being the respective wages. Enth is incomce from entrepreneurial activity,
with pe being the respective wage. trans is the matrix of interhousehold transfers and
govtrans and ftrans are the vectors of government transfers and foreign transfers re-
spectively. ch is the consumption of household h, sh are savings of household h and td are
direct taxes on household income, pch is the price of the household-specific consumption
bundle. Details on the different household types are given in table 2.4 in the appendix
(A).
The government generates income (ygov) from taxes, public capital and international
aid (aid).
ygov = ygov
(∑
h
tdh, te,
∑
i
vati,
∑
i
tari,
∑
i
tii, entgov, aid
)
(2.7)
Where td and te are direct taxes on household and enterprise income respectively, vati
are value added taxes, tari is income from tariffs, tii are indirect production taxes in
sector i, entgov is income from public enterprises.
cgov · pg = ygov − pubinv − subs− interest−
∑
h
govtransh (2.8)
It spends its revenue on public consumption (cgov · pg), transfers to households, subsi-
dies (subs), interest payments (interest) to the rest of the world and public investment
(pubinv). Transfers, subsidies and interest payments are exogenously fixed. The only
good the government consumes are public services. Public investment consists mainly of
construction and to a smaller extent of capital goods. In contrast to most other CGE
applications the government does not only act as a mere redistributor but has in addition
6In contrast to the Tanzania model, income tax revenues rise in proportion with the income level and
differ across households. This implies that the government indirectly benefits from increased transfers
and rising wages.
7A substantial part of household consumption is directly satisfied from their own production of food,
the so-called home consumption. It is important to include this into the model as this production is
not marketed but must be accounted for in the assessment of the strength of welfare effects.
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a distinct consumption and investment function.8 This allows for the identification of
the specific effects from government spending compared to private spending. Only this
disaggregated view on the government allows for a complete picture of Dutch Disease
effects from aid. These might in fact differ from traditional Dutch Disease from resource
booms or other windfall gains. By means of the government-specific consumption and
investment functions it is possible to clearly distinguish the effects of different forms of
increased government spending.
Savings are generated by households, enterprises and the rest of the world. Savings
are used for private capital investment. Total investment is always chosen to equal total
savings. Investment demand for the two investment goods is determined in a Leontief
fashion.
2.3.3. Modeling of aid
Aid is specified as grants to the government, which may use it for its own spending pur-
poses or transfer it to the private sector. Aid is taken as a financial transfer from the rest
of the world which allows the country to finance additional net imports. This assumption
implies an extension of the balance of payments from additional international aid [see
Bandara, 1995, p.316-317]. This net trade balance will be held fixed across all following
scenarios in order to allow for a valid comparison across policy scenarios.
The scaling up of aid is implemented using a multiplier with the initial level of aid in
the government's income equation. The respective use of aid is modeled by the choice
of the shares of the different components in the budget. The government may use the
additional aid either for public consumption, public investment, transfers, subsidies or
for a combination of these elements.
2.3.4. Sector-specific factors
Dutch Disease effects, i.e. an expansion of the production of non-tradeables at the
expense of tradeable sectors, are driven by migration of factors from tradeable to non-
tradeable sectors. The first face high competition on world markets and thus have no
possibility to increase prices and wages. Hence, Dutch Disease effects would be limited
if either factors are not (completely) mobile across sectors or if factor supply would not
be fixed, in our case if the effective factor supply would increase with public investment
financed by aid. We model both situations, separately, in order to show to which extent
Dutch Disease might be limited.
Most of the labor force in our dataset is unskilled. These workers have only finished
primary school or even not finished primary school. Thus we assume that these work-
ers do not accumulate sector-specific human capital and labor should not be considered
8To our knowledge a combination of government specific consumption and investment in one model has
so far not been implemented in aid-focused developing country CGEs.
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as potentially sector specific. The exporting sectors are mining, manufactured mining
products and agricultural exports. These sectors suffer from potential loss of their pro-
duction factors. As most exports depend on mining production, we focus our simulations
concerning sector specific factors on the mining sector. Given that this sector is highly
capital-intensive and capital in mining is very specialised, we assume in some of our
simulations that capital in mining is sector-specific and the supply is fixed.
2.3.5. Modeling of productivity effects
The productivity effects from increased public investment are captured as in Markusen
[2002] by introducing a multiplier on factor endowments. An increase in total factor
productivity leads hence to an increase in the effective supply of factors. It is assumed
that the increase in total factor productivity is uniform across all factors and also across
sectors.9 In the benchmark scenario the respective parameter is set to unity, such that
effective factor supply equals the actual factor supply in the base year. In the counter-
factual, public capital formation increases the effective supply of factors of production.
The respective elasticity of total factor productivity with respect to public investment is
taken from the literature. Our parameter choice is based on the numerous estimations
of Hulten [1996]. He estimates this elasticity to be between 0.12 and 0.25 depending on
the specification of the model. These two values have been used.10
2.4. Data and Parameterisation
2.4.1. Data
Zambia is very aid dependent, almost 30% of the government budget is financed by
external assistance [see OECD & AfDB, 2007, p.552]. Public capital formation relies
strongly on external support: up to 70-80% is financed by external sources. In 2001,
the base year of our analysis, total ODA (grants and loans) disbursed to Zambia from
the OECD countries amounted to roughly 11% of the Zambian GDP [see SourceOECD,
2007]. The Zambian government draws the financing of its Poverty Reduction Strategy
(PRS) largely upon increased aid flows even though these are conditional on the im-
plementation of institutional and accounting reforms [see OECD & AfDB, 2007, p.552].
The Zambian aid receipts have been used for public capital accumulation especially in
infrastructure but also for the health and education sectors as well as for administrative
reforms. For Zambia the assumption by Adam & Bevan [2006] that most or all aid is
used for public capital formation is not appropriate. Even though grants and total ODA
9Jensen [2009] models the productivity effects from public investment more specifically by modeling the
reduction in transport costs due to road investments, unfortunately this captures only a part (appr.
20% in the Zambian case) of total public investment. We chose this rather general way of modeling
the productivity gains from public investment as our focus lies on the comparison of different uses as
opposed to the detailed investigation of one specific use only.
10An elasticity of 0.12 means that doubling public investment would increase the effective factor supply
by 12%. Other values have been tested in robustness checks. Note that Adam & Bevan [2006] use a
somewhat higher value of 0.5.
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(including loans) have recently increased relative to GDP, public capital accumulation
has fallen relative to GDP. Increased aid has not resulted in increased public investment
[see OECD & AfDB, 2008, p.619].
In 2006, the Zambian domestic production was structured as follows: 20% were pro-
duced in the agricultural sector, 32% in the industrial sector and 49% in the services
sector.11 Zambian exports rely mainly on three sectors: Mining, which contributed 4%
to the 2006 GDP and roughly 60% to total exports, traditional agricultural products
(coffee, tea, tobacco, sugar, cotton) and manufactured copper products (rods and wires)
which constitute another 20% of Zambian exports. The main Zambian imports are cap-
ital goods, manufactured goods and processed food.12 The main consumption goods are
agricultural products, mostly food but also manufactured goods and private and public
services.
Most parameters, such as expenditure shares for households, the government and the
investment function, as well as parameters for production technologies and preferences
can be computed directly from the data.13 The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) has been
suitably aggregated for the purpose of this analysis. This data has been complemented
with data from the national accounts for foreign grant inflows and interest payments.14
2.4.2. Parameterisation
For Zambia, like for most developing countries, estimated elasticities of substitution and
transformation are unavailable. For convenience, Cobb-Douglas and Leontief functions
are mainly used for the production functions. This conforms with most other CGE appli-
cations and also with empirical results confirming that substitutability between factors
is very limited in developing countries [see Duffy & Papageorgiou, 2000; Agenor et al.,
2008]. The Armington function elasticities have been chosen as in other developing coun-
try applications between 0.4 for capital goods and manufacturing and 1.5 for agricultural
products [see Dervis et al., 1982].15 For exports it is assumed that in agricultural sec-
tors the shift from domestic supply to export supply is easier than in the other sectors,
whereas in manufacturing and capital goods production it is rather costly to switch to
a different destination market. Elasticities of transformation are specified between -0.5
in manufacturing and capital goods and -1.1 mining and basic food processing. World
market prices are exogenous and act as a numeraire in the model.
11Data for 2006 taken from Kufa et al. [2008, p. 3]. The Zambian production and consumption structure
in the base year (2001) is given in table 2.2 in the appendix.
12See table 2.3 in the appendix for more information on the trade structure.
13The basic SAM has been provided by the International Food Policy Research Institute. It is described
in detail by Thurlow et al. [2004].
14National accounts data has been taken from the statistical appendices of different IMF-Country reports
on Zambia, mainly Akatu et al. [2006] and IMF [2005], and the Zambian Poverty Reduction strategy
paper [see Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2002] as well as the Public Expenditure Reviews
and the OECD African Economic Outlook [see OECD & AfDB, 2007; OECD & AfDB, 2008].
15Alternative specifications have been tested in robustness checks.
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2.5. Spending scenarios
The Zambia model is used to simulate alternative spending scenarios for the additional
aid inflows. Results will be presented for a 45% increase in grants which corresponds
to about 2.5% of the Zambian GDP and lies in between the average annual increase in
the recent past and the expected increase given in the Fifth National Development plan.16
Four core strategies are distinguished for the use of additional aid. It could be spent
on public investment, enhancing the infrastructure, enlarging the public capital in health
and education and aiming at a broad increase in total factor productivity. It could be
used for public consumption i.e. public services especially on current expenditures for
health and education to enhance the social and health situation and the living standard
especially of the poor. Or it could be transferred to the private sector where it may be
spent either on private consumption or on private investment. All other possible spend-
ing strategies (i.e. forms of aid) represent hybrid forms of the above.
Most previous CGE applications on increased aid assume that the additional resources
are entirely invested or even that if aid enters the country in the form of imported capital
goods. For the sake of comparison an investment-only scenario is simulated here, too.
A growing proportion of aid is allocated in form of budgetary support [see OECD &
AfDB, 2007], which means that a part of it will also be spent on recurrent expenditure.
In addition, it can be observed in Zambia like in many other countries, that aid simply
substitutes for the public investment budget of the government and thus indirectly raises
the recurrent expenditure as the tax receipts are now redirected towards recurrent pur-
poses [see Fagernäs & Roberts, 2004]. In view of the growing importance of budgetary
support and the possible shift in the use of tax receipts, it is very likely that aid will
also increase recurrent expenditure. In consequence a hybrid scenario with a proportion
of aid used for public consumption and for transfers to private households is simulated
here as well. A pure public consumption scenario completes the spectrum of possible
spending scenarios. The results of 14 scenarios are presented in table 2.1.
We first simulate the direct effects from increased public spending in particular sectors.
We call these the demand-driven effects. In a second step we add features to the model
that potentially limit Dutch Disease effects: Limited intersectoral factor mobility and
increased factor productivity from public investment financed by aid.
2.6. Simulation results
This section presents the key simulation results starting with the aggregate and sectoral
effects on production followed by the trade balance effects and closing with the welfare
16See Zambian Ministry of Finance and National Planning [2005, p.242-245]. Increases in aid between
15 and 100% have been tested in robustness tests. The qualitative results remain robust, the extent
of the effects is almost linearly linked to the amount of aid provided.
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Table 2.1.: Spending scenarios
Stage 1 - Direct spending effects
Index Scenario Description
NAIV Proportional
increase
Reference scenario. Government spending pattern from
the benchmark SAM is retained. Budgetary support.
Public consumption (58%), public investment (24%),
transfers (18%).
PUBINV Public investment Additional aid is entirely invested by the government.
Programme/Project aid. Infrastructure, health and san-
itation, education.
PUBCONS Public consump-
tion
Additional aid entirely used for government consump-
tion. Aid finances current expenditure on health, edu-
cation and public administration.
PRIVINV Private invest-
ment
Additional aid fully transformed into private investment
(e.g. micro-credits).
TRANS Transfer scenario Additional aid fully transferred to private households
and used for consumption and savings.
Stage 1 - Scenarios with sector-specific capital in mining
NAIV_CAP Proportional
increase, mining-
specific capital
Strategy corresponds to scenario NAIV but capital in
the mining sector is sector specific.
PUBINV_CAP Public invest-
ment, mining-
specific capital
Strategy corresponds to scenario PUBINV but capital
in the mining sector is sector specific.
PUBCONS_CAP Public consump-
tion, mining-
specific capital
Strategy corresponds to scenario PUBCONS but capital
in the mining sector is sector specific.
PRIVINV_CAP Private invest-
ment, mining-
specific capital
Strategy corresponds to scenario PRIVINV but capital
in the mining sector is sector specific.
TRANS_CAP Transfer scenario,
mining-specific
capital
Strategy corresponds to scenario TRANS but capital in
the mining sector is sector specific.
Stage 2 - Scenarios with productivity effects
NAIV_LOW Proportional
increase, low
productivity
Strategy corresponds to scenario NAIV. 1% increase in
public investment ⇒ 0.12% productivity effect.
NAIV_HIGH Proportional
increase, high
productivity
Strategy corresponds to scenario NAIV. 1% increase in
public investment ⇒ 0.25% productivity effect.
PUBINV_LOW Public invest-
ment, low pro-
ductivity
Strategy corresponds to scenario PUBINV. 1% increase
in public investment ⇒ 0.12% productivity effect.
PUBINV_HIGH Public invest-
ment, high pro-
ductivity
Strategy corresponds to scenario PUBINV. 1% increase
in public investment ⇒ 0.25% productivity effect.
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and distributional effects. First the demand driven effects (stage 1) are presented, in the
second part of this section, a productivity response to public investment is included (stage
2). The sensitivity analysis reveals to which extent the assumed share of investment
spending in the use of aid as well as the assumed strength of the productivity effects
influence the results.
2.6.1. Stage 1 - Demand driven (spending) effects
Due to the exogenous fixed supply of all factors of production, an increase of spending
from aid is bound to leave the economy without noteworthy immediate aggregate output
effects. The simulations confirm that aid has no significant impact on aggregate real
GDP as long as it is used for non-investment purposes or, if it is invested, lacks to have
any effects on productivity.17 At a disaggregated level only few sectors strongly benefit
from the additional aid flows whereas production in most other sectors remains largely
unchanged or diminishes slightly. The expansion of the construction sector (from pub-
lic investment) and the public services sector (from public consumption) comes at the
expense of the contraction of the two main exporting sectors mining and agricultural
exports. Figure 2.4 shows the percentage changes in sectoral production. The mining
sector which is the most important export sector and contributes about 60% to Zambian
exports, suffers in almost all scenarios from the most severe decline in production. In
most cases the exporting sector agricultural exports suffers, too. The transfer scenario
hurts agricultural exports most strongly. The rise in transfers goes primarily to the poor
who spend their income almost exclusively on food. The resulting price increase for food
encourages domestic food producers to reallocate their production from exports toward
domestic supply. The contraction of output in mining and agriculture is accompanied by
a fall in their corresponding exports.18
The sectoral production and trade effects result from a reallocation of productive re-
sources from the exporting sectors to the non-tradeable sectors construction and public
services. The mining sector, in particular, suffers from a fall in its used capital and in
its employed work force, especially of skilled labor. Mining production is very capital
intensive and employs a high share of the Zambian capital stock. The sector loses up to
10% of its capital stock and up to 15% of its skilled labor force. Given the importance
of the mining sector for the Zambian economy this result should be taken very seriously.
The factor reallocation is illustrated for the case of skilled labor in figure 2.5.
If only a small proportion of aid is used in a way that increases factor productivity,
like e.g. budgetary support, most sectors are hit by negative effects on their sectoral
17The results are therefore not shown here. In the robustness checks we alternatively introduce unem-
ployed unskilled labor. This does not affect the qualitative results as unskilled labor is not a perfect
substitute for skilled labor or capital. The consideration of initial unemployment has some effects on
income distribution but it has been left out of the basic models for the sake of simplicity and due to
a lack of reliable data on unemployment levels.
18Sectoral trade effects are not shown here for brevity.
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Figure 2.4.: Effect of aid on sectoral production
Figure 2.5.: Effect of aid on the sectoral use of skilled labor
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production, exports and employment. In these cases only those sectors benefit which
are directly addressed by government spending, namely construction and public services.
The additional private income does not translate into noteworthy effects on the other
sectors and exporting sectors are clearly worse off. Overall, the sectoral simulation results
provide a more complete picture of the effects from increased public spending financed
by aid compared to the aggregate results alone. The shift of production and factor use
from exporting to domestic sectors clearly documents considerable Dutch Disease effects
from international aid.
Figure 2.6.: Effect of aid on the trade balance
As regards to the trade balance effects, the increase in international aid allows for
an increased current account deficit. The increased deficit could either make room for
increased imports, like e.g. Heller [2005] proposes, or for reduced exports. In all scenar-
ios a mixture of both arises but some scenarios are biased in favor of increased imports
whereas especially the consumption scenarios (NAIV, PUBCONS and TRANS) lead to
decreasing exports.19 Figure 2.6 shows that the consumption scenarios in particular are
followed by declining exports whereas in the full investment scenarios (PUBINV and
PRIVINV) imports rise substantially. In comparison with private investment public in-
vestment falls to a larger extent on construction and less on imported capital goods. The
Dutch Disease effect on domestic exports is smallest in the case of private investment
19Torvik [2001] and Adam & O'Connell [2004] argue that Dutch Disease and the downward pressure on
the export sector could be aggravated through negative learning by doing effects. A decline in output
in the exporting sector causes a fall in productivity in these sectors and a further loss of international
competitiveness. These additional, mutually reinforcing effects of Dutch Disease remain outside the
scope of the present analysis.
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(-4%). In contrast, an increase in public consumption induces the strongest Dutch Dis-
ease effects as the increased public demand falls almost exclusively on public services as
a non-tradeable domestic good.
If aid leads to an increased demand for non-tradeable goods it will raise their rela-
tive price as production capacities are limited. This price increase or real appreciation
attracts factors of production to the non-tradeable sectors and leads to a reduction in
exports. The real appreciation is weaker in the private investment scenario but it is of
noteworthy size in all scenarios.20 It follows that even if aid is mainly invested some
Dutch Disease effects are likely. This results from the specific structure of exports in
Zambia which is highly concentrated and specialised. There exist only two important
export sectors which produce about 90% of Zambian exports. These sectors sell their
production almost entirely on world markets.
In order to assess aid effectiveness the choice of the adequate welfare measure is cru-
cial. Most CGE applications use as welfare measures either the Hicks equivalent change
in household income or real GDP.21 The Hicks equivalent change in welfare is the percent-
age change in real private consumption. Note, however, that the presence of government
spending requires additional measures. The Hicks equivalent does not include public
spending if it does not enter the households' consumption bundle. Correspondingly, an
increase in public consumption does not have a direct impact on private welfare measured
by the Hicks equivalent. For the sake of comparison, we also provide a broader measure
including public spending and present the percentage change in aggregate real private
and public spending. While the Hicks equivalent as the conventional welfare measure is
more accurate as it is defined in equivalent terms, the broader measure including real
public consumption assumes that public spending is exactly as valuable as private spend-
ing and in addition is not defined as equivalent change. This measure alone is likely to
overstate the welfare effect but it allows for a comparison of the different scenarios.
An increase in aid raises the Hicksian equivalent even if it is not or unproductively
invested. The strength of the welfare effect depends on the use of aid. The effect is higher
in public investment and transfer scenarios. Figure 2.7 summarizes the welfare effects
in the different scenarios. Note that if aid is completely spent on public consumption
it has a negative effect on the Hicks equivalent change in income. This is due to the
fact that the Hicks equivalent only measures welfare of private households. In contrast
the broader welfare (TOTEXP) measure including real public spending on consumption
or investment rises substantially in almost all scenarios except for spending on private
investment.
Even though only 24% of aid is invested in the NAIV scenario, the effect on the Hick-
20Results for the real exchange rate are shown in 2.5 in the appendix.
21See for example Rutherford & Tarr [2008].
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Figure 2.7.: Effect of aid using alternative welfare measures
sian equivalent is relatively strong. This follows from the fact that 18% of aid are directly
transferred to private households and thus directly add to private welfare. The same is
true for the TRANS scenario in which all aid directly enters private spending.
Adam & Bevan [2006] point out in their simulations of disaggregated welfare effects
that additional aid always leaves the rural households relatively worse off. Figure 2.8
shows the changes in the Hicksian equivalent for different household types across scenar-
ios. The distributional effects clearly depend on the assumed spending pattern. In the
consumption-focused scenarios (NAIV, PUBCONS and TRANS) income effects favor
the rural households (57.6% of the population) and run against self-employed house-
holds (21.5% of the population) and employers (1% of the population). In contrast, in
the investment-focused scenarios (PUBINV and PRIVINV) the distributional effects are
more balanced. Nonetheless, across all scenarios the self-employed benefit only underpro-
portionally from aid-induced welfare gains or are even absolutely worse off in real terms.
The same is true for employers but this is only a small group.
Small and medium farms represent the largest and poorest group of the population.
They earn most of their income from unskilled labor and spend almost 90% of it for
food, most of their consumption is home-produced. These households receive the major-
ity of public transfers. The second-largest and -poorest group are self-employed micro-
entrepreneurs. These earn most of their income from entrepreneurial activities and re-
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Figure 2.8.: Effects of aid on household incomes
ceive only a minor part of public transfers. Home production is of less importance in
their consumption bundle which has a high share of food as well. Households of for-
mally employed constitute another fifth of the Zambian population. These households
earn income from labor and entrepreneurial activities and receive a substantial amount
of public transfers, too. Large-scale farmers and employers constitute the richest part of
the population. While large farm households generate income from both forms of labor
and to a smaller extent from capital and entrepreneurial activity, employers receive most
of their income from enterprise earnings. Both spend less than half of their income on
food.22
22Concerning income distribution across household types several relevant aspects are included in the
CGE, such as changes in all goods prices, factor prices and incomes. Furthermore we include
household-type specific consumption patterns and factor endowments. Finally the importance of
home produced and consumed food is fully taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the distributional
results have to be interpreted with some caution. The five different household types represent ex-
tremely different shares of the Zambian population. A comprehensive assessment of the distributional
impact requires data on the basis of deciles of the population.
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2.6.2. Demand-driven effects with imperfect factor mobility
The previous section showed that additional aid inflows induce a downward pressure on
domestic exports - in the Zambian case mainly copper. These effects are strongest if
the spending strategy of the government focuses on non-tradeables. The effects are still
noteworthy if the government spends parts of the additional income on (tradeable) capi-
tal goods. These strong shifts in the sectoral production structure and the real exchange
rate appreciation are mainly driven by production factor reallocation from the tradeable
to the non-tradeable sectors (see figure 2.5).
It is plausible to assume that unskilled labor is mobile across sectors in Zambia, given
the very low qualification of the majority of the Zambian labor force (more than 98%
of the labor force in our dataset do not have finished a secondary school) and most sec-
tors, especially the agricultural sectors, are labor-intensive. In contrast to labor, capital
might, in some sectors, be sector-specific. In the Zambian case this is of special impor-
tance given the high dependency of the Zambian exports on copper and copper products.
Capital in mining may be assumed to be (at least partly) sector-specific. In contrast to
other countries where exports often rely on labor-intensive goods and Dutch Disease is
driven by a movement of labor [see e.g. Barder, 2006; Bandara, 1995], the reallocation
effect might be overestimated in the scenarios described above, given the importance of
capital for Zambian exports. For these reasons we rerun our simulations with capital in
mining being fully sector-specific.
Looking at the sectoral production effects of a 45% increase in aid with mining-specific
capital, Dutch Disease effects are slightly reduced compared to figure 2.4. The size of the
sectoral reallocation in total is smaller and the negative effect on mining disappears. Still,
the negative effect on agricultural exports, which are labor intensive, even increases. The
burden of adjustment has now shifted to another export sector - from mining to agricul-
ture. This effect is most pronounced in the transfer scenario where agricultural exports
fall by more than 12%.
Given the importance of copper for the Zambian trade balance it is not surprising
that with unchanged copper production, the aggregate trade balance effect shown above
is also reduced. The inflowing foreign exchange is now in most scenarios used for an
increase in imports instead of a reduction in exports. The qualitative ordering of the
tradebalance effects across policy scenarios remains unchanged.
Regarding welfare total expenditure (TOTEXP) remains unchanged compared to the
scenarios in the previous section. In contrast, the Hicks' equivalent change in welfare
is higher in all scenarios compared to above especially in the TRANS scenario. This
increased real welfare effect results from the fact that prices are less affected in this case
and thus the spending effect leads to a higher real effect on welfare. However, the result
remains that the scenarios with weaker Dutch Disease (PUBINV and PRIVINV) also
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Figure 2.9.: Effect of aid on sectoral production with mining-specific capital
Figure 2.10.: Effect of aid on the trade balance with mining-specific capital
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come with a smaller increase in welfare.23 The increased aggregate welfare is distributed
differently across households. In comparison to the scenarios with mobile capital the
distribution hurts owners of small and medium farms in all scenarios except for the
transfer scenario. Thus, if capital owners suffer with mobile capital, land owners suffer if
capital in mining is fixed. This can be explained by the strong pressure on agricultural
exports that leads to a downward pressure on land rents.
Figure 2.11.: Effects of aid on household incomes with mining-specific capital
Briefly summarized we find that in the special case of a highly specialized economy
with a sector-specific factor in the main export sector, Dutch Disease effects will be less
severe compared to the standard case with perfect factor mobility. Nonetheless, the
conclusion remains that positive immediate welfare effects and the prevention of Dutch
Disease might be conflicting policy goals. In addition in the case with sector-specific
factors other exporting sectors might suffer even more and the factors used intensively
in these sectors face declining returns.
23See figure 2.16 in the appendix.
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2.6.3. Productivity (supply) effects
Adam & Bevan [2006] and Agenor et al. [2008] argue that aid-induced Dutch Disease
effects may be compensated by large positive effects on the supply side as the overall
productivity rises. They assume that aid is used for the provision of public infrastruc-
ture which increases the labor productivity as well as the access to markets. We therefore
introduce a productivity response to public investment. This is relevant in the budgetary
support scenario (NAIV) and in the public investment scenario (PUBINV). We present
the respective reference cases without productivity effects from the previous section and
add two productivity simulations for each of the two scenarios. If some or all aid is
invested and if public investment is assumed to have a stimulating effect on total factor
productivity, it has positive effects on GDP. This holds even if only a small part of the
aid is invested, like in the scenarios NAIV_LOW and NAIV_HIGH in which only 24%
of the additional aid are invested. Unsurprisingly, the effect on real GDP is strongest
in the case in which all additional aid is invested and where total factor productivity
is expected to have a high elasticity of 0.25 with respect to public investment (scenario
PUBINV_HIGH).
Figure 2.12.: Effect of aid on output with productivity effects
The enhanced productivity alleviates the restriction on factor supply and hence damp-
ens the rise in the prices of increasingly demanded goods. The real exchange rate response
to aid should therefore be weakened in these scenarios. Even though the real appreciation
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is less severe if aid is assumed to enhance productivity, the effect is not overturned. This
stands in contrast with Adam & Bevan [2006] where much stronger productivity effects
are assumed and a real depreciation occurs in some cases.
The aggregate results show that the Dutch Disease effects are not fully neutralised.
This is also confirmed at the disaggregate level. A general production effect across all
sectors is only found as long as all aid is invested and generates large productivity effects.
However, even in the scenarios with productivity effects, the exporting sectors benefit
only underproportionately from aid. Figure 2.13 shows the effects on sectoral production.
Figure 2.13.: Effect of productive aid on sectoral production
The productivity gain from public investment allows for a general increase in produc-
tion. As a consequence exports may rise in line with imports. This is illustrated in two
cases in figure 2.14. It is shown that positive effects on exports require a high proportion
of aid spent on investment accompanied by sufficiently strong productivity effects.
Figure 2.17 in the appendix shows the effects on welfare and income distribution. The
strength of the income effect depends positively on the share of international aid go-
ing into public investment and on the assumed strength of the productivity response.
Similarly the likelihood of individual household types to face a real decline in income
decreases. Small farm households receive a substantial amount of transfer income which
is independent from the level of productivity. Therefore, these households improve their
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Figure 2.14.: Effect of productive aid on the trade balance
relative position in the budgetary support scenario. In contrast, the other household
types predominantly receive factor incomes which rise in line with productivity. Hence,
the relative position of employees, employers and self-employed households improves with
the strength of the assumed productivity effects and the share of public investment. It
can be concluded that the government may have to compensate poor rural households if
it invests most of the aid productively.24
2.7. Conclusions
This paper evaluates by means of a multi-sector-multi-household CGE model for Zambia
the aggregate and sectoral effects of international aid, its trade balance effects as well as
the implications for welfare and income distribution. At the aggregate level, the effect
of international aid on production is generally fairly small, unless a high proportion of
aid is invested and leads to gains in total factor productivity. If aid is spent for other
purposes, it clearly induces considerable Dutch Disease effects, especially in case that
factors are mobile.
While the spending of aid leads to an expansion of some sectors in the economy, in
particular the production of non-tradeable goods, it generally hurts the exporting sec-
tors via a substantial real appreciation. A more detailed analysis of sectoral reallocation
shows that the most important export sector mining suffers strongly from the real ap-
24The distributional results from the public investment scenarios are consistent with those in Adam &
Bevan [2006].
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preciation and the migration of its production factors to other sectors. Even if the total
effective supply of factors increases due to public investment and gains in total factor
productivity, the mining sector benefits only underproportionately and experiences a rel-
ative decline. As this sector is quantitatively very significant for the Zambian economy
this effect should be taken very seriously. These simulation results for production and
trade generally lend support to the view of Heller [2005] who calls for aid being used to
eliminate bottlenecks on the supply side by investment and increased imports of capital
goods. A high proportion of aid should be invested with the particular aim to enhance
productivity. Moreover, the investment projects ought be targeted in favor of the ex-
porting industries in order to reduce Dutch Disease effects. However, in recent years the
Zambian public capital formation has stagnated or even decreased relative to GDP even
though aid and GDP have increased.
Dutch Disease effects are less pronounced if in the main export sector, the main pro-
duction factor is sector-specific. This holds in particular if we assume mining-specific
capital, which limits the movement of factors to non-tradeable sectors. This assumption
is implausible for the other important export sector, agriculture, which mainly employs
mobile unskilled labor. For this reason the burden of adjustment shifts to those exporting
sectors that predominantly employ mobile factors.
Given the growing importance of budgetary support in the Zambian aid receipts, the
scenarios with a mixed spending pattern have to be regarded as most realistic. If aid
leads to a proportional increase in all public spending categories, direct positive effects
from increased demand are largely compensated at the aggregate level by negative effects
in the two main export sectors. Note, however, that there is a direct effect on private
welfare due to increased direct transfers to households. Looking at the pure public con-
sumption strategy the simulation results illustrate that it has neither positive effects on
production nor on household welfare.
The distributional results vary significantly across simulation scenarios depending on
the type of spending and the assumed strength of productivity effects. While an increase
in public transfers favors predominantly the poor rural households, we find that the ben-
efits of public investment spread more evenly across the household types. In the scenarios
with public investment and productivity effects households which earn income from en-
trepreneurial activities (self-employed and employers) are better off. In comparison with
Adam & Bevan [2006] who find that rural households are always relatively worse off,
our setup shows that the income effect of rural households depends on the assumptions
concerning the spending pattern and the size of productivity effects.
In summary, our CGE framework allows for a comprehensive assessment of aid effec-
tiveness on the basis of three sets of indicators: Aggregate and sectoral production, trade
balance and welfare and income distribution. The simulations reveal a fundamental pol-
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icy trade-off. A pro-growth-pro-trade-strategy calls for an investment-focused spending
pattern which, however, does not immediately improve the economic situation of the
poorest income groups. In contrast, a public-transfer-scenario immediately changes the
situation of the poorest households for the better without any lasting growth effects. Pol-
icy makers in developing countries as well as international donors have to decide between
short-term and long-term objectives.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Descriptive statistics of the Database
Table 2.2.: Structure of production and demand in Zambia 2001
Sector Share in Share in priv. Share in total
total output consumption dom. demand
Staple Food 7.74% 17.57% 3.53%
Agr. Exports 1.53% 0.00% 0.84%
Oth. Agriculture 7.34% 16.24% 4.90%
Mining 7.71% 0.00% 1.10%
Processed Agr. 14.54% 33.56% 15.97%
Oth. Manufact. 10.46% 13.00% 14.26%
Capital Goods 5.56% 0.00% 11.76%
Construction 4.53% 0.70% 4.47%
Trade and Transport 22.83% 7.63% 24.20%
Priv. Services 10.05% 4.76% 11.38%
Publ. Services 7.71% 6.53% 7.59%
Table 2.3.: Structure of trade in Zambia 2001
Sector Share in total Share in total Exports/Output Imports/Demand
exports(%) imports(%) (%) (%)
Staple food 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.63
Agr. exports 8.34 1.50 64.03 16.70
Oth. Agriculture 3.74 3.94 5.97 14.86
Mining 59.01 1.36 89.69 3.45
Processed agr. 2.06 12.28 1.66 15.24
Oth. manufacturing 20.09 29.68 22.51 36.00
Capital goods 0.68 31.66 1.44 53.79
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade and transport 0.00 8.67 0.00 7.20
Private services 5.99 10.81 6.98 18.02
Public services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
All sectors 100.00 100.00 17.49 15.08
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Table 2.4.: Household groups and characteristics
Small and
medium
farms
Large
farms
Self-
employed
Formally
employed
Employer
% of population 57.5 0.1 21.5 20.0 0.9
% of total priv. income 26.2 1.0 20.6 33.8 12.8
Income tax rate 0.0 12.1 5.4 11.8 22.2
Savings rate 0.1 1.3 0.9 1.4 3.1
% of publ. transfers 40.1 0.0 19.0 38.1 2.9
Income from... (%)
Unskilled labor 73.0 39.8 14.4 34.2 4.8
Skilled labor 3.6 35.9 2.6 18.9 3.1
Capital 11.1 4.1 0.6 0.3 0.08
Land 3.9 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.0
Enterprise 0.0 18.6 78.4 41.1 90.7
Publ. transfers 5.8 0.0 2.6 4.0 1.2
Expenditure (%)
Home production 61.0 43.2 12.8 4.1 3.2
Food 87.9 49.6 65.3 58.5 40.7
A.2. Simulation results
Selected result tables
Table 2.5.: External balance (real, in billion ZK) and real exchange rate
Scenario Real ex-
change rate,
output-
weighted
Real ex-
change rate,
export-
weighted
Export Import Real trade
balance
base 1 1 3759.553 5901.883 -2142.330
NAIV 1.023 1.056 3506.887 5988.516 -2481.630
PUBINV 1.019 1.056 3580.163 6061.793 -2481.630
PUBCONS 1.024 1.060 3475.346 5956.975 -2481.630
PRIVINV 1.011 1.029 3608.972 6090.602 -2481.630
TRANS 1.023 1.049 3531.944 6013.574 -2481.630
NAIV_CAP 1.063 1.033 3656.368 6137.998 -2481.630
PUBINV_CAP 1.050 1.040 3688.418 6170.047 -2481.630
PUBCONS_CAP 1.068 1.034 3642.757 6124.387 -2481.630
PRIVINV_CAP 1.038 1.015 3701.142 6182.772 -2481.630
TRANS_CAP 1.057 1.031 3650.525 6132.154 -2481.630
NAIV_LOW 1.022 1.054 3537.429 6019.059 -2481.630
NAIV_HIGH 1.021 1.052 3572.337 6053.966 -2481.630
PUBINV_LOW 1.014 1.042 3831.325 6312.954 -2481.630
PUBINV_HIGH 1.009 1.030 4098.322 6579.952 -2481.630
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Table 2.6.: Sectoral production (real, in billion ZK)
Scenario Staple
food
Agr.
ex-
ports
Oth.
agricult.
Mining Proc.
agr.
prod.
Manu-
factu-
ring
Capital
goods
Con-
struc-
tion
Trade
&
Transp.
Oth.
Ser-
vices
Public
Ad-
min.
base 2480.56 489.69 2354.82 2473.80 4663.30 3355.77 1781.86 1452.78 7319.25 3223.73 2471.15
NAIV 2507.30 473.18 2346.26 2242.54 4705.54 3357.84 1781.04 1531.09 7295.74 3227.49 2675.16
PUBINV 2493.40 485.64 2338.07 2302.39 4669.97 3387.29 1853.40 1674.99 7349.49 3249.58 2483.78
PUBCONS 2498.74 487.01 2321.11 2205.97 4671.51 3339.03 1771.53 1537.72 7249.51 3213.92 2827.34
PRIVINV 2489.00 488.38 2339.41 2326.36 4660.83 3344.73 1932.89 1470.20 7386.55 3234.99 2496.31
TRANS 2536.38 437.56 2393.40 2289.41 4783.47 3371.84 1768.09 1459.70 7352.49 3234.77 2489.04
NAIV_C 2549.25 452.07 2316.34 2464.30 4668.49 3320.24 1769.29 1508.38 7301.45 3174.64 2576.38
PUBINV_C 2525.31 472.50 2305.22 2467.07 4627.65 3351.49 1844.11 1667.45 7339.47 3202.92 2451.24
PUBCONS_C 2532.22 446.87 2294.94 2463.53 4636.47 3303.70 1760.80 1511.27 7259.90 3160.37 2711.11
PRIVINV_C 2516.23 478.37 2307.54 2467.81 4619.47 3311.38 1924.33 1467.16 7372.77 3192.45 2483.31
TRANS_C 2567.27 426.07 2359.80 2465.79 4739.78 3335.08 1758.90 1450.40 7344.70 3186.51 2448.55
NAIV_L 2523.87 477.96 2361.05 2263.32 4735.00 3380.37 1786.58 1540.81 7340.44 3248.57 2705.95
NAIV_H 2542.22 482.08 2379.56 2287.98 4770.62 3406.04 1792.44 1548.86 7392.26 3272.45 2728.43
PUBINV_L 2623.75 511.68 2474.92 2482.19 4929.97 3572.25 1894.11 1724.14 7723.94 3421.02 2609.51
PUBINV_H 2763.60 542.99 2616.27 2671.33 5201.79 3767.86 1938.58 1784.84 8119.33 3602.99 2778.27
Table 2.7.: Factor prices (relative to benchmark)
Scenario Unskilled
labor
Skilled
labor
Capital in
mining
Capital Land
base 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
NAIV 1.040 1.046 1.002 0.880
PUBINV 1.026 1.023 1.007 0.769
PUBCONS 1.044 1.069 1.003 0.611
PRIVINV 1.022 1.016 1.002 0.813
TRANS 1.040 1.017 0.999 1.573
NAIV_CAP 1.092 1.101 0.928 1.087 0.050
PUBINV_CAP 1.066 1.070 0.949 1.073 0.037
PUBCONS_CAP 1.093 1.126 0.922 1.094
PRIVINV_CAP 1.057 1.060 0.952 1.059 0.147
TRANS_CAP 1.084 1.067 0.938 1.070 0.800
NAIV_LOW 1.039 1.047 1.002 0.865
NAIV_HIGH 1.038 1.047 1.002 0.870
PUBINV_LOW 1.018 1.015 1.005 0.863
PUBINV_HIGH 1.011 1.013 1.004 0.900
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Table 2.8.: Real disposable income by household type (in billion ZK)
Scenario Small and
medium
farms
Large farms Self em-
ployed
Formally
employed
Employers
base 3094.239 122.930 3035.708 3741.503 861.178
NAIV 3150.066 125.859 3026.513 3806.068 856.391
PUBINV 3099.931 123.464 3031.249 3755.477 856.810
PUBCONS 3110.450 125.948 3001.481 3776.537 827.997
PRIVINV 3102.499 123.261 3027.952 3748.366 857.345
TRANS 3307.979 125.662 3057.588 3866.158 858.565
NAIV_CAP 3099.662 126.789 3089.017 3879.477 886.422
PUBINV_CAP 3055.256 123.606 3069.213 3793.461 867.793
PUBCONS_CAP 3068.728 126.782 3068.883 3842.319 873.029
PRIVINV_CAP 3061.235 123.231 3057.317 3776.859 861.296
TRANS_CAP 3256.520 125.990 3100.767 3911.02 873.498
NAIV_LOW 3168.681 126.242 3047.980 3822.656 863.000
NAIV_HIGH 3190.287 127.195 3071.690 3850.491 870.000
PUBINV_LOW 3255.517 130.478 3204.943 3962.810 919.367
PUBINV_HIGH 3420.053 137.795 3386.004 4176.547 973.033
Table 2.9.: Production, consumption and welfare (real, in billion ZK)
Scenario Marketed
production
Private con-
sumption
GDP Armington
supply
Aggregate
consump-
tion
base 29567.19 10740.58 12052.09 32586.4 12444.25
NAIV 29638.67 10849.92 12047.93 33007.12 12744.81
PUBINV 29787.23 10751.95 12052.61 33167.64 12466.68
PUBCONS 29627.18 10727.43 12045.58 32990.38 12781.72
PRIVINV 29672.31 10744.44 12053.08 33057.74 12472.16
TRANS 29596.16 11100.97 12048.80 32967.9 12793.49
NAIV_CAP 29570.34 10966.39 12050.56 32947.33 12755.97
PUBINV_CAP 29735.08 10794.35 12053.52 33122.71 12474.79
PUBCONS_CAP 29567.39 10864.76 12048.20 32940.47 12794.23
PRIVINV_CAP 29628.11 10764.96 12053.86 33019.86 12479.26
TRANS_CAP 29545.44 11152.81 12051.27 32923.49 12802.27
NAIV_LOW 29842.40 10913.58 12133.15 33215.48 12834.66
NAIV_HIGH 30062.29 10994.68 12225.59 33440.68 12932.39
PUBINV_LOW 31330.38 11358.13 12702.91 34748.91 13155.09
PUBINV_HIGH 33005.05 11978.45 13407.11 36463.81 13899.52
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Selected figures
Figure 2.15.: Effect of non-productive aid on real gdp
Figure 2.16.: Effect of aid using alternative welfare measures with mining-specific capital
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Figure 2.17.: Effect of productive aid on real household incomes
A.3. Model code listing
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3. Improving Africa's roads
Modeling infrastructure investment
and its effect on sectoral production
behaviour
Abstract
Investment in infrastructure is considered as a crucial instrument for economic de-
velopment. Given the scarce resources for public investment in developing countries
policy analysis should include a detailed perspective on the effects of infrastructure.
This paper develops a modeling framework for the analysis of the effects of improved
road infrastructure on the economy of African countries. The theoretical framework
is tested empirically and used for simulations in a Computable General Equilibrium
(CGE) model. The effects on production and welfare are analyzed. Additionally,
the model serves to investigate the effect of roads on the economic participation of
rural households.
Working paper version published in: Proceedings of the German Development
Economics Conference, Research Commitee
for Development Economics, Verein für So-
cialpolitik, 2010
Proceedings of the Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP) Conference, Venice, 2011
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 I had occasion to join many such farmers at a `drinking bash' and when
I asked them why they had not taken their surplus grain to market
rather than using it to prepare liquor, they told me the roads were
too potholed to make this feasible. Letiche [2010]
3.1. Introduction
Investment in infrastructure in general and in transport, water and energy in particular, is
considered as a crucial prerequisite for sustainable economic development. This common
belief is reflected in a strong emphasis of all donors, especially of those of multilateral aid,
on the sectors energy, transportation, water and communication. World Bank lending to
Africa for these sectors amounted to 3.3 billion fiscal 2009 US-Dollars which is a doubling
of infrastructure aid since 2006.
Rural infrastructure constitutes a substantial and growing component of Bank
activities. Currently, over one-fifth of Bank lending in the rural sector is spent
on infrastructure.1
The developing world and especially the African continent has a very poorly developed
and maintained infrastructure compared to middle and high income countries. On av-
erage Sub-Sahara Africa has a road density of only approximately 200 meters of paved
roads per km2 compared to 1400 meters in high income OECD countries.2 The same
applies to other forms of infrastructure such as electricity, sanitation and in-house water
taps. [See Fay & Yepes, 2003]
The importance of infrastructure has been stressed in the literature since the seminal
work by Aschauer [1989]. For industrial countries it is clearly documented that invest-
ment in public capital increases total factor productivity and has a positive impact on
long-term output. [See e.g. Gramlich, 1994; Romp & de Haan, 2007, for comprehensive
surveys of the literature.] In the development economics literature several studies inves-
tigate the effects of infrastructure on national output using replications of Aschauer's
approach. However, most studies on developing countries focus on poverty and income
distribution instead of output, productivity or growth. [E.g. Calderon & Serven, 2008]
Even though a number of project and case studies (esp. for industrial countries) find
large positive effects from infrastructure on welfare and confirm reductions in transaction
costs due to better transport ways, the macroeconomic infrastructure literature and more
specifically the developing country literature in this field is very heterogeneous and fails
to make clear predictions on the concrete macroeconomic effects.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by showing how infrastructure in-
vestment could be modeled in a general equilibrium setup with multiple sectors and
heterogenous households and by integrating the dimension of market participation of
1World Bank Website on the strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development, December 2009.
2Own calculations based on World Bank World Developing Indicators 2009.
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rural households into the analysis. We focus on transport infrastructure. This paper
advances a disaggregated perspective in policy analysis on infrastructure investment in
developing countries especially on the effects of rural roads in Africa.
We develop a stylized general equilibrium model which integrates transportation ex-
plicitly into the supply function of a representative good. In this model setup with two
goods, a consumption good and a transport good, one representative agent and two fac-
tors of production, we show that supply, production and consumption can be increased
by means of reduced transport costs if transport infrastructure is improved. Easier trans-
port of goods to markets frees up labour and capital for the use in production.
In an empirical cross-sectional analysis of the influence of transport network density
on the trade and transport margin, we confirm that better transport networks reduce
transport and transaction costs. Using cross-sectional data for 58 countries from all over
the world and controlling for a number of country characteristics it is shown that a higher
road length reduces the trade and transport margins.
We combine the stylized model and the estimation results in a CGE model which ad-
ditionally includes multiple goods and households, international trade, subsistence agri-
culture, public investment as well as operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. General
equilibrium analysis provides a good toolkit to investigate the aggregate and disaggre-
gate effects of infrastructure investment on a sectoral basis. The complex setup of the
calibrated CGE model presented here allows for the investigation of the effects of trans-
port infrastructure on production, consumption and factor allocation. Most importantly,
the model permits the investigation of the effect of a better access to markets by means
of better roads on the participation of rural households in the economy. The model
allows for different assumptions concerning the division of the costs and benefits from
infrastructure between the different household groups. It is shown that an increased
quantity of transport infrastructure increases welfare. Production and consumption rise
at the aggregate and disaggregate level. However, the assumed efficiency of infrastruc-
ture provision as well as the size of O&M costs are crucial concerning the magnitude of
these effects. This paper focuses on general modeling issues, but the model could easily be
calibrated to other more disaggregated data and applied to specific investment programs.
Given that infrastructure in most African countries is at such a low level and many
of these countries are so waste that even doubling the length of roads would leave the
country with a very low network density and bearing in mind the enormous investment
costs for large scale infrastructure projects, our model results might provide guidance
in cases where investment programs have to make a focus. From a sectoral production
perspective, we find that especially those sectors with high tranport intensities and high
capital intensity benefit (mining, capital goods, utilities). Our distributional results show
that the welfare distribution becomes more even if higher if rural households are targeted
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specifically. Taking both into account, an agriculture-based development strategy would
require an investment focus on rural roads whereas this is not necessary for resource-based
development (like Zambia which is the example in this aper).
3.2. Overview of the relevant literature
3.2.1. Definition and classification of infrastructure
Infrastructure is a heterogeneous concept as e.g. Calderon & Serven [2008] point out.
The term infrastructure is most widely defined by Jochimsen [1966]3 as
[...] the sum of material, institutional and personal facilities and data which
are available to the economic agents and which contribute to realizing the
equalization of the remuneration of comparable inputs in the case of suit-
able allocation, that is complete integration and maximum level of economic
activities.
Even narrowing the definition to only material infrastructure as Buhr [2003] does:
[Material] infrastructure is understood to represent capital goods in the form
of transportation, education and health facilities, equipment of energy and
water provision, facilities for sewage, garbage disposal and air purification,
building and housing stock, facilities for administrative purposes and for the
conservation of natural resources.[...]
leaves us with a number of different aspects to be considered.
Other studies use a substantially narrower definition of infrastructure like e.g. Estache
[2006]:
[...] infrastructure is defined here as all the facilities used to deliver energy,
water and sanitation, telecommunication and transport services.
Not all of the elements of infrastructure are goods, there are also services and immate-
rial components. Furthermore, not all of these are provided publicly nor are they public
goods in general. It should also be mentioned that many of these components do not
fall into the category of investment. The widely-used approach to analyse infrastruc-
ture by only investigating public investment does not suit the concept of infrastructure
appropriately as e.g. Calderon & Serven [2008] emphasize. Nonetheless, even in the
theoretical literature public capital and infrastructure are often used as synonyms, like
e.g. in Gramlich [1994]:
Public capital consists of large capital intensive monopolies such as highways,
other transportation facilities, water and sewer lines and communication sys-
tems.
3Translation as in Buhr [2003].
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It is obvious that not all of the above mentioned components of infrastructure work in
the same way in promoting growth and reducing poverty. While education and health
are especially efficient in improving the productivity of labor, law and security promote
the efficient allocation of capital. Energy and water are intermediate inputs in produc-
tion while transport and communication improve the access to markets. This variety of
effects shows that the frequently used approach to measure infrastructure by using the
perpetual inventory method and hence aggregating all past public investment flows is
very limited in capturing all dimensions of infrastructure. Given the fact that resources
for large scale investment in infrastructure are scarce in most developing countries, it is
important for prudent policy analysis to take into account the variety of distinct effects
of each infrastructure category. In addition some infrastructure investments give rise to
high O&M cost which should be considered either.
In this paper infrastructure is defined following Estache [2006] only comprising elec-
tricity, water, telecommunication and transport. Among these components we will con-
centrate on transportation infrastructure i.e. roads, railways and ports. We will show
how to model its effects in a suitable general equilibrium model.
3.2.2. Theoretical background
Most previous literature states that improving the length and quality of roads and rail-
roads would lead to higher output and lower poverty. The reasoning behind this is a
combination of different positive effects. Roads in general and paved roads in particular
improve the connection between producers, markets and consumers. Enhancements of
the roads and railroads of a country should hence lead to a more efficient allocation of
goods and services. This increased efficiency in the allocation is based on different chan-
nels4:
First, as transport is easier and less costly producers lose less of their production on
the road and spend less time for transportation i.e. the unit transport cost per marketed
unit of the produced goods decreases. This should result in a higher share of produced
goods being marketed. Less production is lost on the way to the market and less is
consumed directly at the producers house. Furthermore, as producers have improved
access to markets they are not relying on retailers but can directly access their poten-
tial consumers, this should increase competition on markets but also the possibilities for
small producers to realize fair prices. In addition, consumers have improved access to
markets which increases the diversity of products available for consumption and reduces
information asymmetries. Hence, this increases arbitrage between formerly separated
markets. Moreover, as producers and consumers are linked more directly, production
adapts more efficiently to demand as information flows are improved.
Olsson [2009] makes a distinction between direct and indirect effects from better roads.
4Based on the arguments by Olsson [2009].
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The first channel above represents the direct effect whereas the three other channels con-
stitute the indirect effects. In addition, Olsson [2009] expects that the economy undergoes
structural changes as technologies spread more easily across the country. All these effects
should lead to a reduction in the spread between producer price and consumer price5.
This could either result in higher producer prices, in lower consumer prices or a com-
bination of both. If producer prices rise this would lead to a higher share of marketed
production and a lower share of home consumption leaving households with a higher
income from marketing their production and the possibility to broaden the range of con-
sumed products. A reduction in consumer prices with constant producer prices enables
consumers to increase their real consumption which has a clearly positive effect on welfare.
In addition to the aggregate positive effect an improvement in the road and railroad
network will have a positive impact primarily on the rural population. The agricultural
sector has the highest spread between producer and consumer prices hence relative bene-
fits for farmers should be the highest. Moreover, the rural population is typically spread
across wide areas with very limited access even to local or regional markets leaving this
part of the population with limited consumption and income opportunities. In addition,
better roads improve the access to health care and educational institutions for the rural
population.
In the production function literature infrastructure is normally treated as a production
factor entering the national aggregate production function. In this paper we will model
infrastructure more directly as a means of transport. Infrastructure is used to transport
the production to the market. Improvements in infrastructure reduce the need for labor
and capital in the transportation services sector. Infrastructure enters the production
function of the transportation sector and is a substitute for capital and labor in this
sector but not in others. There exist large sectoral differences in transport intensities,
hence, higher transport requirements of a specific good induce higher benefits from better
roads for this sector.
3.2.3. Econometric studies on the infrastructure-development link
The literature on infrastructure impact is very heterogeneous in terms of what kind of
infrastructure is analyzed and which outcome variable is considered. There exist several
detailed surveys of the literature e.g. by Gramlich [1994]; Buhr [2003] and more recently
Romp & de Haan [2007]. The following very brief summary of the relevant literature
only includes the main strands of the transport literature and even more specifically the
studies on the effects of transport infrastructure improvements in developing countries.
Most macroeconometric studies on the effects of infrastructure follow the so-called
production function approach. They estimate a national production function where GDP
or growth depend not only on labor, capital and technology but also on public capital.
5Both net of taxes.
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Public capital is normally measured using the perpetual inventory method. Most of the
recent literature in this strand is based on the work by Aschauer [1989] who applied
the method to U.S. time series data. It has been applied to cross-section data including
developing countries by Hulten [1996]; Ram [1996] and many others. There seems to
be a consensus on the positive effect from public capital on output even though the
magnitude of this effect is disputed. Still, the methodology is only capable to investigate
the effect of public capital as an entity instead of the effects of distinct forms (like roads)
specifically. This is for example criticized by Calderon & Serven [2008]. Hulten and also
Aschauer [2000] emphasize that not only the volume of infrastructure provided but also
the efficiency of its use are important. Wu et al. [2010] find that government spending is
less effective in low-income countries and attribute this to inferior institutions.
Estache [2006] reviews the macroeconometric literature on infrastructure and develop-
ment and points out that even though
[...] since the late 1980s over 150 published papers in English, French or Span-
ish and at least as many unpublished ones have analyzed the macroeconomic
effects of infrastructure [...]
there is still a large knowledge gap especially due to limitations in the fields of data col-
lection, evaluation of existing projects and accountability. Estache concludes that con-
cerning the macroeconomic output effect the findings are positive nonetheless concerning
other aspects of development such as poverty and distribution there is less evidence avail-
able. Njoh [2000] emphasizes that the link between infrastructure and development has
been investigated mainly for the industrial countries in the 1950s and in form of country
studies. Nonetheless, he underlines the specific importance of the subject for developing
countries. The findings from cross-country studies concerning poverty and distribution
and its correlation with infrastructure suggest that the poor and rural population should
be targeted specifically as they did not benefit from past infrastructure projects. [See
Bryceson et al., 2008; Letiche, 2010]
A completely detached strand in the macroeconomic literature focuses on the trade
effects of better transport networks. Using gravity models, this literature investigates the
tariff equivalent costs of poor roads on international trade. Unfortunately, disaggregated
data for developing countries is very limited and prohibits disaggregated studies espe-
cially for rural areas in Africa and the possibility to access local markets. Examples are
Yeats [1980], Limao & Venables [2001] and more recently Portugal-Perez &Wilson [2008].
In addition to the considerable macroeconomic literature there exists a variety of coun-
try and case studies evaluating specific projects or programmes in developing countries.
These studies mostly focus on the effect of better roads on variables such as poverty,
employment and access to markets. Examples are Olsson [2009] who analyses the Philip-
pines, Escobal & Ponce [2002] who compare three African countries, Fan et al. [1999]
for India or Fan [2008] for Uganda. These studies provide promising evidence about the
overall positive effect of infrastructure, especially on rural development. For all of these
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countries it has been found that especially rural roads provide an instrument to reduce
rural poverty and promote growth.
3.2.4. CGE models of infrastructure in the literature
Against the background of the presented macro- and microeconomic approaches a CGE
study is not limited to only one specific outcome variable. Such a model shows the ef-
fects of a specific policy experiment on aggregate and sectoral output but also on income
distribution, welfare and factor allocation as e.g. Stifel & Thorbecke [2003] emphasize.
Furthermore, it allows to distinguish between direct and second round effects and it pro-
vides a clear counterfactual. Recent studies using this approach are Agenor et al. [2008]
[applied to another country by Moreira & Bayraktar, 2008], Adam & Bevan [2006] and
Levy [2006] as well as Jensen [2009].6 These studies use quite substantially differing
models: While Agenor et al. [2008]; Moreira & Bayraktar [2008] explicitly model all dif-
ferent forms of public capital and their effects, their model is very aggregated in terms
of scctors and households. This model has only one representative household and only
one aggregate good. The authors disaggregate the simulated macroeconomic effects from
infrastructure using a dynamic microsimulation. Adam and Bevan's model on the other
hand is more disaggregated with respect to the number of sectors and contains a number
of different households but it includes only aggregated public capital and does not explic-
itly account for roads. They assume that public capital directly enters the production
function. This approach could be interpreted as a CGE-replication of the production
function approach in the econometric literature. A comparable approach is used by Levy
[2006] who compares the effects of public investment either in the road infrastructure or
in irrigation infrastructure in Chad. She confirms that road investments after a windfall
gain are capable to compensate Dutch Disease effects. However, her model applies an ap-
proach comparable to the production function approach and introduces infrastructure as
a multiplier on total factor productivity. Hence, it summarizes the effects from all public
capital investments and does not specifically address the transport cost effect. Jensen
[2009] explicitly refers to this caveat and adresses investments in road quality and road
quantity by explicitly including a road network model based on the engineering litera-
ture. The economic part of his model is aggregated to a degree comparable with Adam
& Bevan [2006] and Levy [2006] with five production sectors. Jensen [2009] includes the
effect of roads on transport costs and welfare in a very detailed way. Unfortunately such
a detailed analysis requires very detailed data which is not available for many African
countries like the Chad (as in Levy's study) or Zambia (which is analyzed in this paper).
All of these models do not account for the fact that an important share of agricultural
production in developing countries is directly consumed in the producer's house. This
part of agricultural production is not marketed and hence does not require transporta-
6These are only the studies for African countries as this is the focus of this paper. It would be ideal
to use a spatial multiregional CGE model with Iceberg transport costs like e.g. Buckley [1992],
Bröcker [1998] and Haddad & Hewings [1999], unfortunately the regionally disaggregated data which
is essential for this approach is not available for Sub-Sahara African countries.
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tion i.e. infrastructure. The models by Agenor et al./Moreira/Bayraktar, Adam/Bevan
and Levy do also not take into account that transport networks are of minor importance
for production but are an essential requirement for market access. Hence, better roads
reduce the demand for capital and labor in transportation. Our approach combines the
disaggregated modeling of infrastructure as in Agenor et al. [2008] with the sectoral dis-
aggreation as partly done in Levy [2006] and Adam & Bevan [2006] and additionally
accounts for subsistence agriculture and O&M-costs. Our production function clearly
distinguishes between production and transportation to markets as also Jensen [2009]
does. It also accounts for sectoral differences in transport intensity. The general struc-
ture of production is shown in figure 3.4.
In Adam & Bevan [2006] public capital is provided by the rest of the world and enters
the sectoral (Cobb-Douglas-) production functions as a factor of production. The respec-
tive exponent has been taken from an empirical study by Hulten [1996] and reflects the
public capital-elasticity of output. In this setup there exists a limited possibility to sub-
stitute between labor, capital and public capital. Obviously, this aggregated approach
does not capture the effects from transport networks explicitly, it summarizes the output
effect of all different kinds of public investment. There are also no sectoral differences as
the elasticity parameter is only available at the most aggregate level. Infrastructure in
this model is just another factor of production with a particular provision (see figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1.: Production function in Adam and Bevan (2006)
Levy [2006] uses a model which is, like the model used here, based on the IFPRI model
[See Löfgren et al., 2002]. She introduces migration and external price setting into the
model, which are special features of the Chad. Infrastructure is included in a comparable
way as in Adam & Bevan [2006]: Infrastructure acts as a multiplier on all inputs in the
production function. Thus, it is assumed to increase total factor productivity, which is
in line with the empirical findings in the production function literature. Infrastructure
increases factor productivity by the factor GINV 0.2, which means that an additional per-
cent of infrastructure increases factor productivity by approximately 0.2 percent. The
shock is applied uniformely across sectors no matter which are the concrete infrastruc-
ture requirements. Her way of modeling infrastructure is, like the one of Adam & Bevan
[2006] very much in line with the empirical findings of Aschauer [1989], Hulten [1996]
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and others. However, it is only capable to capture the effects of public capital in general
but not the distinct effects of transport infrastructure through transport costs specifically.
Figure 3.2.: Production function in Levy (2006)
Agenor et al. [2008] use a simulation model which includes three different forms of
public capital in the national production function of a composite good: Public capital in
health, education and infrastructure. These capital aggregates enter at different levels of
a nested production function. Infrastructure enters the top nest. Agenor et al. [2008] de-
scribe the elasticity of substitution between infrastructure and the labor/capital-nest to
be low. While their model is very detailed concerning different forms of infrastructure
it is limited by construction with respect to the sectoral results. The model has only one
sector of production and one representative household. Hence, there is no possibility to
have different transport-intensities across sectors and different sectoral reactions to an
increase in infrastructure (see figure 3.3). The authors are able to disaggregate the effects
of a public capital shock with respect to households and sectors using a microsimulation
model. Nonetheless, this modeling procedure is not able to capture asymmetric effects
in the different sectors due to differences in transport intensities.
3.3. A Computable General Equilibrium model of road
infrastructure
3.3.1. A stylized model including transport infrastructure
Before moving to a more realistic CGE of infrastructure, we want to illustrate in a small
stylized model how the above mentioned effects from transportation are integrated into a
general equilibrium model. The model is formulated as a mixed complementarity prob-
lem (MCP) which means that quantities are associated with zero-profit conditions and
prices are linked with market-clearance conditions.7 If the zero profit conditions (equa-
tions (3.1) to (3.4)) hold as strict equations a positive quantity of the respective good is
7See Rutherford [1999] for a detailed description of the approach and appendices 1&2 in Markusen
[2004] for an illustrative application.
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Figure 3.3.: Production function in Agénor et al. (2008)
supplied and demanded. The market clearance conditions (equations (3.5) to (3.10)) de-
termine the prices that ensure that supply equals demand. An income-spending balance
equation (11) closes the model.
We distinguish between the production and marketing of goods. This is important as
the assumption that all production is marketed will later be relaxed and some produc-
tion will remain unmarketed. Marketing requires the transport of goods by means of
labor, capital and infrastructure. Poor infrastructure leads to a higher need of labor and
capital used for transport. We assume that using infrastructure implies only operation
and maintenance cost while using transport services means to pay for labor and capital.
We model a simple closed economy with only one representative consumption good
C, two factors of production and one representative agent: The composite good (X) is
produced in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function. The zero profit condition for
X is given by:
pX = p
α
L · p1−αK (3.1)
where pX is the price for one unit of X, pL the wage and pK the capital rent with α
and (1− α) being the input coefficients of labor and capital respectively.
The production X is then transported to the market using transportation services TS
or a road. Both are combined in the transport aggregate T which is remunerated with
the price pT . The transport aggregate T is assumed to be provided in fixed proportion
to the production of X. The zero profit condition for C is defined as in equation (3.2).
pC = pX · X0
C0
+ pT · T0
C0
(3.2)
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pC being the consumption price and pT being the unit transport cost. Prices are multi-
plied with the relation of production to consumption and transportation to consumption
in the base year. The subindex 0 indicates base year levels. This does not imply that
the demand for transportation services is fixed as transportation services and infrastruc-
ture are substitutes. The supply of infrastructure is fixed exogenously and is hence not
subject to a zero profit condition.
Transport services (TS) are produced by using capital and labor while transportation
via a road only requires infrastructure capital INF . Hence, the zero profit condition for
transport services is defined by equation (3.3) and (3.4) replaces the zero profit condition
for the transport aggregate.
pTS = p
β
L · p1−βK (3.3)
T =
T0
X0
·X (3.4)
The respective prices of the commodities X and TS are complementary to the market
clearing conditions (3.5) and (3.6)
pX ·X = X0
C0
· C ·
(
pX · X0
C0
+ pT · T0
C0
)
(3.5)
pTS · TS = TS0
T0
· T ·
(
p
TS0
T0
TS · p
INF
T0
INF
)
(3.6)
The value of the production of X and TS respectively (left hand side of equations
(3.5) and (3.6)) must equal the value of demand of the respective good, given by the
right hand side of the equations. The price adjusts to fulfill this condition. Both are
scaled to base year levels for reasons of simplicity.
The artificial price for the transport aggregate (pT ) is defined by the market clearance
condition for transportation, the shadow price for infrastructure (PINF ) by the respective
condition for infrastructure.
pT · T = T0
C0
· C ·
(
pX · X0
C0
+ pT · T0C0
)
(3.7)
pINF · INF = INF
T0
· T ·
(
p
TS0
T0
TS · p
INF
T0
INF
)
(3.8)
The prices for labor and capital result from the respective market clearing conditions
(3.9) and (3.10)
pL · L = α ·X0 ·X · pX + β · TS0 · TS · pT (3.9)
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pK ·K = (1− α) ·X0 ·X · pX + (1− β) · TS0 · TS · pT (3.10)
Total consumption equals total income, which is defined as the sum of income from
labor, capital and infrastructure.
pC · C = Y (11a)
Y = L · pL +K · pK + INF · pINF (11b)
All other things being equal an increase in infrastructure would reduce the demand for
TS as infrastructure is a substitute for transport services. The reduced demand for TS
frees up labor and capital that can be used for increased production.
A natural way to calibrate this model would be to assume that in the benchmark sit-
uation the existing stock of infrastructure (INF ) is zero. This assumption implies that
- even though there might exist a stock of infrastructure - infrastructure in the bench-
mark is so poor that it does not add to national welfare and that the existing trade and
transport margin is an equilibrium outcome of the limited availability of roads. Invest-
ing in infrastructure would translate into a counterfactual with positive values of INF
assuming that additional infrastructure allows for a reduction of spending on transport
services (TS) and adds to overall welfare as it enters the national income Y .
The model represented by equations (3.1) to (11b) has been calibrated to an artificial
benchmark dataset with no infrastructure and T0X0 = 0.1 and increases in infrastructure
by 1 to 10% of GDP have been simulated. The following reactions to an increase in INF
result for the different variables of the model:8
Variable X C T TS pX pC pT pTS pINF Y
Sign of effect + + + - - - - - - +
∂x/∂INF
These qualitative results are robust to changes in the benchmark data as well as in
the assumed increase in infrastructure. The results from simulations in the idealized
model show that the general ideas described above are correctly translated into a model.
Nonetheless, a number of extensions to the basic model are needed in order to draw a
realistic picture of the effects of infrastructure investment and to allow for policy impact
assessments. These are described in the next section.
8Results for pL and pK depend on the assumed factor intensities and are not shown here. PK served
as numéraire in this example.
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3.3.2. Extensions to the small model
The model above does not take into account that there is no actual price for using the
roads. The cost of roads must be divided into two categories: The investment cost that
occurs before the road is in place and the maintenance cost; both must be accounted
for as costs for the economy. It is very likely that the actual cost of road usage is far
below the cost of transport services. Nonetheless, the price for transportation services
in the model reflects the alternative cost or shadow price of infrastructure. It may be
interpreted as the welfare gain from increased infrastructure. This approach, to measure
the gains from infrastructure by using the willingness to pay for roads, is for example
used by Olsson [2009] and we adopt this interpretation here.
An important feature of CGE models is that they integrate heterogeneous households
and different goods. This allows different transport intensities across sectors. In addition
it is very likely that welfare increases from better roads are particularly beneficial for the
rural population. This can be implemented in the model by assuming that the financing
of roads is done via taxes proportional to the income of households but the benefits are
assigned to households with respect to their location.
An important issue for developing countries is the notion of subsistence agriculture or
in general home consumption of households' own production. The decision to either sell
their production on markets or directly use it at home will significantly depend on the
costs a household would have to bear to transport their goods to the market and their
purchases back home. Therefore, the decision between home consumption and marketing
of produced goods should be modeled explicitly, this is done here, as shown in figure 3.4.
In the small model it is implicitly assumed that one additional unit of infrastructure
investment provides exactly one additional unit of road which can only be used for a
limited number of goods to be transported. In the CGE model roads are public goods in
the way that one additional kilometer of roads may be used to transport a large number
of different goods. This is done by a multiplier on infrastructure based on empirical
findings.
3.3.3. The Computable General Equilibrium model
The general idea shown in the small model above is translated into a disaggregated CGE
model.9 The model is structured as follows:
Production
Production is disaggregated into nine sectors, two of which are agricultural, four indus-
trial and three are services. In each sector output is produced from a specific combination
9The general structure of the model presented here is comparable to other developing country CGEs
like e.g. the IFPRI model. The model has been programmed using MPSGE and solved using the
GAMS/PATH solver. A copy of the model code can be made available on request.
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of intermediate inputs, capital and two different types of labor. Labor and capital are
assumed to be mobile across sectors. The production process is modeled using a nested
production function as shown in figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4.: Nested production function
Skilled labor and capital are imperfect substitutes in a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion with a corresponding elasticity of substitution (s=1). We assume the substitutability
between unskilled labor and skilled labor/capital to be more limited (s=0.5). Substitu-
tion between different intermediates or between intermediates and factors of production
is ruled out by the assumption of a Leontief type top nest (s=0). The supply of labor,
capital and land is fixed exogenously to base-year levels.
Domestic production may either be marketed or consumed at home. If it is marketed,
it has to be combined with a transport good, which might either be trade and transport
services (mg) or a road (which is initially not available and shown in grey color in figure
3.5 below). The choice between home consumption and marketed production is deter-
mined by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. Home consumption is
only possible in agricultural sectors and basic manufacturing (i.e. food processing). Do-
mestic goods are imperfect substitutes for foreign goods. Domestically produced goods
are combined with imported supply in a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) func-
tion to form the Armington aggregate which is sold on domestic markets. Domestically
produced goods may also be exported, but production of exports differs from production
for local markets. This is implemented using a Constant Elasticity of Transformation
(CET) function. The structure of the supply side is shown in figure 3.5.10
10The Armington elasticities have been taken from the literature. See the appendix for details.
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Figure 3.5.: Supply side of the economy
Infrastructure serves as an input in the production sector road. Infrastructure capital is
combined with O&M, which is paid for by the government, to provide an alternative way
of transporting goods to the market. The resulting transport good is a perfect substitute
for the trade and transport margin. Nonetheless, the supply of this alternative transport
is limited by the supply of infrastructure capital. Transport via roads is remunerated
with a shadow price that represents the welfare gains in terms of savings in time, capital
and goods. These gains are either assigned (i.e. transferred) to all households propor-
tionately, only to rural households or to the government. This last case will be used as
benchmark scenario.
Demand
Domestic demand consists of household demand, government consumption, investment
and intermediate demand. Intermediate demand is linearly linked to the quantity of
output.
The model has two household types which differ in their location: urban and rural.
The two household types also differ in their factor endowments, their savings, direct tax
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rates and consumption preferences. Households generate income from labor and capi-
tal. Apart from these income sources households receive transfers from the government.
Household income is used for tax payments, consumption and savings.
The government generates income from taxes, public capital and international aid. It
spends its revenue on public consumption, transfers to households, interest payments
to the rest of the world, public investment and operation and maintenance of roads.
Transfers, subsidies and interest payments are fixed exogenously. The only good the
government buys apart from the public investment good are public services. In the
benchmark scenario the government collects the welfare gains from better roads through
endogenous taxes and uses these additional earnings to provide a higher level of public
services or transfer payments and thus redistributes the welfare gains.
Savings are generated by households and the rest of the world. Savings are used for
private capital investment. The model is closed by total investment that always equals
total savings. There exists only one investment good. Infrastructure capital is provided
from an external source, international aid.
3.4. Empirical relationship between infrastructure and
transport costs
Translating the theoretical framework into a suitable CGE model requires information
on how much reduction in transport costs will result from an increase in the quantity and
quality of roads. This relationship is captured by a parameter that defines how much
additional transportation will be made available from a specific amount of public capital
in infrastructure. This parameter must be set exogenously.
The literature is rather vague about the exactly quantified relation between increased
expenditure on infrastructure and transport costs: In a case study of several international
transport corridors in Africa Teravaninthorn & Raballand [2009] find that an improve-
ment of the roads from fair to good reduces the transport cost by approximately 15%.
Unfortunately, they do not provide any quantitative information on the amount of pub-
lic investment needed for this improvement. The vague classification from fair to good
does not allow to integrate this estimation into a quantitative model. In contrast, studies
using the production function approach provide concrete elasticities but these are not
exactly compatible with the theory developed above as they measure the output effect,
which is classified here as an indirect effect from better transportation. In addition, these
results differ significantly across studies. Estimations of tariff-equivalent costs of poor
infrastructure in gravity models focus on international trade. They provide neither any
estimates about intranational transport costs nor about concrete amounts of investment
needed to provide a better road status.
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Against this background this paper attempts to quantify the effect from better roads
on transport costs directly. As the CGE model uses Social Accounting data it is natural
to estimate the elasticity of the trade and transport margin with respect to the trans-
port network from Social Accounting data, too. SAMs are available for a large number of
countries and provide detailed sectoral information on the demand for transport services.
In a cross-sectional estimation for 58 countries from all over the world we investigate the
effect of transport density on the trade and transport margin. This is a straight forward
way to test the aforementioned theoretical reflections and the model setup empirically
and provides us with a concrete parameter estimate for policy analysis in the CGE model.
We estimate the following equation:
lnmi = α+ β ln transporti + γ1ln gdpci + γ2ln urbani + γ3ln popi + ui (3.11)
As dependent variable we use sectoral spending on trade and transport services rel-
ative to sectoral output, i.e. the trade and transport margin (mi). We calculate this
output-weighted margin from input-output data both over all sectors and only for agri-
cultural sectors. Our main independent variable of interest, the transport network density
(transporti), is measured here as the length of all railroads and paved roads in km per
surface in km2. In addition, we control for GDP per capita (gdpci) as a proxy for devel-
opment of the economy and hence for the stage of market development, for the degree of
urbanization (urbani) as a measure of dispersion of market participants and for the size
of the population (popi).
11
The data on trade and transport margins comes from input-output-tables from differ-
ent sources, mainly the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the
OECD. Data on road and rail road length as well as the control variables GDP/capita
and population are taken from a World Bank Dataset on infrastructure used by Fay &
Yepes [2003] and from the World Development Indicators (WDI) Database for more re-
cent years. Missing data has been taken from the Human Development Index, Eurostat,
the United Nations and national statistical authorities of the different countries.
The spending for trade and transport represents between 2 and 41 % of sectoral pro-
duction costs, 12 % on average. The countries in our sample have on average 570 m of
transport infrastructure per km2 of surface. The smallest country has 3.5 million inhab-
itants, the largest more than 1 billion. On average more than half of the population lives
in towns. The GDP per capita lies between 148 US-$ and 45.478 US-$.
11Several other control variables such as the Human Development Index (HDI), literacy, economic free-
dom, surface and others have been tested but the results are not shown here as they are not qualita-
tively different and most variables have been insignificant. The next chapter of this thesis develops
the econometric approach further.
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The sample consists of 58 countries of which 28 are OECD countries, five East and
South Asian countries, four eastern European and Middle-Asian countries, one middle
East/North African country, nine Latin American countries and eleven countries from
Sub-Sahara Africa. Five of these countries (Egypt, Russia, Bolivia, Belgium and Chile)
have been excluded as outliers.12
Figure 3.6 shows the sectoral trade and transport margin as a share of sectoral output
for one country in the sample (Zambia) in order to give a general impression of the im-
portance of trade and transport costs in developing countries and across different sectors.
Figure 3.6.: Sectoral trade and transport margins in Zambia 2001
Table 3.1 summarizes the regression results for different specifications. mag represents
the trade and transport margin in the agricultural sectors, which should be more sen-
sitive to road quality compared to mall which is the weighted average of the trade and
transport margin over all sectors. All variables have been used in natural logarithms
such that the results can be interpreted as elasticities. In addition, the use of loga-
rithms significantly reduces the number of outliers which is important here given the
rather small sample and the fact that there is a large difference in magnitude between
the different variables (GDPC has much higher absolute values than the other variables).
The regressions clearly show that an increased availability of roads and railroads sig-
nificantly reduces the trade and transport margin. This effect is robust across different
specifications. The sign remains negative in all estimations and the coefficient is insignif-
icant in only one specification. These findings clearly confirm the theoretical considera-
tions described above and support our way of modeling infrastructure. The relation is
confirmed not only for the agricultural sector but also for the weighted transport expen-
diture of all sectors.13
12The inclusion of these countries does not change the qualitative results but removes the significance
of most coefficients.
13The inclusion of additional or alternative controls like the HDI instead of GDP per capita or an
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Table 3.1.: Results of cross-sectional OLS regressions
Spec. no (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent ln(mag) ln(mag) ln(mag) ln(mag) ln(mall) ln(mall) ln(mall) ln(mall)
# Obs. 53 53 53 53 45 45 45 45
ln(transp) -0.16** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.12** -0.14** -0.16*** -0.04 -0.12**
ln(gdp) -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10
ln(urban) -0.08 -0.06 0.03 0.02
ln(pop) -0.17*** -0.07
R2 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.39
adj. R2 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.33
F-test 20.1*** 10.5*** 6.9*** 7.9*** 22.2*** 12.1*** 7.9** 6.4***
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
The elasticities between 0.04 and 0.18 seem to be rather small but this is due to the
fact that the independent variable is transport network density. As the transport density
lies between 0.007 and 2.667 in our sample, a 1% increase of this density is often a very
small shock. For Zambia, for instance, a 1% increase in the density would require 87
km of additional roads or rail roads to be built and additional public investment of less
than 0.01% of the GDP. This is far below the yearly public investment budget. In fact
our results correspond quite well with those of Teravaninthorn & Raballand [2009] if we
assume that an improvement of the quality of roads from fair to good approximately
requires a doubling of the transport density. This would imply a 15% decrease in average
transport costs which is consistent with our elasticities.
These results are promising and support the general idea of this paper. Nonetheless,
it is desirable to have even more reliable estimations of the elasticity. Ideally, transport
costs should include time and loss on the road. Unfortunately, the data for such an inves-
tigation is not available at a broad cross-sectional or panel level. It would be preferable
to use transport network capital as an explanatory variable, which would be closer to
the theory and the concept of public investment. However, this could not be used due to
data limitations, measurement problems and problems of comparability across countries.
Moreover, an extension of our sample by adding more countries would be desirable.
3.5. Simulations and results
3.5.1. Calibration
The CGE model is calibrated to a base year data set in order to provide a benchmark
structure of the economy. The data used for this paper is a slightly idealized SAM for
Zambia. Zambia represents a typical Sub-Sahara African country here. Its transport
network density of 0.012 km of paved roads and railroad per km2 of surface is among the
education index does not change the results qualitatively but provide results of lower reliability.
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lowest in the world and only at less than 1% of the German transport density. The SAM
has been aggregated to a rather high level of aggregation: nine sectors of production,
two households, two types of labor and one type of capital. For simplicity, very small
data entries have been removed from the data base and transfers between households,
too. The different forms of indirect production taxes have been aggregated to only one.
This aggregation reflects the methodological focus of this study. In this manner it is en-
sured that effects from an increased road density are clearly identifiable and not hidden
in a very complex system of second and third round effects. Nonetheless, the data set is
rich in terms of the information provided concerning households' home consumption as
well as the trade and transport margins. The data contains sectoral information about
distinct trade and transport margins for domestic supply, imported supply and exports.
It also provides sectoral levels of home consumption per household type. Information of
this type is needed for a consistent calibration of the model.14
The previously estimated infrastructure-elasticity of the trade and transport margin is
reflected in the model in the input/output-relation of the road-sector which must be set
exogenously. The CGE model has been calibrated to an elasticity of 0.15 but different
levels have been implemented in robustness tests.
All other parameters for the calibration of the model are either calculated from the
base year data (input coefficients, production function exponents, shares in consumption,
tax rates, savings rates) or have been taken from the relevant literature (CET- and CES-
elasticities in the Armington formulation).
3.5.2. Simulations
The CGE model described above has been used to run a series of simulations with in-
creases in the transport density between 5% and 100%. This large range of shocks serves
to investigate whether there might be a minimum amount of investment required to
produce any effect and whether there exist decreasing returns to public investment. In
addition, public investment levels differ significantly across countries and thus there is
no obvious counterfactual at this stage of model development.
In order to provide a general idea of the dimension of the simulated shocks either pro-
jections about the infrastructure requirements of developing countries or past investment
budgets of the respective states could be taken into account. As a point of reference one
might consider the work by Fay & Yepes [2003] who calculated actual infrastructure in-
vestment needs for a large sample of countries for 2000-2010. They find that Sub-Saharan
African countries should on average invest 5.5% of their GDP per year into infrastructure
in general of which 2.8% in new investments and 2.7% in maintenance. Approximately
20% of these investments should be spent on roads.15 Taking world average investment
14The original dataset is: Thurlow et al. [2005].
15Very roughly calculated this would mean annual road investments of 1% of the GDP, half of which
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costs for new roads as in Fay & Yepes [2003] these investments would translate into an
increase in the transport density between 60 and 200% in the Zambian case.16
These rough calculations serve to provide some idea of the dimensions. For this reason
we simulate a wide range of shocks, keeping in mind that 5% is far below the require-
ments and 100% might be above the realistic increases in the stock of infrastructure.
Nonetheless, it would clearly be possible to simulate any given amount of investment
or any given length of additionally paved roads if concrete amounts of investment and
prices for these are known. Note, a 100% in infrastructure density is comparable to the
infrastructure shock of 2.5% of the GDP simulated by Adam & Bevan [2006]. Agenor
et al. [2008] and Levy [2006] simulate substantially larger infrastructure shocks of 5%
and 15% of the GDP respectively.
In addition to the range of possible magnitudes of the public investment programmes
one can think of different assumptions about the distribution of welfare effects. We
therefore run the simulations for three different scenarios. In general, welfare effects will
be savings in terms of traveling time, capital in transportation and avoidance of goods
loss. There is some empirical evidence for instance by Jacoby & Minten [2009] that these
effects are higher for households which are located in remote regions. In our setup with
only two household types (rural and urban) this would mean that only the rural house-
holds benefit directly from welfare gains. Alternatively, urban households might benefit
as well with a greater diversity of goods supplied and a general lowering in transportation
costs. Hence, we also include a scenario in which the welfare gains are assigned propor-
tionally to all households. A third notion is the incorporation of the financing of an
infrastructure project through increased taxes. In this scenario the government collects
the welfare gains through some form of tax e.g. fuel taxes, road charges or motor vehicle
taxes and uses the additional income to redeem the loans it took to finance the road and
to provide more and better public services. As this last scenario is distribution-neutral
and will mainly show the supply side effects it serves as a benchmark case in this study
and is later compared with the other two cases.17
The size of the elasticity of transport costs with respect to the provision of roads has
not been studied before. The only concrete number stems from our own estimation.
As a robustness check we therefore run a series of simulations in which we keep the
level of investment constant (at levels resulting to a 20% and 100% increase in the
transport density) and increase the elasticity parameter. These results will also be briefly
would provide new roads and half of which should be spent on maintaining old roads. Taking Zambia
as an example this would mean a transport network budget of about 65 billion Zambian Kwacha
(ZK). The Zambian public capital investment in the base year amounted to about 1000 billion ZK.
Assuming that on average 20% of investment programmes are dedicated to infrastructure investment
this would mean an investment budget of 200 billion ZK.
16Note, this leaves aside increases in the quality through maintenance.
17Tax financing of infrastructure is rather unrealistic in most African countries due to underdeveloped
tax systems, nonetheless, given the neutrality concerning distribution, we use this artificial scenario
as a benchmark. A concrete policy analysis could include the financing of infrastructure explicitly.
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summarized.
3.5.3. Results
The simulations show that with increasing availability of transport infrastructure, the de-
mand for trade and transport services (and thus for capital and labor in transportation)
decreases while the overall production and consumption increases. In the benchmark
case where the government redistributes the welfare gains the increase in consumption is
spread evenly across households.
Figure 3.7.: Transport sector results
The demand for transport services clearly decreases with increasing availability of
roads. Nevertheless, the price for transporting goods to markets remains constant. This
is due to the fact that the overall demand for the transport aggregate will increase given
the increase in production. The effects on production and consumption are shown in
figure 3.8.
Domestic marketed production (indicated by the black line in figure 3.8) increases with
increasing availability of free transport.18 Capital and labor released in the transport
sector may now be used in other sectors. Home consumption relative to total output is
captured in the grey bars and is clearly decreasing on the aggregate level.
The increased production is mainly consumed domestically. The grey line represents
18The increase in domestic production by only about 0.25% seems to be a small reaction to an increase
in infrastructure by 100%. However, a doubling of infrastructure would lead to an infrastructure
density of 0.024 km per km2 of surface which still is one of the lowest infrastructure densities in
the world. Nonetheless, it would require to build about 7000 km of new roads and rail roads which
would be an expensive project for the Zambian government. Zambian infrastructure is so far below
the requirements that even doubling it would still have only small effects.
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Figure 3.8.: Production, welfare and home consumption for different levels of infrastruc-
ture
the Hicks equivalent change in welfare which is the change in real consumption possi-
bilities of private households measured in units of initial consumption. The gains from
better transport thus translate indeed into a higher level of overall welfare. The aggre-
gate use of factors of production in the other sectors except transport services increases
compared to the base year.
The additionally available factors are distributed very unevenly across sectors. The
production of trade and transport services clearly drops. Correspondingly, we see a sub-
stantial increase in the production of public and community services. This effect has two
sources: First, the additional roads need maintenance which creates a higher demand for
public services. Second, the government uses a part of its higher income to provide a
higher level of public services (apart from road maintenance).
As the different sectors have differing transport intensities19 a shock on transport costs
will have substantially different effects on the different sectors. Indeed we see in figure 3.9
that sectoral production in some sectors increases substantially whereas other sectors are
nearly unaffected. Namely public and community serves directly benefit from increased
demand due to road maintenance and from additional tax income. But also the min-
ing sector (MIN), the utilities sector (EAW) and the capital goods sector (INV) benefit
from lower transportation costs and additional labour supply. The staple food (STF)
and other manunfacturing (MAN) are nearly unaffected whereas agricultural cash crops
production (CCR) and tourism and financial services (TFI) face shrinking production.
The mining and capital goods benefit because they are caracterized by a combination
of high transport intensity and high capital share in value added. The prices both for
19See figure 5.1 for a summary of transport margins in the different sectors.
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Figure 3.9.: Sectoral real production at an infrastructure level of 150%
transport and capital decrease and thus these sectors benefit twice. Public and com-
munity services benefit from a positive demand shock. Electricity and water are also
produced capital intensive and thus profit from decreasing costs. Relative wages on the
other hand rise and thus the labor intensive sectors staple food and cash crops do not
benefit. Transport services face a negative demand shock as well as financial services
which are the main intermediate demanded in transport.
In figure 3.10 we see that at the sectoral level home consumed production evolves in
correspondence to marketed production.20 This implies that in the sectors where home
consumption is possible, only the agricultural sectors and food processing, the share of
home consumption is more or less kept constant in contrast to the theoretical predic-
tions. Nonetheless, as the production in other sectors increases significantly, the share
of aggregate home consumption in aggregate consumption decreases correspondingly.
This apparent paradox can be explained as follows: Given the fact that home produced
agricultural products are by assumption perfect substitutes for marketed agricultural
products, home consumption is always preferable to marketed goods in agricultural sec-
tors as long as there exist positive transport costs inducing a higher relative price for
marketed goods. Nevertheless, the welfare gains from better infrastructure allow the
households to increase their consumption not only of home consumed goods but also of
other, market-only goods. Thus, we see a change in the composition of the aggregate
consumption bundles of both households in favor of marketed goods. We do not observe
a substitution effect between home consumed and market goods within one sector but
between sectors.
20Note that home consumption is only possible in agricultural sectors and very basic manufacturing.
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Figure 3.10.: Sectoral effects at an infrastructure level of 150%
Figure 3.11.: Income and consumption
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As the government collects the welfare gains in form of an endogenous tax on in-
frastructure in this baseline scenario, the investment programme is (nearly) distribution
neutral.
Figure 3.11 illustrates the aforementioned phenomenon that even though the quantity
of produced goods in the category of subsistence agriculture increases parallel to total
output in agriculture, home consumption has a constant or slightly declining importance
in the consumption bundles of both households.
3.5.4. Alternative specifications of welfare effects
As described above welfare gains might either be assumed to favor the rural households,
to be equally spread across all households or to be redistributed through public services.
These three scenarios are simulated and compared.
At the aggregate level, the welfare effect depends significantly on the assumption that
households benefit directly from better transport infrastructure but not on the assump-
tion which household receives the welfare gains directly. Figures 3.13 and 3.14 in the
appendix show that the aggregate welfare effect is much higher if the welfare effects are
completely assigned to private households. However whether all households benefit or
only rural households does not have an influence on the aggregate effect on welfare, pro-
duction and home consumption. Nevertheless, this assumption obviously has an influence
on distribution.
Even if the welfare gains are distributed to all households in accordance to their share
in the population, we see a clearly poverty-reducing distributional effect, as the rural
households represent a higher share of the population. Figures 3.12(a) and 3.12(b) show
the effect of infrastructure on income and income distribution for the two different as-
supmtion sets.
Compared to the neutral scenario we see a more pronounced drop in the aggregate re-
lation of home consumption to marketed production because private households demand
more transport intensive goods compared to the government. Thus, the transport cost
effect has a higher impact on the composition of consumption bundles if private house-
holds dispose of the additionally available resources. The effect on home consumption at
the household level is shown in figure 3.15 in the appendix.
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Figure 3.12.: Effects on income distribution with different assumption sets
(a) All households benefit directly
(b) Only rural households benefit directly
3.5.5. Robustness
It is important to mention that the quantitative dimension of the results depends on
a number of assumptions. Most importantly, the value of the additional infrastructure
capital has been calculated on the basis of world average public investment prices. This is
only a very rough approximation for the purpose of illustration of the model's capabilities.
This assumption does not affect the relative results but the overall magnitude of the
effects.
In contrast the relative results and the proper working of the model might be sensitive
with respect to the assumed elasticity of the trade and transport margin. As a robustness
check we keep the level of investment constant at 20% and 100% increase in the transport
density and change the elasticity parameter between 0.0005 and 0.01. The results are
only affected in their magnitude but show a linear relationship to the elasticity parameter.
The model compilation and solution is robust with respect to changes in the elasticity
parameter.
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3.6. Policy implications and conclusion
This paper shows that even though there seems to be a consensus about the positive
effects from better roads on development which is reflected in a number of investment
programs, the evidence in the development economics literature is mixed and far from be-
ing complete. Most importantly, there is often no explicit accounting for different forms
of infrastructure. Theoretical contributions often mention a transport cost reducing ef-
fect from roads. Nonetheless, concrete quantitative results are scarce and unreliable. In
addition, the theoretical reflections in the literature have not been translated into appro-
priate models for policy analysis.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on transport infrastructure in several
ways: We show how the verbal theoretical considerations on the direct and indirect ef-
fects from better roads can be translated into a general equilibrium setup. We develop
a small stylized model of transport infrastructure and apply the same methodology in a
realistic CGE thereafter. In addition to this contribution in the field of CGE modeling
we present empirical evidence for a clear and significant negative relationship between
transport networks and trade and transport margins. We measure transport costs as the
share of spending on trade and transport inputs in total sectoral output.
Simulations with the CGE model confirm that with increasing availability of roads the
demand for labor and capital for transport declines. These factors move to the other
sectors to produce a higher aggregate output. Welfare, measured as real consumption
increases on average and at the disaggregate level for all households. The composition of
the new consumption bundle and hence the reaction of subsistence agriculture depends
on the assumption which households benefit directly from shorter traveling times and less
goods lost on the road. As rural households spend a large share of their income on food
the higher the rural gains the higher the share of agriculture in additional production and
hence the higher the share of subsistence agriculture, too. Especially if infrastructure
programs are in favor of rural areas, the welfare effect clearly transcends the output effect.
The empirical and simulation results show that infrastructure investment programs are
a well-suited instrument to support the development of a country as increased infrastruc-
ture has positive effects on production and welfare. However, infrastructure projects are
extremely costly and the empirical literature emphasizes that efficient planning of such
projects is of major importance. We clearly confirm this in our model simulations. Infras-
tructure affects the production sectors differently depending on their transport intensity
and their factor input requirements. Especially manufacturing and capital-intensive ac-
tivities benefit while agricultural sectors are less favored given the relative increase in
wages. Hence, a pro-poor investment strategy especially in agricultural economies should
target rural areas specifically. We do not confirm that a substantially higher proportion
of agricultural goods is marketed as transport costs are still above zero but nonetheless
the production and consumption of market-only consumption goods increases broadening
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the consumption possibilities. Another important factor to bear in mind is the increased
demand for public and community services due to higher O&M spending. These require
that at least part of the welfare gain from new roads is collected through taxes and used
for maintenance.
Even though the simulation results correspond to the theoretical predictions, the mag-
nitude of the effects is relatively small compared with the high investment costs. This
is partly because the initial road density is so low that even doubling the availability
leaves the country with a highly insufficient network. In addition, our robustness checks
show that altering the elasticity parameter changes the magnitude of the effects. The
direct effect from increased investment demand has been neglected here as well as the
possible dynamic effects induced by the structural changes shown here. A promising way
of developing the model further would be to transform it into a fully dynamic model.
However, it requires reliable estimations not only of the road-elasticity of the transport
margin but also on investment costs and depreciation as well as maintenance costs on
the national level.
The model presented here can be very useful in evaluating concrete infrastructure
investment projects and programs. It has been applied to a highly aggregated dataset
but could easily be used with very detailed data as well and thus provide important
insights into sectoral and distributional effects from better transport networks, too.
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B. Appendix
B.1. Model specification
Table 3.2.: Armington elasticities
sector Elasticity of Substitution Elasticity of Transformation
Staple Food 2.0 0.75
Cash Crops 1.5 4.0
Manufacturing 1.5 1.25
Mining 1.5 4.0
Tourism&Finance 0.2 0.2
Publ. Services 0.2 0.2
Capital Goods 0.5 0.5
Utilities 1.0 1.0
Trade&Transport 2.0 2.0
B.2. Results
Complete result listing - Redistribution of welfare gains through government
Table 3.3.: Infrastructure and transport demand and prices
% increase in infrastructure demand
for trans-
port service
(margin)
Price trans-
port good
Price O&M Price use of
roads
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0824
5 0.9935 1.0000 1.0005 0.0683
10 0.9869 1.0001 1.0011 0.0682
15 0.9804 1.0001 1.0016 0.0682
20 0.9739 1.0002 1.0021 0.0682
25 0.9673 1.0002 1.0027 0.0682
30 0.9608 1.0003 1.0032 0.0682
35 0.9543 1.0003 1.0037 0.0682
40 0.9477 1.0004 1.0043 0.0682
45 0.9412 1.0004 1.0048 0.0682
50 0.9347 1.0004 1.0054 0.0682
55 0.9281 1.0005 1.0059 0.0682
60 0.9216 1.0005 1.0064 0.0682
65 0.9151 1.0006 1.0070 0.0682
70 0.9085 1.0006 1.0075 0.0682
75 0.9020 1.0007 1.0081 0.0682
80 0.8955 1.0008 1.0086 0.0682
85 0.8889 1.0008 1.0091 0.0681
90 0.8824 1.0009 1.0097 0.0681
95 0.8759 1.0009 1.0102 0.0681
100 0.8693 1.0010 1.0108 0.0681
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Table 3.4.: Production, welfare and home consumption
% increase in infrastructure Hicks
equiv-
alent
welfare
change
in
welfare
Domestic
produc-
tion
change
in do-
mestic
produc-
tion
Home
con-
sump-
tion
Home/
Mar-
keted
produc-
tion
0 10798 26170 2456 0.0938
5 10799 1.0001 26174 1.0002 2455 0.0938
10 10800 1.0002 26179 1.0003 2455 0.0938
15 10801 1.0003 26183 1.0005 2454 0.0937
20 10802 1.0004 26188 1.0007 2453 0.0937
25 10803 1.0005 26192 1.0008 2453 0.0936
30 10804 1.0006 26196 1.0010 2452 0.0936
35 10805 1.0007 26200 1.0012 2451 0.0936
40 10806 1.0008 26205 1.0013 2451 0.0935
45 10808 1.0009 26209 1.0015 2450 0.0935
50 10809 1.0010 26213 1.0016 2449 0.0934
55 10810 1.0011 26217 1.0018 2449 0.0934
60 10811 1.0012 26221 1.0020 2448 0.0934
65 10812 1.0013 26225 1.0021 2448 0.0933
70 10814 1.0015 26229 1.0023 2447 0.0933
75 10815 1.0016 26233 1.0024 2446 0.0933
80 10816 1.0017 26237 1.0026 2446 0.0932
85 10817 1.0018 26241 1.0027 2445 0.0932
90 10819 1.0019 26245 1.0029 2444 0.0931
95 10820 1.0020 26249 1.0030 2444 0.0931
100 10821 1.0022 26253 1.0032 2443 0.0931
Table 3.5.: Factor prices
% increase in infrastructure wage un-
skilled
wage skilled land rent capital rent
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
5 1.0000 1.0008 0.9999 0.9999
10 1.0000 1.0015 0.9998 0.9998
15 1.0001 1.0023 0.9997 0.9997
20 1.0001 1.0030 0.9995 0.9997
25 1.0001 1.0038 0.9994 0.9996
30 1.0001 1.0045 0.9993 0.9995
35 1.0001 1.0053 0.9992 0.9994
40 1.0002 1.0061 0.9990 0.9993
45 1.0002 1.0068 0.9989 0.9992
50 1.0002 1.0076 0.9988 0.9992
55 1.0002 1.0083 0.9987 0.9991
60 1.0002 1.0091 0.9986 0.9990
65 1.0002 1.0098 0.9984 0.9989
70 1.0003 1.0106 0.9983 0.9988
75 1.0003 1.0114 0.9982 0.9987
80 1.0003 1.0121 0.9981 0.9986
85 1.0003 1.0129 0.9980 0.9986
90 1.0003 1.0136 0.9978 0.9985
95 1.0004 1.0144 0.9977 0.9984
100 1.0004 1.0152 0.9976 0.9983
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Table 3.6.: Sectoral production
% increase in infrastructure Staple
Food
Cash
Crops
Manu-
fac-
turing
Mining Trade
and
fi-
nan-
cial
ser-
vices
Public
and
com-
mu-
nity
ser-
vices
Invest-
ment
goods
Utili-
ties
Tran-
sport
ser-
vices
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
5 1.0005 0.9977 1.0004 1.0031 0.9978 1.0109 1.0016 1.0026 0.9948
10 1.0009 0.9954 1.0009 1.0062 0.9957 1.0218 1.0033 1.0052 0.9897
15 1.0014 0.9931 1.0013 1.0093 0.9935 1.0326 1.0049 1.0077 0.9845
20 1.0018 0.9908 1.0018 1.0124 0.9913 1.0435 1.0066 1.0103 0.9794
25 1.0022 0.9885 1.0022 1.0155 0.9892 1.0543 1.0082 1.0129 0.9742
30 1.0027 0.9863 1.0027 1.0186 0.9870 1.0651 1.0098 1.0155 0.9691
35 1.0031 0.9840 1.0031 1.0217 0.9849 1.0759 1.0115 1.0180 0.9639
40 1.0036 0.9817 1.0036 1.0248 0.9827 1.0867 1.0131 1.0206 0.9588
45 1.0040 0.9795 1.0040 1.0279 0.9805 1.0975 1.0147 1.0232 0.9536
50 1.0045 0.9772 1.0045 1.0310 0.9783 1.1082 1.0164 1.0258 0.9485
55 1.0049 0.9750 1.0049 1.0341 0.9762 1.1190 1.0180 1.0283 0.9433
60 1.0053 0.9728 1.0054 1.0372 0.9740 1.1297 1.0196 1.0309 0.9382
65 1.0058 0.9705 1.0058 1.0403 0.9718 1.1404 1.0212 1.0335 0.9330
70 1.0062 0.9683 1.0063 1.0434 0.9697 1.1512 1.0228 1.0361 0.9279
75 1.0066 0.9661 1.0067 1.0466 0.9675 1.1618 1.0245 1.0386 0.9227
80 1.0071 0.9639 1.0072 1.0497 0.9653 1.1725 1.0261 1.0412 0.9176
85 1.0075 0.9617 1.0076 1.0528 0.9632 1.1832 1.0277 1.0438 0.9124
90 1.0079 0.9595 1.0081 1.0559 0.9610 1.1938 1.0293 1.0464 0.9073
95 1.0084 0.9573 1.0085 1.0591 0.9588 1.2045 1.0309 1.0489 0.9021
100 1.0088 0.9552 1.0090 1.0622 0.9566 1.2151 1.0325 1.0515 0.8970
Table 3.7.: Sectoral home consumption
% increase in infrastructure Staple Food Cash Crops Manufacturing
5 1.0005 0.9974 1.0004
10 1.001 0.9949 1.0009
15 1.002 0.9923 1.0013
20 1.0020 0.9898 1.0018
25 1.0025 0.9872 1.0022
30 1.0030 0.9847 1.0027
35 1.0035 0.9822 1.0031
40 1.0040 0.9797 1.0035
45 1.0045 0.9771 1.0040
50 1.0050 0.9746 1.0044
55 1.0055 0.9721 1.0049
60 1.0060 0.9697 1.0053
65 1.0064 0.9672 1.0058
70 1.0069 0.9647 1.0062
75 1.0074 0.9623 1.0067
80 1.0078 0.9598 1.0071
85 1.0083 0.9574 1.0076
90 1.0088 0.9549 1.0080
95 1.0092 0.9525 1.0085
100 1.0097 0.9501 1.0089
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Table 3.8.: Income distribution
% increase in infrastructure income
real, rural
income
real,
urban
income
urban/
rural
rel. sub-
sistence/
consump-
tion rural
rel. sub-
sistence/
con-
sumption
urban
0 1.0000 1.0000 3.1820 0.5519 0.0570
5 1.0001 1.0001 3.1820 0.5518 0.0569
10 1.0002 1.0002 3.1821 0.5516 0.0569
15 1.0002 1.0003 3.1822 0.5515 0.0568
20 1.0003 1.0004 3.1822 0.5514 0.0568
25 1.0004 1.0005 3.1823 0.5512 0.0567
30 1.0005 1.0006 3.1824 0.5511 0.0567
35 1.0006 1.0007 3.1825 0.5509 0.0566
40 1.0007 1.0009 3.1825 0.5508 0.0566
45 1.0008 1.0010 3.1826 0.5506 0.0565
50 1.0009 1.0011 3.1827 0.5505 0.0565
55 1.0009 1.0012 3.1828 0.5504 0.0565
60 1.0010 1.0013 3.1829 0.5502 0.0564
65 1.0011 1.0014 3.1830 0.5501 0.0564
70 1.0012 1.0016 3.1831 0.5499 0.0563
75 1.0013 1.0017 3.1832 0.5498 0.0563
80 1.0014 1.0018 3.1833 0.5496 0.0562
85 1.0015 1.0020 3.1834 0.5495 0.0562
90 1.0016 1.0021 3.1835 0.5493 0.0561
95 1.0017 1.0022 3.1836 0.5492 0.0561
100 1.0018 1.0024 3.1837 0.5490 0.0560
Selected figures - Alternative welfare allocation scenarios
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Figure 3.13.: Production, welfare and home consumption - All households benefit
Figure 3.14.: Production, welfare and home consumption - Only rural gains
Figure 3.15.: Income distribution - All households benefit
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B.3. Model code listing
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Model code documentation
not included in electronic version.
Please contact the author
for a copy of the model code.
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4. One model fits all?
Determinants of transport costs
across sectors and country groups
Abstract
We show with pooled OLS estimations based on transport margins from interna-
tional social accounting data that investments in improved road infrastructure have
the potential to significantly reduce transport costs. However, this result can only
be clearly confirmed for industrial countries and is of primary importance for the
production and transportation of agricultural goods. For developing and transition
countries, in contrast, we find other determinants such as weather conditions to be
more important in determining transport costs. A key variable, especially in these
countries, is corruption. Very high corruption has the potential to prevent positive
effects from roads on transport costs or to even reverse them. This paper contributes
to the literature on infrastructure investment by introducing and applying an inter-
nationally comparable measure of transport costs which can be calculated for a large
number of countries. We conclude that investment in transport infrastructure can
have substantial positive effects especially on agricultural production and the effi-
cient marketing of agricultural products but only if specific additional conditions
are in place.
Working paper version published as: CEGE Working Papers No. 122, University
of Göttingen, 2011
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 It costs more to transport a vehicle from Abidjan to Addis Ababa
than shipping the same vehicle from Abidjan to Japan.
Naude & Mathee [2007]
4.1. Introduction
Investment in infrastructure is often seen as a promising path for growth and devel-
opment. Based on the experiences with large infrastructure investments in industrial
countries, like e.g. the first transcontinental railroad in the U.S. finished in 1869, in-
frastructure projects are widely considered to induce large growth effects. However, the
magnitude of the estimated effect differs quite substantially.
Classic studies in the field of economic history like Jenks [1944] or Fishlow [1965]
for the United States and Fremdling [1977] for Germany argue that the connection of
markets through railways had a massive influence on the industrialisation of the respective
countries. Comparable studies also exist for the initial construction of motorways in
industrial countries. In modern industrial economies infrastructure networks are still
seen as important prerequisites for regional development. This is for example reflected
in the large scale infrastructure programmes after German reunification and also in the
inclusion of infrastructure into the aims of the Lisbon strategy:1
Establishing an efficient trans-European transport network (TEN-T) is a key
element in the relaunched Lisbon strategy for competitiveness and employ-
ment in Europe. If Europe is to fulfil its economic and social potential, it is
essential to build the missing links and remove the bottlenecks in our trans-
port infrastructure, as well as to ensure the sustainability of our transport
networks into the future. (European Commission)
The assumption that infrastructure reduces transport costs is also included in many
gravity models in international trade. Infrastructure is included as an explanatory vari-
able in some of these models which implicitly assumes that there is an influence of
infrastructure on trade costs. [See e.g. Portugal-Perez & Wilson, 2008]
Policy initiatives such as the WTO's Aid for Trade program or the World Bank's
Infrastructure Action Plan emphasize the importance of infrastructure for developing
countries. This political emphasis on infrastructure reflects the widespread belief that
the observed positive effects from infrastructure in developed countries apply to devel-
oping countries as well.
The literature usually argues that improvements in the road network reduce transport
costs and transport times. The studies on Americas railways distinguish three types of
effects from infrastructure improvements: the direct effect on transport costs which is
1Source: European commission http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/index_en.htm
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argued to reduce transaction costs and thus increase the volume and number of transac-
tions, the backward linkage through increased demand for resources and factors needed for
infrastructure construction and the forward linkage effect which summarizes the induced
additional economic activities due to the presence of infrastructure. The importance of
the direct cost reducing effect (which is also a prerequisite for forward linkage effects)
has been stressed in many subsequent studies.
Reduced transport costs are e.g. mentioned as important results from infrastructure
investment in developing countries in Escobal & Ponce [2002] and Teravaninthorn &
Raballand [2009]. However, even for industrial countries, concrete estimations for the
travel cost reduction from better roads are scarce. This is partly due to the fact that
time series based studies for distinct countries cannot provide internationally applicable
results. There are a number of studies in the international trade literature that quantify
the tariff equivalent costs of poor roads on international trade but these cannot provide
any insight concerning intranational transport and often focus on industrial countries
alone [See e.g. Yeats, 1980; Limao & Venables, 2001; Portugal-Perez & Wilson, 2008].2
Evidence on the effects of better roads in developing countries is mixed.3 Existing coun-
try studies use substantially differing approaches to measure transport costs and hence
it is difficult to conclude whether the determinants of transport costs are the same for
developing and developed countries and even within these groups.
This paper contributes to the literature by developing and applying an internationally
comparable measure of transport costs and estimating the effect of the length of transport
ways on this measure across countries. Pooled estimations of the influence of transport
network density on the transport margin show that better transport networks reduce
transport costs. The effect is stronger for agricultural sectors compared to a weighted
measure for all sectors. The observed effect from infrastructure on transport costs differs
substantially across country groups. It cannot be confirmed unconditionally for develop-
ing and transition countries. In their case, other determinants such as weather conditions
have a strong influence on transport costs as well. Most importantly, in low and middle
income countries the effectiveness of road infrastructure strongly depends on the level of
corruption. In highly corrupt countries the effect might be reversed and a higher level of
infrastructure comes along with higher transport costs.
4.2. Literature and theoretical background
The literature on the effects from infrastructure investments states that improving the
length and quality of roads and railroads would lead to higher output and lower poverty.
The reasoning behind this is a combination of different positive effects. Roads in general
2The application of a comparable approach on intranational transport costs would require very detailed
data.
3See Estache [2006] for a comprensive survey of the literature.
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and paved roads in particular improve the connection between producers, markets and
consumers. Enhancements of the roads and railroads of a country should hence lead to
a more efficient allocation of goods and services.
Most macroeconomic studies on the effects of infrastructure follow the so-called pro-
duction function approach based on Aschauer [1989] who applied the method to U.S.
time series data. These studies estimate a national production function where GDP or
growth depend not only on labour, capital and technology but also on public capital.
Public capital is usually measured using the perpetual inventory method, i.e. aggregat-
ing past investment flows. This approach has been applied to developed and developing
countries, to time-series, cross-section and panel data and there seems to be a consensus
on the positive effect from public capital on output even though the magnitude of this
effect is disputed. [See e.g. Hulten, 1996; Ram, 1996]. Hulten [1996] finds that the effect
of public capital on growth is much lower if the sample comprises developing countries.
He argues that this is due to less efficient planning and use in these countries. Also
Aschauer [2000] states that it might be crucial whether existing infrastructure is used
efficiently. Still, the methodology is only capable to investigate the effect of public capital
as an entity instead of the effects of better transport networks in particular. This caveat
is mentioned e.g. by Calderon & Serven [2008].
In addition to the considerable macroeconomic literature there exists a variety of coun-
try and case studies evaluating specific projects or programs. Examples for industrial
countries are: Holl [2007]; Linneker & Spence [1996] and Vesper & Zwiener [1991]. Re-
cent examples for developing countries are Olsson [2009] who analyses the Philippines,
Escobal & Ponce [2002] who compare three African countries, Fan et al. [1999] for India
or Fan [2008] for Uganda. For all of these countries it has been found that especially
rural roads provide an instrument to reduce rural poverty and promote growth but only
Olsson [2009] and Escobal & Ponce [2002] try to establish a more concrete chain of effects
that explains the overall positive influence of roads. While Olsson [2009] offers theoretical
reflections on this aspect, Escobal & Ponce [2002] estimate the effect of the road status
on travel times and do not find a robust effect across the three countries in their sample.
Olsson [2009] argues that the positive aggregate effect of better and longer roads is
based on an improved cost efficiency in transporting goods to markets. The lower trans-
port costs are explained by shorter travel times combined with less loss on the road,
direct market access even for small scale producers, reduced information asymmetries
and quicker adaption to changes in supply and demand. In addition, Olsson [2009] ex-
pects that the economy undergoes structural changes as technologies spread more easily
across the country.
While there exists strong empirical support for the general idea that improved roads
lead to higher production and welfare, there is only a very limited number of studies
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that directly investigate the infrastructure - transport cost link. The link has been inves-
tigated for large past infrastructure projects in distinct countries like the U.S. railways
or the Eastern German motorways but to our knowledge an international comparison of
the transport cost effects of infrastructure investment is still due. This might be mainly
due to the fact that data on transport costs across a large number of different countries
is not available especially not for developing and transition countries.
The recent literature is rather vague about the exactly quantified relation between
increased expenditure on infrastructure and the effect on transport costs. For developing
countries there exist only very few studies. Escobal & Ponce [2002] and Teravaninthorn
& Raballand [2009] focus on developing countries and especially on Africa. They apply
a completely different methodology compared to most studies for industrial countries.
In a case study of several international transport corridors in Africa Teravaninthorn &
Raballand [2009] find that an improvement of the roads from fair to good reduces
the transport cost by approximately 15%. Other concrete cross-country estimations that
include intranational transport costs and not only international transport costs do not
exist to our knowledge.
The measures for transport costs used in the different country and regional studies
referenced above are very heterogeneous. Some rely on vehicle operation costs, others
use freight rates or travel times. Hence, it is difficult to obtain a general result from com-
paring such country studies. However, it seems important to know whether the positive
impact of infrastructure projects in industrial countries could possibly be replicated in
developing countries. Summarizing the recent literature on infrastructure in developing
countries Estache [2006] concludes that the knowledge gap is not a small one.
4.3. Econometric design
4.3.1. Specification
Against this background this paper attempts to quantify the effect from better and longer
roads on transport costs directly and investigates whether there exist systematic differ-
ences between industrial countries and developing and transition countries.
As an internationally comparable measure of transport costs we will use the transport
margin (m). We calculate this margin as the sectoral spending on transportation relative
to overall sectoral production costs and aggregate this over comparable sectors.
mi,s =
transport related production costs in sector s in country i
total production cost in sector s in country i
(4.1)
The transport margin thus comprises all elements of transport costs that have been re-
ported as spending on road, air and water transportation, transportation related services
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and maintenance of transport vehicles. It indirectly covers wages paid to the labor and
capital involved in transportation. The measure is not able to account for indirect costs
of long transport ways such as the loss of perishable goods or the foregone profit due to
the time spent on the road that could not be used productively (if not comprised in labor
cost in transportation). As we calculate the cost measure relative to total sectoral cost
we consider it highly comparable across countries even if production technologies differ
substantially.
Information on sectoral spending on transportation can be obtained from social ac-
counting data. Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) are available for a large number of
countries and for several years and provide detailed sectoral information on the demand
for transport services.4 This allows to build a dataset on international transport spend-
ing. The underlying SAMs differ in their level of disaggregation but can be aggregated
to a comparable structure.
In a pooled estimation for 64 countries from all over the world and three periods we
investigate the effect of transport density on these transport margins. This is a straight-
forward way to test the aforementioned theoretical reflections.
We estimate the following equation for each s separately:
ln(mi,s) = α+ β ln(transneti) + γ controlsi + δ dummiesi + ui (4.2)
As the dependent variable we use sectoral spending on transport services in country
i relative to sectoral output in country i, i.e. the transport margin (mi). We calculate
this weighted margin from input-output data both only for agricultural sectors (s = ag)
and over all sectors (s = all), we use sectoral output as weights.
Our main independent variable of interest is the road network density (transneti) mea-
sured here as the length of paved roads5 in km per surface in km2. We expect that higher
transport network densities are associated with lower transport margins. In addition, we
expect this effect to be stronger in agricultural sectors.
Several other variables should have an impact on transport costs. The GDP per capita
(gdpci) as a proxy for the development of the economy but also for the overall transport
demand is included as explanatory variable. One would expect that with higher overall
transport demand, costs should decrease due to economies of scale. In contrast, if the
level of technology is very low, an increasing GDP could also induce higher transport
costs if transport is a very scarce service. This ambiguous ex ante expectation concern-
ing the influence of gdpc on transport costs might lead to a non-linear influence. We
4The results found with this measure might also be useful in the specification of SAM-based CGE
models such as Jensen [2009].
5As an alternative measure for transport infrastructure we use paved roads and railroads taken together.
This does not have a substantial impact on the results.
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therefore test for non-linearity in GDP by including gdpc2.
In addition, we control for the degree of urbanization (urbani) as a measure of disper-
sion of the market participants. Intuition suggests a negative coefficient for urbanization
over all sectors. A higher degree of urbanization implies shorter transport ways and thus
lower transport margins. However, the opposite is true in agricultural sectors: If the
major part of the population lives in towns, food has to be carried long distances from
the production site to the consumers.
Moreover, we include the population density (popdensi), measured as persons per
km2. On the one hand a higher population would mean higher transport requirements
for transport of persons and thus imply a positive coefficient. On the other hand a
smaller population might be spread across wide surfaces and thus need more transport
which also induces higher transport costs and thus a negative coefficient for population
density.
Climate conditions have a strong influence on both, the status of present roads and the
possibility to use them. For this reason we include two climate variables: a temperature
index and the yearly precipitation. The temperature index is calculated by adding up
the squared maximum and minimum temperatures in degree Celsius for the respective
year. Precipitation is measured in total mm per m2 per year.
As we will focus part of our investigation on transport costs in agricultural sectors we
include the fraction of land dedicated to agricultural use (agrlandi) in these estimations.
A higher share of agricultural land is expected to increase the efficiency of transport in
these sectors and thus decrease agricultural transport costs.6
Some studies on public investment argue that the efficiency of the use of public capital
is very important and that part of public investment is never used productively due to
corruptive elites. [See Hulten, 1996; Aschauer, 2000] For this reason we include trans-
parency international 's perceived corruption index as an explanatory variable in some
estimations. The index is defined between 0 and 10 where low values of the index are
associated with very high levels of corruption.
As the sample comprises countries from all over the world, we include sets of dummy
variables to control for structural differences between country groups. We alternatively
include dummies for income groups, for geographical regions and for OECD member
status.
We perform estimations both for the margin in agricultural sectors only and for the
6We tried to include the number of motor vehicles per 1000 persons as a proxy for transport technology.
However, this measure is only available for a very limited number of periods and countries and thus
the results are not reliable. The results are shown in table 4.11 in the appendix.
101
4. One model fits all?
Determinants of transport costs across sectors and country groups
weighted margin aggregated over all sectors. All estimations use pooled data and OLS
with hetero-scedasticity-corrected standard errors (White procedure). Given the frequent
and systematic missings in our panel data set a fixed effects estimation with cross-section
fixed effects is not possible. Instead, we include country-group fixed effects and time fixed
effects. Time fixed effects, however, have never been significant and thus results are not
reported here.
4.3.2. Data
We construct a panel data set from various sources.7 The panel contains data for 64
countries and 3 years (1995, 2000, 2005). The panel is highly unbalanced and missings
are systematic (OECD countries usually have a full set of observations whereas part of
the non-OECD countries have only two or even only one observation). The explanatory
variables are available for all countries and nearly all years. In contrast, Social Account-
ing data is not frequently surveyed in all countries. For most developing and transition
countries only one SAM is available.8 In total, we have 135 observations.
The data on transport margins has been collected from input-output-tables from differ-
ent sources, mainly the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Eurostat
and the OECD. Data on road and rail road length as well as most of the control variables
are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) Database. The country classification
in income groups follows the World Bank classification. The regional groups are chosen
as in Fay & Yepes [2003]. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show descriptive statistics.
The spending for transport ranges between 0.4% and 15% of sectoral production costs,
3.5% on average, in agricultural sectors and between 1 and 15% over all sectors, 6% on
average. The countries in our sample have on average, 788 m of paved roads per km2 of
surface where the lowest transport network density is at only 3m/km2 and the highest at
6086 m/km2. The GDP per capita lies between 254 US-$ and 51,934 US-$. On average,
168 persons live on one km2 of surface. The least concentrated country is populated
by only 2.4 persons/km2 and the most densely populated has over 3100 persons on the
same surface. On average, more than half of the population lives in towns, only 12%
in the most rural country and over 97% in the most urbanized. The climate conditions
vary substantially across the countries. The temperature index lies between 7 and 1600
degrees Celsius. The highest maximum mean temperature is at about 32°C, the lowest
minimum mean temperature is at about -11°C.
7A detailed overview of the different data sources is included in table 4.7 in the appendix.
8The availability of SAMs also determines the total number of countries, we can only use Social Ac-
counting Matrices where transportation is explicitly included and not aggregated with trade services
and which have been updated between the periods of our panel.
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The sample consists of 64 countries of which 29 are high, 27 middle and 8 low income
countries, the low and middle income countries are located as follows: three Eastern
Asian and three Southern Asian countries, nine eastern European and Central-Asian
countries, twelve Latin American countries, one Middle East and seven countries from
Sub-Sahara Africa. Given the fact that the sample is biased in favor of high income
countries (app. 60% of the observations are from high income countries) we include in-
come group dummies to control for this and estimate country-group wise in addition to
the pooled estimation. The observations with very low margins, very high temperatures
and very low degrees of urbanization have been excluded from the relevant regressions
after distributional tests.
4.4. Results
4.4.1. Pooled estimation
Table 4.3 summarizes the regression results for different specifications with the transport
margin in agricultural sectors (mag) as dependent variable in specifications (1)-(5). This
margin in agriculture should be more sensitive to bad roads compared to mall which is
the weighted average of the transport margins in all sectors.9 All variables have been
used in natural logarithms such that the results can be interpreted as elasticities.10
The regressions clearly show that for the complete sample an increased availability of
roads significantly reduces the transport margin in agricultural sectors. This effect is
robust in a number of different specifications. The sign remains negative across the dif-
ferent estimations. However, the effect is only significant if we control for distinct country
characteristics such as the income group classification or the geographical location.11 All
these may be interpreted as indicators that clearly differ between industrialized and de-
veloping countries. The estimated elasticity of the transport cost measure with respect
to changes in the road density lies between 0.077 and 0.334 in absolute terms.
The other explanatory variables clearly add explanatory power to the estimation but
are mostly insignificant. We find a fairly robust positive relationship between the degree
of urbanization and transport costs in agricultural sectors, which is related to the fact
that in highly urbanised countries the distance between production site and sales market
for agricultural products is highest.
9Results for all sectors are described in the columns (6)-(10) in table 4.3, results for other specifications
are shown in tables 4.8, 4.11 and 4.12.
10In addition, the use of logarithms significantly reduces the number of outliers which is important here,
given the rather small sample and the fact that there is a large difference in magnitude between the
different variables (gdpc has much higher absolute values than the other variables).
11The coefficient is also significantly negative if we control for the level of education in the labor force.
The education variable itself is, however, not siginificant. This result is shown in table 4.11 in the
appendix.
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Results for the impact of GDP per capita are ambiguous. In order to check whether
this is due to a non-linear relationship between GDP and transport costs, we add gdpc2
in estimation (a12). The coefficients for gdpc and gdpc2 have opposing mathematical
signs, which is an indicator for a non-linear relationship between the dependent variable
and the GDP per capita. However, none of the two coefficients are significant and the
squared term adds only little explanatory power.12
The inclusion of the climate indicators seems to be important as these significantly
increase the explanatory power even though they are only significant in equation (3).
Both high temperatures and high quantities of precipitation increase transport costs,
which is intuitive as these extreme weather conditions hinder transport even if roads are
appropriate. A high share of agriculturally used land is associated with slightly lower
transport margins in agriculture, supposedly due to economies of scale. The effect is not
significant in the complete sample.
The two dummy variables for low and middle income countries are negative and the
low income dummy is highly significant. If these dummies are alternatively split into
five regional dummies for the low and middle income countries, only the Latin America
dummy and the South Asia dummy are significant and the overall explanatory power of
the estimation is lower. However, the significance of these dummies for income groups
or geographical location is a strong indication for a substantial difference between high
income countries on the one hand and developing and transition countries on the other
hand.
One possible explanation for differences in transportation costs between high income
and middle and low income countries, apart from the climate (which adds some explana-
tory power but is not significant), might be that high levels of corruption lead to higher
transaction costs and longer transport times due to frequent controls on the way. In-
deed, corruption is strongly negatively correlated with GDP per capita (see figure 4.1)
and might thus explain the significance of the income dummies if it plays a role in de-
termining transport costs.13
In order to take this into account we include transparency international's perceived
corruption index into estimations (4) and (5). The inclusion of the index increases the
adjusted R2 by 1.7 percentage points. The coefficient has the expected negative sign but
is not significant.
As we believe that the effectiveness of roads might be conditional on the absence of
corruption we include an interaction term between the corruption index and the road
density in the last specification. Surprisingly, this strongly affects the results. The ex-
12See table 4.11 in the appendix.
13Please note the corruption index is defined between 0 and 10 where high levels of the index stand for
low levels of corruption.
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Figure 4.1.: Correlation between corruption and GDP per capita
planatory power rises, the coefficient of road density switches from significantly negative
to insignificantly positive and the coefficient of the corruption index increases and is now
significant, too. The positive coefficient for road density indicates that at very high lev-
els of corruption (i.e. corruption index = 0) an increase in road density could increase
transport costs. Calculating the mean effect of road density on transport margins in
agriculture at mean corruption level gives a coefficient for ln(trans) of −0.331 with a
t-value of −4.786.14 In other words the effectiveness of roads is strongly conditional on
the absence of corruption, at the mean corruption level in the complete sample, the cost
reduction from a 1% increase in road density is roughly 0.3%. However the income group
dummies remain significant even though their influence is lower if corruption is controlled
for.
Medium and low income countries have lower levels of agricultural transport costs, the
OECD member status does not influence the results. Time fixed effects have not been
significant.15
The relation between the transport network density and the transport costs for the
complete sample is confirmed not only for the agricultural sectors but also for the
weighted transport expenditure of all sectors. These results are shown in the last five
14All mean effects are summarised in table 4.6.
15Not shown here to simplify the exposition.
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colums of table 4.3. We consistently find negative coefficients for transport networks
as well. However, the influence of transport networks on the weighted transport costs
in all sectors is much lower. In addition, the explanatory power of the estimations is
substantially lower compared to the estimations for the agricultural sector.
Interestingly, the non-linearity of transport costs with respect to gdpc is significantly
confirmed here in contrast to the results for mag. The GDP has a significant influence
on transport costs in four out of the ten specifications. The influence of GDP is positive
and switches to negative if ln(gdpc)2 is included. The influence of ln(gdpc)2 is signifi-
cantly positive if included. This indicates a diminishing negative influence of the GDP
on transport costs. The signs of most other coefficients are in line with the results for
agricultural transport costs but the magnitudes are lower as well. Time fixed effects
have been insignificant here, either. We do observe a significant coefficient for the low
income dummy but not for the middle income dummy. Geographical dummies do not
have significant influences on transport costs over all sectors.
The results for the inclusion of corruption are not robustly confirmed here. Even
though the inclusion of corruption increases the explanatory power, the coefficient of the
index as well as the one of the interaction term are highly insignificant and close to zero.
Calculating the effect of transport on the margin at mean corruption gives a coefficient
of −0.194 with a t-value of −4.735. This is comparable to the result in equation (9),
thus we do not confirm an interaction effect here.
The somehow weaker results for the weighted transport margin in all sectors might
partly result from the fact that the production structure differs substantially across coun-
tries and thus, as we use sectoral production as weights, the transport cost measure is
very heterogeneous compared to agricultural production which is more comparable across
countries.
4.4.2. Country group estimations
The fact that the income groups have been found to be consistently significant as well
as some of the geographical dummies even after controlling for a number of country
characteristics like climate, population density, urbanization, land use, education and
corruption indicates that there might be a structural difference in the determinants of
transport costs between high income countries and developing and transition countries.
Hence, we divide our sample into a high income and a medium and low income sample.16
We run the same regressions as shown above in order to isolate country group specifics.
We indeed find substantial differences between the two subsamples.
Table 4.4 shows the results for the margin in agricultural sectors. Estimations (1) -
16The descriptive statistics for the two subsamples are shown in the appendix in tables 4.9 and 4.10.
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(5) are for the high income countries only, whereas estimations (6) to (11) only comprise
low and medium income countries.17
It is obvious that the two samples produce quite differing results. For high income
countries we mostly confirm the results obtained in the complete sample. We find a
significantly negative relationship between road infrastructure and transport costs. The
estimated coefficients are even higher compared to table 4.3. Still, the influence of GDP
per capita is ambiguous. Densely populated countries have higher transport costs in
agriculture as well as highly urbanised countries. Supposedly this is due to the fact that
agricultural products have to be carried long ways in these countries. In contrast, higher
shares of agriculture in total land use lead to lower transport costs in this sector, which
may be attributed to economies of scale in transportation.
We also confirm the positive influence of corruption on transport costs (negative coeffi-
cient). However, we do not observe an interaction effect. The coefficient of the interaction
term is insignificant and its inclusion adds virtually no explanatory power.
17Note, to simplify matters not all specifications presented above for the whole sample are replicated
here. We only show those with most explanatory power.
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The picture is quite different for the middle and low income sample. Here we mostly
find positive but sometimes insignificant coefficients for the road density. Hence, in mid-
dle and low income countries additional roads have no effects on transport costs or may
even increase these.
We do not find significant effects of gdpc or population density but we confirm the cost
increasing influence of urbanization. The climate indicators especially the temperature
index are the only determinants that are significant in most specifications to the contrary
of the high income and the complete sample results. For the low and middle income sam-
ple we find a strong cost increasing influence of temperature and a cost-reducing influence
of precipitation.
The inclusion of corruption increases the explanatory power. However corruption is
only significant if the interaction term is included as well. In this case we find a very
high and positive coefficient for roads and high and negative coefficients for corruption
and the interaction term. The R2 is much higher compared to the other specifications,
except for equ. (9). Thus, for transport costs in the agricultural sector in develop-
ing and transition countries we cannot confirm that roads reduce these. However, we
clearly find that corruption hinders improvements in transport costs. At the mean level
of corruption in this sample, the effect of transport infrastructure on transport margins
in agriculture is 0.3341 with a t-value of 2.06. Thus, the mean level of corruption in
developing countries is so high that additional roads are not only inefficient concerning
transport costs in agriculture, they even increase costs in this sector, supposedly due to
inefficient allocation of road investments. At very high levels of corruption (index close to
0) additional roads may even increase transport costs overproportionally (coefficient > 1).
What has been found for the margin in agricultural sectors for the two country groups
is not true for the weighted margin over all sectors. For both income groups we confirm
the negative influence of road infrastructure on tranport costs but with weaker explana-
tory power and lower coefficients. We consistently confirm the cost-increasing influence
of population density and urbanization.
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The countries differ in the influence of climate and in the influence of corruption. We
find a strong influence of temperature on transport costs in both country groups but
with opposing signs. In high income countries higher temperatures reduce the transport
margin whereas in middle and low income countries higher temperatures increase the
transport margin. This may be explained by differences in technology. For precipitation,
the influence is low and partly insignificant in industrialised countries but highly negative
in developing countries.
We cannot confirm the positive influence of corruption for high income countries, but
we find it to be of importance for middle and low income countries, we see a rise in R2
after inclusion of the corruption index. Still, the corruption index is only significant after
controlling for an interaction between corruption and roads. The coefficient for road net-
works becomes insignificant. Calculating mean effects for table 4.5 leads to a coefficient
of transport at mean corruption of −0.089 in high income countries and −0.380 in middle
and low income countries. Hence, the inefficiency of road allocation that has been found
for the agricultural sector in developing and transition countries does not apply for the
margin in all sectors. Still, we confirm the interaction effect and find roads impact to be
conditional on corruption, only the mean level of corruption is not prohibitive for cost
reduction in all sectors but only in agricultural sectors.
Table 4.6.: Effects of ln(transnet) on transport margin at mean corruption
Specification Sample Coefficient t-statistic P-Value
ln(mag) all -0.331*** -4.786 0.000
ln(mall) all -0.194*** -4.735 0.000
ln(mag) high -0.527*** -7.516 0.000
ln(mall) high -0.089** -1.999 0.050
ln(mag) low&med 0.334** 2.061 0.051
ln(mall) low&med -0.380*** -3.516 0.000
4.4.3. Robustness
All estimations have been done using heteroscedasticity-robust standard-errors. The
results are perfectly robust disregarding whether the Newey-West-specification or the
White-specification is used. Based on the Jarque-Bera-Test, we do not reject the null-
hypothesis of normally distributed residuals in any of our estimations.
The results are also robust with respect to the sample. We have run estimations ex-
cluding the smallest and largest countries and obtained similar results as shown here.
However, we are not able to exclude more than one of the developing countries at a time
given the small number of developing countries in the sample.
As the quality of roads has an influence on transport costs, too [this is e.g. found by
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Teravaninthorn & Raballand, 2009, and others] and this aspect is not covered by our
approach we have included either the share of paved roads in the total network of the
respective country or the share of expressways in the paved network of the country in
equations (a20)-(a21) and (a23)-(a24) in table 4.6 in the appendix as measures for the
average road quality in the country. These explanatory variables add slightly to the ex-
planatory power but do not change the general results described above. However, data
on the expressways was only available for the years 2000 and 2005 and thus the inclusion
of this indicator reduces the number of observations substantially. The same is true for
the number of vehicles in a country which might be used as a proxy for the availability
of transport technology. However the data in the WDI on vehicles is very incomplete.
In order to address the problem that the sample splitting leads to a substantially
reduced number of degrees of freedom we have alternatively estimated equations (a22)
and (a25) with triple interaction terms including the income group dummys. The results
are in table 4.6 and are not in contradiction to the results found with separate samples.
In addition it is visible that the influence of corruption is mainly driven by the low income
countries. However, the mean effect is also significant for middle income countries (not
shown).
4.5. Conclusions
We have shown by means of pooled OLS estimations in a sample comprising high, medium
and low income countries that investments in longer and better roads have the poten-
tial to significantly reduce the transport spending. However, this result is of particular
importance for agricultural production and transportation of agricultural goods. Even
though the negative effect of roads on transport costs is confirmed for all sectors, the
importance of the effect is substantially lower on average compared to agricultural trans-
port costs. Other explanatory variables might be more important in industrial sectors.
These results for the complete sample and the confirmation of these for the high in-
come sample show that our proxy for transport costs, the transport margin, is a good
and internationally comparable measure of transaction costs from transportation. Our
results are in line with most findings for high income countries that use other measures
such as the tariff equivalent costs of bad roads or vehicle operation costs.
Splitting the sample into high income countries on the one hand and low and medium
income countries on the other hand reveals substantial differences between country groups.
In low and medium income countries we find climate and most importantly the level
of perceived corruption to be more important in determining transport costs than the
availability of infrastructure. We find substantial differences between industrial and de-
veloping and transition countries that should be taken into account when infrastructure
projects are planned in low and middle income countries.
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We find an interaction effect between road status and corruption that might lead to
negative effects from roads at very high levels of corruption, supposedly due to inefficient
planning and non-maintenance of existing roads. The effectiveness of infrastructure pro-
grams might thus be conditional on the reduction of corruption in these countries. This
is in line with Aschauer [2000] and Hulten [1996] who argue concerning public investment
in general that not only the amount of public capital is important but also how efficiently
it is invested and used. Especially in the agricultural sector in developing and transition
countries this interaction effect is crucial. The mean level of corruption is so high that
it is prohibitive for cost reductions in agriculture. Thus, the agricultural sector in these
countries does not benefit from higher levels of infrastructure and this is partly due to
corruption.
This paper contributes to the literature on infrastructure investment by developing
and applying an internationally comparable measure of transport costs which can be
calculated for a large and growing number of countries. We isolate important determi-
nants of transport costs and provide an insight on sectoral differences concerning roads'
effect on transport costs. Most importantly, we find strong support for the hypothesis
that the positive experiences from large infrastructure programs in industrial countries
cannot easily be applied to developing and transition countries as other important cir-
cumstances should be present as well.
We conclude that investment in transport infrastructure can have highly positive effects
especially on agricultural production and the efficient marketing of agricultural products.
However, this is conditional on low levels of corruption and efficient planning and use of
the infrastructure as well as on the climatic circumstances.
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C. Appendix
Table 4.7.: Data sources & description
Variable Country Data Source Description
transport
margins (m)
Argentina IFPRI
Own calculations based on the Social
Accounting Matrices or Input-Output tables.
Calculation: For each sector we compute:
Sectoral spending on transport/Total
sectoral production and marketing cost, we
then aggregate the margins by calculating an
output-weighted average.
Australia OECD
Austria Eurostat
Bangladesh IFPRI
Belgium Eurostat
Bolivia IFPRI
Brazil IFPRI
Bulgaria Eurostat
Canada OECD
Chile IFPRI
China OECD
Colombia IFPRI
Costa Rica IFPRI
Czech Republic Eurostat
Denmark Eurostat
Egypt IFPRI
El Salvador IFPRI
Estonia Eurostat
Finland Eurostat
France Eurostat
Germany Eurostat
Ghana IFPRI
Great Britain Eurostat
Greece Eurostat
Honduras IFPRI
Hungary Eurostat
India National statistics
Indonesia IFPRI
Ireland Eurostat
Israel OECD
Italy Eurostat
Japan OECD
Kenya IFPRI
Latvia Eurostat
Lithunia Eurostat
Luxemburg Eurostat
Macedonia Eurostat
Malta Eurostat
Mexico IFPRI
Netherlands Eurostat
New Zealand OECD
Nigeria IFPRI
Norway OECD
Paraguay IFPRI
Peru IFPRI
Poland Eurostat
Portugal Eurostat
Romania Eurostat
Russia National statistics
Slovakia Eurostat
Slovenia Eurostat
South Africa IFPRI
Spain Eurostat
Sweden Eurostat
Switzerland National statistics
Tanzania IFPRI
Thailand IFPRI
Turkey Eurostat
Uganda IFPRI
Ukraine National statistics
Uruguay IFPRI
USA OECD
Vietnam IFPRI
Zambia IFPRI
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road density
(transp)
all World develop-
ment indicators
The road density has been calculated based
on the indicators: roads, total net-
work,roads, paved percent and surface, to-
tal. It is defined as paved roads/km2 surface
GDP per capita
(gdpc)
all World develop-
ment indicators
GDP per capita in constant US$
population den-
sity (popdens)
all World develop-
ment indicators
Temperature
index (temp)
all World metereo-
logical organiza-
tion
The index has been calculated as yearly max-
imum squared + yearly minimum squared
Precipitation
(precip)
all World metereo-
logical organiza-
tion
Precipitation per year in mm
urbanization (ur-
ban)
all World develop-
ment indicators
urban population as % of total
agricultural
land(agrland)
all World develop-
ment indicators
Agricultural land as % of land area
Corruption all Transparency in-
ternational
The perceived corruption index is defined be-
tween 0 and 10 where 10 means no corrup-
tion
Education (edu) all World develop-
ment indicators
% of labor force with tertiary education
Motor vehicles
(vehicl)
all World develop-
ment indicators
Motor vehicles per 1000 persons
% Paved roads
(paved)
all World develop-
ment indicators
Paved roads as % of total network
% Expressways
(exprway)
all CIA World Fact-
book
Expressways as % of total paved network
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Table 4.12.: Results from pooled OLS regression for different additional specifications
Spec. No. (a20) (a21) (a22) (a23) (a24) (a25)
dependent ln(mag) ln(mag) ln(mag) ln(mall) ln(mall) ln(mall)
# of obs 105 63 105 105 63 105
ln(transp) 0.405* 0.357 -
0.318***
-0.218 -0.028 -
0.207***
(1.981) (1.000) (-2.830) (-1.424) (-0.076) (-2.747)
ln(gdpc) 0.016 0.357 -0.002 -1.301** 0.443 -1.574**
(0.092) (1.000) (-0.010) (-2.238) (0.375) (-2.449)
ln(gdpc)2 0.080** -0.007 0.093***
(2.483) (-0.109) (2.700)
ln(popdens) 0.253*** 0.274*** 0.121* 0.165*** 0.179*** 0.145***
(3.640) (5.514) 1.662 (3.270) (4.295) (2.927)
ln(urban) 0.755** 0.402 0.083 0.124 0.180 0.115
(2.135) (0.681) (0.167) (0.513) (0.750) (0.529)
ln(temp) -0.025 -0.019 0.107* 0.027 0.015 0.004
(-0.557) (-0.344) (1.769) (1.011) (0.447) (0.143)
ln(precip) 0.184 0.350 -0.048 -0.153* -0.035 -0.151**
(1.225) (1.258) (-0.366) (-1.949) (-0.257) (-2.161)
ln(corrup) -0.91*** -1.121* -0.201 -0.090 -0.212 -0.074
(-2.765) (-1.900) (-0.584) (-0.447) (-0.695) (-0.509)
ln(corrup)*ln(transp) -0.45*** -0.42** -0.018 -0.115
(-5.169) (-2.344) (-0.248) (-0.609)
ln(corrup)*ln(transp)*low 0.355 0.357***
(1.628) (5.720)
ln(corrup)*ln(transp)*med 0.139 -0.057
(1.441) (-1.046)
low income -1.837 -1.146** 0.044
(-1.577) (-2.023) (0.129)
middle income -0.124 -0.343 -0.518
(-0.336) (-1.529) (-1.618)
ln(paved) 0.106 -0.215 0.114 0.094
(0.599) (-1.230) (0.822) (0.665)
ln(exprway) 0.124 -0.112*
(1.181) (-1.834)
constant -8.16*** -9.77*** -3.592 1.487 -7.531 3.203
(-4.123) (-3.505) (-1.426) (0.504) (-1.424) (0.993)
R2 0.378 0.437 0.387 0.274 0.351 0.300
adj. R2 0.320 0.342 0.307 0.179 0.226 0.200
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Abstract
Universal primary education is regarded as one of the key pillars of sustainable de-
velopment. The positive influence of education on growth is supported by many
empirical studies. However, the effects of education on labor supply, poverty re-
duction and welfare as well as subsistence agriculture are hardly traceable in an
econometric setup, given the complex interactions and the long-term nature of ed-
ucation. An economy-wide dynamic simulation model provides a well-suited toolkit
to analyze the effects of increased school provision in these aspects and provides
insights into the intertemporal aspects of the schooling decision of children.
We develop a macro-economic model which explicitly includes education and human
capital allocation and takes into account that the possibility of child labor increases
the opportunity costs of human capital formation. In an application for Tanzania,
we find that a large scale investment program in education might have a negative
effect on both GDP growth and high skilled labor supply in the short-term but leads
to higher GDP and welfare as well as significantly reduced child labor supply in the
medium to long term.
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A sustainable end to world poverty as we know it, [..] require[s] that
citizens are empowered to make positive choices and provide for
themselves and their families.
United Nations Millennium Declaration
5.1. Introduction
Universal primary education ranges prominently among the Millennium Development
Goals and is thus regarded as an important component of human development. In ad-
dition, education is widely believed to allow a country to access a higher steady state
growth path by accumulating human capital. Consequently, education is one of the key
pillars in the development strategies of all African countries and is also one of the main
areas in which development aid is given on a large scale. Spending aid on education is
also seen as a way to prevent Dutch Disease by reducing bottlenecks in scarce skill supply
in the economy [See Heller, 2005].
Empirical cross-country evidence, such as Barro [1997] and Barro & Sala-i-Martin
[2003], confirms that human capital measured by years of schooling has a positive in-
fluence on growth due to increased productivity of workers. Even though this finding is
considered as weak by authors such as Schultz [1999], Pritchett [2001] and Topel [1997],
consensus prevails that very poor education hinders economic development. Schooling
does not only have direct positive effects on human development like lower child mortal-
ity and better health status. It also provides the population with the skills required for
democratic participation and a strong civil society.
Pritchett [2001] suggests that the seemingly low productivity payoff in terms of wage
increases for higher skilled workers might partly be explained by low demand for these
skills and thus emphasizes the importance of considering the demand side of the labor
market as well. Schultz [1999] highlights the differences between primary and higher edu-
cation in terms of social costs and distributional impact and concludes that Africa might
have put too much weight on higher education. This is also in line with findings that
primary education in general produces the highest social rate of return [See also Dreher
et al., 2008]. Moreover, female primary education has a positive influence on child nutri-
tion and children's health status and thus indirect positive effects on labor productivity.
In addition, distributional aspects are of high importance given that reducing poverty is
among the main objectives of aid policy. Gupta et al. [1999] and Gupta & Verhoeven
[2001] add that the efficiency of public investment and public spending is important for
the success of large scale investment in education.
Against the background of the summarized empirical literature the efficiency of public
investment planning, the structure of the labor force and the structure of production and
thus demand for labor need to be integrated in the analysis. In addition, a distinction of
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primary, secondary and higher education is required, i.e. a distinction between different
skill levels in the labor force. The distributional as well as structural consequences in re-
action to investment in education should be regarded as well. Jung & Thorbecke [2003],
Agenor et al. [2008] and Maisonnave & Décaluwé [2010] suggest that a Computable Gen-
eral Equilibrium (CGE) model could provide additional insights in these respects. While
Cloutier et al. [2008] investigate the effects of a reduction in education expenditure in
Vietnam, Jung & Thorbecke [2003], Agenor et al. [2008] and Maisonnave & Décaluwé
[2010] investigate the effect of an increase in public capital for education in different
African countries. While Agenor et al. [2008] assume that only educated labor is used
in production, Jung & Thorbecke [2003] in their model for Tanzania and Zambia and
Maisonnave & Décaluwé [2010] for South-Africa directly model the choice between dif-
ferent skill levels. Both papers develop a recursive dynamic model where the endogenous
skill choice of the labor force does not only depend on the wage differential but also on
the level of public capital in education. They find that increasing public capital in edu-
cation has moderate growth effects. Jung & Thorbecke [2003] find that the production
structure of the economy, the initial labor force structure as well as unemployment in the
benchmark and targeting of the new investments have strong impacts on the results.
This paper takes Jung & Thorbecke [2003] as a point of departure and adds a num-
ber of aspects to the model. Most importantly, we model the process of human capital
formation (i.e. schooling) and the human capital accumulation explicitly instead of in-
cluding only the outcome of the educational process (i.e. the skill choice). This requires
disaggregating skilled labor into the number of (physical) workers and the amount of
human capital they have accumulated. In addition, the inclusion of schooling also allows
to account for the effects of increased human capital accumulation on child labor em-
ployment and family income from child labor.1 Given that child labor is an important
production factor in Tanzania as in other African countries, this adds further insights.
We find that in general the aggregate growth effect of higher enrollment rates is positive
but small. The magnitude of the growth effect from increased schooling strongly depends
on the availability not only of schooling facilities but also of teachers. If enrollment is
increased mainly by raising the pupil-teacher ratio, we do not find a growth effect. In
addition, we find that the availability of enough schools and teachers alone leads to a
strong endogenous decrease in child labor even if the government fails to enforce enroll-
ment. The expected future return to education is high enough that a majority of the
households accept the foregone earnings from child labor and send their child to school,
once the opportunity is there.
A substantial increase in enrollment is necessary if human capital accumulation is in-
tended to grow faster than the population. Only a fraction of all enrolled children will
really accumulate human capital due to non-passing and lower quality of teaching if the
1This aspect of educational policy is also mentioned by Maisonnave & Décaluwé [2010].
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pupil-teacher ratio increases.
On the production side we see that in the first years after an increase in enrollment the
availability of skilled labor outside the public sector stagnates due to the requirement of
additional teachers. In addition, some export-oriented agricultural sectors are very sensi-
tive to decreases in child labor supply and face strongly declining output if enrollment is
increased. We find clear indications that capital and also land constrain the production
effect from increased high-skilled labor supply.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section gives an overview
of the CGE literature in this specific field. Section 3 describes our model in detail,
followed by a description of the data. In section 5 we present the scenarios we simulate.
Results are summarized in section 6 which is followed by a conclusion.
5.2. CGE models on educational policy in Africa
Our study uses a recursive-dynamic economy-wide macro-economic model with a detailed
educational sector to analyze increases in investment for education in a Sub-Saharan
African country, namely Tanzania. There exist three other studies that use comparable
models: Jung & Thorbecke [2003], Agenor et al. [2008] and Maisonnave & Décaluwé
[2010]. We combine several features from these models and hence we briefly describe
these models here with a focus on the educational component.
Jung & Thorbecke [2003] model an educational investment program in the two coun-
tries Zambia and Tanzania and compare the results. Their model is a neoclassical mul-
tisector recursive-dynamic CGE model comparable to the dynamic IFPRI model. Given
their focus on the comparison of two countries, the model uses an aggregated production
and household structure (three sectors, four households). The educational sector, how-
ever, is modeled in detail. They distinguish between unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled
labor. The skill choice equation is derived outside the model. The decision whether to
choose a higher level of schooling depends on the wage differential between the current
skill level and the next skill level and the availability of educational institutions. The
skill choice is made from one period to the next and labor supply is updated correspond-
ingly. Their baseline path is characterized by a proportional growth in all skill classes
(equal to population growth) and unskilled unemployment. Their policy scenario is an
increase in the availability of schools by 15%. They find a positive but low GDP effect for
both countries. Wage effects as well as effects on household incomes differ substantially
between the two countries. This is attributed to differences in capital endowments and
in the structure of unemployment between the countries.
Agenor et al. [2008] use a substantially more aggregated approach. Their model is
a one-sector-one-household model leaving distributional and reallocation issues aside.
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Educational reform is modeled in the nested production function. Public capital in ed-
ucation enters the composite public education input which is needed to transform raw
labor into educated labor which is afterwards combined with public capital in health to
form the effective labor supply. Hence, the model does not account for a skill choice by
the households as it assumes that only educated labor is used in production and it does
not distinguish between different skill levels. However, the decomposition of labor into
the educational component and raw labor is an innovative way to measure the effects of
investment in education. They conclude that a one-time permanent increase in aid allows
the government to increase spending on health, education and infrastructure which leads
to higher GDP growth and lower poverty. A distinction between the different spending
purposes of aid is made in the text and also in the model, but the simulated shock affects
all forms of public capital.
Maisonnave & Décaluwé [2010] model the impact of schooling in a recursive dynamic
setup for South Africa. They follow up on Jung and Thorbecke's approach of a three-step
schooling system but explicitly include the decision-making by pupils in the model. The
decision whether a pupil will graduate, drop-out or repeat the skill-level again depends on
the availability and quality of schools as well as on wages. Their model is very specifically
tailored to the South African labor market as it accounts for ethnic differences in school
attendance and unemployment. They find positive but moderate effects from better
schooling quality on production and wages. At the disaggregate level, however, some
sectors face declining production in reaction to an increase in the quality of schooling
due to higher wages for all labor classes.
5.3. Model description
We use a model which is conceptually loosely based on the IFPRI recursive dynamic
model as described in Thurlow [2004]2 and also used in Jung & Thorbecke [2003] but
formulated in our study as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP)3 and implemented
with GAMS/MPSGE. A complete model code listing is included in the appendix.
We start from Jung & Thorbecke [2003], combine features of the models described
above and add a number of major and minor features:
Most importantly, we adopt a decomposition of skilled labor into raw labor and hu-
man capital and combine this with a perspective on four different skill levels that are
characterized by their human capital intensity. All different labor classes have a distinct
production sector combining raw labor and human capital. Moreover, educational pro-
duction, i.e. school attendance of children, is explicitly included in our model. Thus, we
are able to include the decision problem between childrens' labor supply and school at-
tendance but also the conflict between public service provision and teacher employment.
2See Arndt et al. [2010] and Thurlow & Wobst [2006] for applications based on this model.
3See Rutherford [1999] and Markusen [2004] for a detailed description of the modeling approach.
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Jung & Thorbecke [2003] do not explicitly account for the financing of new schooling
facilities, the increase in public capital in education is exogenous in their model. We
directly model the increase in public capital as financed by aid, i.e. an external transfer
to the government. Moreover, an improvement in education does not only require an
increase in the availability of schools, but also higher public recurrent expenditure as it
raises the demand for teachers. We therefore introduce the requirement for teachers in
the production function for education and assume this spending component to be part
of the government's budget.
In addition, as we directly model the production of education, we are also able to
include education explicitly into households' demand function, thus the demand for edu-
cation becomes endogenous in our model. The endogenous skill choice in Jung & Thor-
becke [2003] is made from one period to the next. This neglects the fact that the lag
between the increase in education facilities and the rising educated labor supply takes
several years. We therefore include a longer lag here by disaggregating skilled labor into
raw labor and years of schooling and assuming that a higher skilled worker requires more
years of schooling. Over and above, in African developing countries the skill choice is
not only dependent on the wage difference between unskilled and skilled labor. It also
involves foregone family income from child labor as Maisonnave & Décaluwé [2010] point
out. We have chosen a dataset which incorporates child labor. Thus, we include the
endogenous choice between sending the child to school and sending it to work (mainly in
agriculture) in some of our scenarios.
The datasets used in Jung & Thorbecke [2003] have been aggregated to a very high level
of aggregation (3 sectors, 4 households) in order to be able to compare the two countries
in the application. As the provision of additional education has large-scale impacts on the
sectoral production structure as well as on distribution, we keep the disaggregated struc-
ture of our dataset, which means that our model includes 38 sectors and 13 production
factors as well as 12 household types (disaggregated by region, education of household
head and income). The production factors are mainly different labor types highly disag-
gregated with respect to their skills (child labor, unskilled adults, adults who have not
finished primary school, not finished secondary school, secondary and higher educated),
two types of capital, subsistence composite and land.4 The data is for Tanzania in 2001.5
Some minor changes are made concerning the government sector, household consump-
tion and production as well as elasticities and functional specifications. These are mainly
required by the structure of the data. We additionally adopt a different model closure, in
accordance with Thurlow [2004], holding world market prices and the external balance
4An overview of all abbreviations for households, factors and sectors used in the remainder of the paper
is given in table 5.12 in the appendix.
5There exist few African datasets with the required disaggregation into skill classes and including child
labor. The given dataset allows to compare our results with those from Jung & Thorbecke [2003] as
well as with the effects of schooling projects that have been realised during the simulated period and
the datasets are comparable as all are provided by IFPRI.
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fixed and allowing investment to adjust to changes in savings.
5.3.1. Within-period specification
Our model is a recursive-dynamic neoclassical CGE model with an Armington production
structure. Hence, the agents in the economy optimize their behavior in each period given
current prices, endowments and their preferences. Their decisions affect the evolution
of the physical capital and human capital stock which is updated between periods. In
general, agents in this kind of model display myopic behavior. However, we introduce
some aspects of quasi-forward looking behavior in the schooling choices.
Production function
We use a 5-stage nested production function with a very detailed labor structure as shown
in figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1.: Nested production function
Domestic production (xd) in each sector i is produced as a combination of interme-
diates, land, the subsistence composite6 and value added. Value added is decomposed
into capital and labor, where labor is a composite of high-skilled and lower skilled la-
bor. We assume a Leontief structure for the top level nest and between agricultural and
non-agricultural capital. Capital and labor are weakly substitutable (σ = 0.5) which is
also true for the substitution between highskilled (LNFS, LSEC) and lowskilled (LNFP,
LNON) labor. Labor of neighboring skill classes (LNFS and LSEC, LNFP and LNON) is
6This refers to the non-decomposable inputs of capital and different labor classes in subsistence farming.
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highly substitutable. Child labor is one form of unskilled labor and highly substitutable
with unskilled adults (LNON). Each skilled labor type (LNFP, LNFS, LSEC) is a specific
Leontief combination of raw labor (LNON) and human capital (HC).
Domestic supply
Domestic production (see figure 5.2) may either be used directly as home consumption
(hci) or be marketed (xi) either on the export (exi) or on the domestic market (dsi).
Domestic market sales are imperfect substitutes for imported goods (imi) as the so called
Armington specification implies. Depending on the sales market a trade and transport
margin is added to the value of production and imports (mxi, mdi, mii).
Figure 5.2.: Sales markets
The sectoral Armington elasticities (τi, ρ
t
i and ρ
s
i ) have been chosen in correspondence
with other models in the literature and we explore their relevance in the sensitivity
analysis.7 The Armington elasticities are listed in table 5.14 in the appendix.
Demand
Households earn income from their endowment with labor, agricultural capital, physi-
cal enterprise capital, subsistence composite, land and human capital as well as from
transfers and remittances. They use their income for consumption, direct tax payments,
remittances, savings and education. Households endowment with human capital is de-
scribed in more detail below.
Household preferences are modeled in a two-stage nested utility function. Consump-
tion of goods is modeled in a Cobb-Douglas function. Demand for education depends
positively on the income of the household, the current price of human capital, as a proxy
for expected future return on human capital, and households initial demand for educa-
tion, i.e. their endowment with children. The consumption nest and education are fairly
imperfect substitutes (s = 0.5) in the households' utility top nest.
7See appendix for details.
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Uh = U(
+
Cons,
+
Edu) (5.1)
The government earns income from indirect and direct taxes, import tariffs, foreign
aid and public enterprises. It utilizes its income to provide public services, pay teachers,
construct schools and for transfers to households and public savings.
Export demand for domestic products is perfectly elastic and adjusts to export supply.
The rest of the world pays and receives remittances, transfers foreign aid and school
capital to the government. Investment demand is driven by savings.
Human capital and education
We decompose skilled and semi-skilled labor into the content of raw labor and human
capital by matching our Social Accounting dataset with the underlying Labor Force Sur-
vey such that the values from the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) can be transformed
into numbers of workers. We suppose that the remaining value of skilled and semi-skilled
labor on top of the value of the (unskilled) raw worker is the value of the human capi-
tal the individual has accumulated. By matching the two datasets we find a non-linear
relationship between the years of schooling an individual has completed and the value
of his human capital (see table 5.1). This is in line with findings from the econometric
literature which states that primary skills provide a higher return compared to secondary
skills. Tanzania has a three-step schooling system with a primary school of eight years,
4 years of secondary school and two additional years of tertiary school. We classify 12
and more years as secondary and higher education and thus refer to these workers as
high skilled workers in the following sections. Workers who have not finished secondary
school are referred to as semi-skilled workers and those who have not finished primary
school as low skilled workers. The decomposition and estimation procedure is described
in section 5.4.2.
Table 5.1.: Estimated labor force decomposition, based on Thurlow & Wobst [2003].
Labor class Approx.
years of
schooling
Estimated
share of
human
capital
in value
of worker
(1− θ)
Share of
total labor
force
Share
of labor
income
Subsistence labor (FSUB) < 2 0% 36.2% 45.8%
Child labor (LCHILD) 0 0% 8.6% 0.5%
No education (LNON) < 2 0% 14.1 % 3.6%
Not finished primary school (LNFP) 2-7 25% 9.8% 8.2%
Not finished secondary school (LNFS) 8-11 30% 29% 28.4%
Secondary or higher education (LSEC) 12 + 95% 2.4% 13.6%
Based on these coefficients we calculated the endowment with workers and human
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capital for each household type. Labor supply (L) of every skill type (s) except from
child, subsistence and no education are then modeled explicitly in a production
function using the input coefficients shown in table 5.1. Where human capital (HC) and
physical worker (Lnon) are of course complements meaning that each skill type has a
Leontief production function combining the physical and the skill input. Skilled, semi-
skilled and unskilled workers are then used in production as shown in figure 5.1.
Ls = θLnon + (1− θ)HC (5.2)
New human capital is produced by the education sector. Educational production
(Sedu) requires children, teachers and schools. Depending on the policy scenario we define
teachers and schools either as complements or very imperfect substitutes. In two possible
cases teachers and schools are not strictly complements: Educational production could
be expanded by only increasing the number of pupils and schools without increasing the
number of teachers which means bigger classes or by increasing the number of teachers
(admin) and pupils without increasing the number of schools which could be realized by
double shifting in class rooms, as is commonly done in African schools.
Sedu = f(
+
children,
+
xdadmin,
+
schools,
−
padmin,
−
wchild,
+
pedu) (5.3)
Each child may either work or attend a school depending on the utility from education.
This is modeled by introducing education into the households' demand functions and
making demand for education dependent on the price of human capital (as a proxy for
expected future return on human capital), the price of education itself and households'
endowment with children. Consequently, if the price for human capital is high, households
will demand more education and thus, more children will attend school instead of working.
Deduh = D(
+
childrenh,
−
pedu,
+
phc) (5.4)
This will also have an increasing effect on childrens' wages (wchild) as the number of
child workers decreases. The indirect effect here is that the opportunity costs of sending
a child to school grow. However, educational production will also expand if the availabil-
ity of schools or teachers rises given the Leontief structure of the educational production
function. In this case, however, the price of education will fall if there is excess produc-
tion relative to demand by households. We also include scenarios where we enforce a
100% enrollment rate by exogenously setting labor demand for children to zero, which
represents an effective ban on child labor. In this case the opportunity cost of sending
a child to school is zero as the outside option of working is not given. Households' pref-
erences will still be linked to the price of human capital. Hence, if the price of human
capital is low, households' utility from enforced schooling is low. The opportunity cost of
sending a child to school is captured in the model by the wage for children. The utility
from education is captured by the equilibrium price for education in household demand.
Given that teachers (i.e. public services in the dataset) are modeled as an input in
131
5. How to model a child in school?
A dynamic macro-simulation study for Tanzania
education, a higher provision of education will lead to rising demand for semi-skilled
and skilled workers. Hence, as long as the schooling process still takes place it creates
a pressure on the market for skilled workers and leads to higher relative wages for high-
skilled. Once the schooling from previous periods leads to growing supply of human
capital, this bottleneck could be eliminated and the relative wage premium is reduced or
disappears.
Model closure
The factor markets are closed by flexible wages that adjust to ensure that the exoge-
nously fixed factor supply is employed. We do not include unemployment as subsistence
agriculture and home consumption is included as productive activity and thus official
registered unemployment is partly included as subsistence labor in our data.
External markets are cleared by flexible demand and supply on world markets and fixed
world market prices as well as a fixed current account balance. All transfers within the
country and between the country and the rest of the world are held constant. Investment
adjusts to equal savings. Savings are determined by a fixed marginal propensity to save
for each household. Hence, savings and investment demand grow with income.
5.3.2. Between-period specification
From one period to the next we update a number of variables, namely labor supply,
physical and human capital stock and productivity.
Labor force dynamics
We assume that the supply of unskilled labor and the subsistence composite grows by
2.7% per year while the supply of children grows by 2.75% per year. Both numbers
have been calculated based on the real development of the working age population and
population aged 10-14 in the years 2001-2010.
The development of skilled labor supply of any skill class, however, is endogenous in
our model (unlike in Jung & Thorbecke [2003] who assume a proportional growth of all
skill classes in their baseline) and depends on educational production in former years as
well as demand for the different skill levels. Human capital accumulation is explained
below. New labor is distributed to the household endowments proportionally to their
initial endowment.
Human capital accumulation
The human capital stock grows if a child spends a year at school and does not have
to repeat the class. It passes the final examination and either leaves the school, goes
on to the next class or graduates. We have calculated the average pass rates from the
educational transition matrix for Tanzania in Wobst & Arndt [2004] and are thus able
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to calculate the number of successful pupils that have accumulated an additional unit of
human capital. We discount this number by the pupil-teacher-ratio relative to the base
year as we know from recent experiences in the two educational programs in Tanzania
that a higher pupil-teacher ratio has led to lower pass-rates.8 New human capital is
distributed to the households based on their endowment with children.
Capital stock dynamics
The initial capital stocks in the base year have been calculated based on capital earn-
ings reported in the SAM and interest and depreciation rates as found in Central Bank
statistics and econometric studies. We update the capital stock by depreciating current
capital by 6.5% and adding new investment as found in the model and adjusting this
with an exogenous productivity parameter in order to match actual rates of capital for-
mation. The new capital stock is allocated to the households proportionally to their
initial endowment with capital.
School provision development
In the baseline scenario we assume a moderate growth in the availability of both pub-
lic capital in education and educational staff. The baseline growth rates of these two
variables have been calculated from the development of the number of schools and the
number of teachers in the 1990s. It was not possible to use the real development in
the simulation period as Tanzania realized two large scale education projects during this
period. Hence, we use the 1990s as a reference period. In our policy counterfactuals we
raise either only the public investment in schools or both capital and recurrent public
spending on education and investigate the differences in the results.
Productivity growth
As in most recursive-dynamic CGE models we assume a baseline growth path for total
factor productivity. In accordance with many CGE and econometric models as well as
with Jung & Thorbecke [2003] we chose total factor productivity in the baseline scenario
in a way that leads to an approximate replication of the past GDP growth rates. This
baseline productivity growth, which results at 5% in our model, as well as the adjustment
of the capital stock is common for all scenarios and hence does not affect any conclusion
about the different educational policies we simulate.
5.4. Data
5.4.1. Data sources and SAM aggregation
We use the IFPRI SAM for Tanzania for 2001 as described in Thurlow & Wobst [2003].
We chose Tanzania for several reasons: First, Tanzania and Zambia are natural candi-
dates for our study as this allows to at least partly compare our results with those from
8See The World Bank [2005] and The World Bank [2011].
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Jung & Thorbecke [2003]. Among these two, Tanzania was chosen because Tanzania has
realized two large scale educational projects since the base year of the most recent SAM,
hence we can compare our results with the experiences in reality. Moreover, the IFPRI
Tanzania SAM is very rich in terms of educational disaggregation of the labor force and
it provides information on child labor, both because it is linked to the very detailed
Labor Force Survey 2000/2001. This degree of disaggregation was necessary in order to
match our modeling of human capital production and accumulation. The availability
of a Labor Force Survey for the same year provided important additional information
and allowed to disaggregate skilled and semi-skilled labor into the two components raw
labor and human capital appropriately. In addition, Tanzanian school statistics are also
quite complete and provide a time series dimension. This information was helpful to find
appropriate proxies for public capital in education, the baseline growth rate of schools
and teachers and the total number of pupils between ages 10 and 14.
We aggregate the data slightly in the sectoral dimension. Instead of the original 43
sectors, we retain 38 sectors. We keep the full detail of household and factor disaggre-
gation, we only drop the gender-disaggregation in labor classes for reasons of simplicity
and due to a lack of information on the gender of child labor. Table 5.11 in the appendix
gives an overview of the household and labor class definitions.
Additional data on the labor force, population (population growth, young population,
working age population, regional distribution of children and adults) and the schooling
system (number of teachers, number of schools, enrollment by age group, enrollment by
region) has been taken from the 2000/2001 Tanzania Labor Force Survey, the 2000/2001
Census and several editions of the National Basic Education Statistics (BSE). In addi-
tion, we have used Central Bank statistics to calculate the interest rate.
From schooling statistics we estimate the number of pupils that are between 10 and
14 years old (i.e. have the outside option of working by the definition of our dataset)
and the enrollment rates in these age groups for rural and urban regions. We could
thus approximate the additional endowment with non-working children for the different
households and define these as pupils.
Descriptive tables on the sectoral factor and trade intensities, households' income and
spending structure are included in the appendix.
5.4.2. Skilled labor disaggregation
Social Accounting Matrices commonly report values for the inputs in production not the
quantities and prices separately. In CGE applications the convention is usually that the
initial prices are all set to unity such that values and quantities are equal. Thus, from the
SAM information on the wage premium for human capital cannot be retrieved, however
we follow a modeling procedure which discriminates between the number of (physical)
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workers and the value of their human capital. Hence, we had to combine the SAM data
with other data in order to find out the number of skilled workers instead of their value
and this has to be done for all different skill classes.
Fortunately the IFPRI SAM uses labor force data from the Labour Force Survey
2000/20019 and thus a mapping of the number of workers and the value of these workers
is available. [See Thurlow & Wobst, 2003, p.27] Please note, this mapping is only avail-
able for the whole labor force not on a sectoral basis. Hence we are only able to make
an average decomposition not a sector-specific decomposition.
We decompose the values from the SAM into the value of the physical, unskilled
workers and the value of their human capital. We first calculate the average wage of
an unskilled worker (wLNON as the sum of earnings from unskilled labor in all sectors
i (DLNONi ) from the SAM divided by the number of such workers in the Labor Force
Survey (nLNON ):
wLNON =
∑
iD
LNON
i (SAM)
nLNON (LFS)
(5.5)
For each skilled labor class (s) we then calculate the implicit value of the physical
workers in this skill class over all sectors (
∑
iD
LNON
i,s ), by multiplying the number of
such workers from the LFS (ns) with the wage for unskilled workers:
∑
i
DLNONi,s = ns(LFS) · wLNON (5.6)
Hence, the value of human capital for each skill class (s) in all sectors (i) (DHCi,s )is
retrieved as the difference between the earnings of these workers in the SAM (
∑
iD
Ls
i )
and the implicit value of their physical labor force.
∑
i
DHCi,s =
∑
i
DLsi −
∑
i
DLNONi,s (5.7)
Having retrieved the aggregate numbers for the implicit values of workers and human
capital for each skill class (s), we are now able to calculate the shares reported in table
5.1. These shares are used to calculate the endowments with human capital and unskilled
workers for each household type h and for the calibration of the production functions for
skilled workers of the different skill levels. Thus, we have finally decomposed demand and
supply of labor of any skill class into unskilled workers and a certain amount of human
capital.
5.5. Baseline assumptions and counterfactuals
In the model briefly described above we simulate different scenarios which all represent
educational policy programs. These are briefly summarized in table 5.2.
9Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics (2002).
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Table 5.2.: Scenario specification
Variable Scenario
0 1 2 3 4
School provision grows with
population
growth rate
(n)
grows by
52.2% in 2002
and after-
wards with
rate n
grows with
population
growth rate
(n)
grows with
n + 2 in 2002
& 2003, n + 1
in 2004, n + 5
in 2005 and
2006 and n
from 2007
onwards
grows by
52.2% in 2002
and after-
wards with
rate n
Number of teachers grows with
population
growth rate
(n)
endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous
Pupil-teacher ratio endogenous constant endogenous endogenous endogenous
Child labor Possible Prohibited Prohibited Possible Possible
In the first and second counterfactual we simulate a policy where the government en-
forces a 100% enrollment rate, i.e., we do not allow children to be employed. However,
only in the first counterfactual we provide the required schooling resources to hold the
pupil-school ratio and the pupil-teacher-ratio constant. This means a massive increase in
the availability of schools (by 52.2%) and in the employment of teaching staff in the first
simulation period. Afterwards, schooling investment and educational staff grow with the
same growth rate as in the baseline scenario.
In the second counterfactual we also prohibit child labor but the government continues
to increase schools and teachers only with the baseline growth rate. This means that the
pupil-teacher and pupil-school ratio increase and probably some children will not find a
place in a school but are not allowed to work, either.
In the third scenario we simulate a rather modest investment scenario with a continu-
ous increase in public investment over the years which is based on the two projects that
were realized in Tanzania during the simulation period. We simulate the following path
for the number of schools: In 2002 and 2003, the number of schools increases by 2% plus
the baseline growth. In 2004, an additional 1% is added and in 2005 and 2006 5% on top
of the baseline growth rate. Up from 2007, schools grow with the baseline growth rate.
We assume the number of teachers to grow in accordance with the demand for teachers
from the educational sector. However, we allow childrens' work as an outside option. In
addition, we assume that the productivity of skilled labor grows by 10% up from 2005
due to increased quality in education.
In the forth counterfactual we assume that the government increases public investment
by 52.2% like in the first scenario which means that now each child would have a place
in school. We assume teaching staff employment to grow endogenously. We allow for a
higher pupil-teacher ratio and hold the pupil-school ratio constant. Child labor is allowed
as an outside option.
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It is assumed across all scenarios that the public investment (building of schools) is fi-
nanced by aid whereas the additional teachers have to be financed from the governmental
budget. Hence, educational policy is detrimental to other public service provision. We
hold the population and productivity growth rates constant across the different counter-
factuals.
5.6. Simulation results and sensitivity analysis
5.6.1. Results
Table 5.3 shows the development of the educational inputs and production in the different
scenarios. The public capital in schooling is always set exogenously whereas the number
of teachers is only set exogenously in scenario 1 (implicitly by holding the pupil-teacher
ratio constant). The number of pupils and educational production are determined in the
model following households' demand for education and the working possibility for chil-
dren. The human capital stock results endogenously from educational production and
the pupil-teacher ratio in previous periods.
Table 5.3.: Educational variables
Variable Sce-
nario
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Public
capital
in
schooling
0 1.0000 1.0270 1.0547 1.0832 1.1125 1.1425 1.1733 1.2050 1.2376 1.2710
1 1.0000 1.5222 1.5641 1.6071 1.6513 1.6967 1.7434 1.7913 1.8406 1.8912
2 1.0000 1.0270 1.0547 1.0832 1.1125 1.1425 1.1733 1.2050 1.2376 1.2710
3 1.0000 1.0481 1.0984 1.1399 1.2298 1.3268 1.3633 1.4008 1.4393 1.4789
4 1.0000 1.5222 1.5641 1.6071 1.6513 1.6967 1.7434 1.7913 1.8406 1.8912
Number
of
pupils
0 1.0000 1.0402 1.0981 1.1592 1.2224 1.2880 1.3562 1.4274 1.5017 1.5796
1 1.0000 1.3185 1.5137 1.5702 1.6239 1.6797 1.7376 1.7977 1.8604 1.9259
2 1.0000 1.5747 1.6747 1.7809 1.8940 2.0142 2.1420 2.2779 2.4225 2.5762
3 1.0000 1.0374 1.0926 1.1446 1.2659 1.3712 1.4449 1.5057 1.5682 1.6330
4 1.0000 1.3544 1.4943 1.5687 1.6467 1.7280 1.8122 1.8996 1.9904 2.0850
Number
of
teachers
0 1.0000 1.0160 1.0486 1.0848 1.1228 1.1627 1.2044 1.2480 1.2937 1.3413
1 1.0000 1.3185 1.5137 1.5702 1.6239 1.6797 1.7376 1.7977 1.8604 1.9259
2 1.0000 1.0270 1.0547 1.0832 1.1125 1.1425 1.1733 1.2050 1.2376 1.2710
3 1.0000 1.0374 1.0926 1.1446 1.2148 1.3061 1.3651 1.4108 1.4578 1.5066
4 1.0000 1.3702 1.5005 1.5413 1.5830 1.6276 1.6744 1.7235 1.7748 1.8285
Educa-
tional
produc-
tion
0 1.0000 1.0270 1.0548 1.0834 1.1128 1.1430 1.1740 1.2058 1.2385 1.2721
1 1.0000 1.5189 1.5635 1.6066 1.6510 1.6965 1.7433 1.7914 1.8408 1.8916
2 1.0000 1.0277 1.0555 1.0840 1.1133 1.1434 1.1742 1.2060 1.2385 1.2720
3 1.0000 1.0479 1.0983 1.1400 1.2298 1.3268 1.3635 1.4011 1.4397 1.4794
4 1.0000 1.5191 1.5632 1.6063 1.6506 1.6962 1.7429 1.7910 1.8404 1.8912
Pupil-
teacher
ratio
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0239 1.0472 1.0686 1.0887 1.1078 1.1261 1.1437 1.1608
1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2 1.0000 1.0000 1.5333 1.5878 1.6441 1.7025 1.7630 1.8255 1.8904 1.9575
3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0421 1.0498 1.0584 1.0672 1.0757
4 1.0000 1.0000 0.9885 0.9959 1.0178 1.0403 1.0617 1.0823 1.1022 1.1215
Human
capital
stock
0 1.0000 1.0211 1.0426 1.0648 1.0877 1.1114 1.1360 1.1615 1.1878 1.2152
1 1.0000 1.0211 1.0490 1.0810 1.1142 1.1485 1.1840 1.2207 1.2587 1.2980
2 1.0000 1.0211 1.0428 1.0651 1.0880 1.1115 1.1357 1.1605 1.1859 1.2121
3 1.0000 1.0211 1.0431 1.0661 1.0923 1.1201 1.1499 1.1811 1.2133 1.2466
4 1.0000 1.0211 1.0501 1.0818 1.1144 1.1478 1.1822 1.2176 1.2540 1.2916
It is important to mention that the assumed size of public investment differs quite sub-
stantially across the scenarios: It is visible in the first section of table 5.3 that scenario
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3 which is based on the projects realized in Tanzania has a much lower investment, i.e.
lower school provision, compared to the high investment in scenarios 1 and 4. However,
the projects have not done most of the investment in the first year but the investment is
splitted in two projects and grows gradually.
When children are not allowed to work by assumption (scenarios 1 and 2), the number
of pupils at the end of the simulation period is about 89% higher then in 2001 and about
60% higher compared to simply continuing with current enrollment (scenario 0). Even if
public investment is high enough to provide additional places in schools for every child
currently working, if the pupil-teacher ratio is held constant, the endogenous employment
of teachers is not sufficient to allow every child to go to school in scenario 1. In scenario
2 all children are enrolled but at current school and teacher provision this would lead to
about 50% more pupils per teacher.
Without additional investment and additional teachers (2), 100% enrollment does not
increase educational production significantly compared to the baseline-levels. On the
other hand, if there is a sufficient school provision with enough teachers being employed,
even if the outside option of working is retained (4) the majority of children is endoge-
nously sent to school and educational production as well as human capital accumulation
is nearly as high as with enforced mandatory schooling.
The effect on the stock of human capital, however, is modest even in the high invest-
ment scenarios 1 and 4. This is mainly due to the fact that pass rates are on average
at only 75% and that human capital accumulation is assumed to be slower if the pupil
teacher ratio rises. In this aspect the reality-based scenario 3 lies in between the business
as usual scenario 0 and the high investment provision in scenario 2.
Table 5.4.: Results: Macroeconomic aggregates (benchmark = 1)
Variable Sce-
nario
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP
0 1.0000 1.0419 1.0862 1.1332 1.1833 1.2366 1.2934 1.3539 1.4185 1.4873
1 1.0000 1.0385 1.0839 1.1328 1.1847 1.2400 1.2987 1.3611 1.4275 1.4981
2 1.0000 1.0385 1.0826 1.1293 1.1790 1.2319 1.2882 1.3482 1.4121 1.4803
3 1.0000 1.0419 1.0863 1.1336 1.1836 1.2370 1.2944 1.3556 1.4208 1.4902
4 1.0000 1.0399 1.0853 1.1344 1.1865 1.2418 1.3005 1.3630 1.4294 1.5000
Welfare
0 1.0000 1.0413 1.0839 1.1280 1.1744 1.2232 1.2747 1.3290 1.3862 1.4466
1 1.0000 1.0417 1.0840 1.1294 1.1782 1.2296 1.2839 1.3413 1.4019 1.4659
2 1.0000 1.0393 1.0817 1.1253 1.1712 1.2195 1.2702 1.3235 1.3795 1.4385
3 1.0000 1.0418 1.0847 1.1287 1.1794 1.2305 1.2817 1.3365 1.3945 1.4558
4 1.0000 1.0479 1.0891 1.1348 1.1836 1.2347 1.2887 1.3457 1.4058 1.4694
GDP
growth
rate
(in%)
0 4.1909 4.2484 4.3291 4.4184 4.5067 4.5941 4.6807 4.7664 4.8516
1 3.8514 4.3734 4.5048 4.5894 4.6626 4.7350 4.8064 4.8771 4.9473
2 3.8514 4.2415 4.3157 4.4027 4.4877 4.5724 4.6566 4.7404 4.8241
3 4.1927 4.2596 4.3521 4.4079 4.5198 4.6331 4.7274 4.8105 4.8902
4 3.9913 4.3665 4.5216 4.5934 4.6605 4.7309 4.8009 4.8707 4.9403
GDP/
Capita
0 1.0000 1.0149 1.0314 1.0499 1.0708 1.0940 1.1200 1.1488 1.1808 1.2162
1 1.0000 1.0115 1.0292 1.0495 1.0722 1.0974 1.1253 1.1560 1.1898 1.2270
2 1.0000 1.0115 1.0278 1.0460 1.0665 1.0893 1.1148 1.1431 1.1745 1.2091
3 1.0000 1.0149 1.0316 1.0503 1.0710 1.0945 1.1209 1.1504 1.1831 1.2191
4 1.0000 1.0129 1.0306 1.0511 1.0740 1.0992 1.1271 1.1579 1.1917 1.2289
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In general, we see a slight welfare and GDP increase compared to the baserun in any of
the scenarios with higher investment. However, the welfare effect as well as the produc-
tion effect are rather small compared to the massive investment simulated. It is highest
in those scenarios where we have a large increase in school provision whereas it is smaller
if school availability lacks behind the number of pupils. The welfare effect is highest in
scenario 4 with high schooling provision and endogenous selection into school attendance.
In the case where child labor is prohibited but schooling is not sufficiently provided
(2), we see a strong increase in the pupil-teacher ratio but nearly no effect on welfare
and GDP compared to the baseline. This is because educational production and human
capital accumulation are nearly unchanged compared to the baseline as pupils do not find
a sufficient schooling environment to learn and accumulate human capital while they do
not have the alternative to work and thus do not produce something and earn income
for their households.
Annual GDP growth rates show a much more heterogeneous picture than GDP and
reveal that the two scenarios with very high schooling investment (1 and 4) produce lower
growth rates in the first period, followed by a growth boost when the additional human
capital enters the labor market and remaining at higher growth rates afterwards, whereas
the project scenario (3) leads to a slow but steady increase in GDP growth in 2002 to 2009.
Table 5.5.: Results: Factor prices in 2010, base year level = 1
ScenarioFSUB LCHILD LNON LNFP LNFS LSEC CAPAG CAPNAGLAND
0 0.875 0.500 0.470 0.943 1.199 1.236 0.819 0.944 1.666
1 0.848 0.000 0.436 0.824 1.034 1.065 0.730 0.981 2.277
2 0.884 0.051 0.487 0.980 1.248 1.286 0.861 0.934 1.468
3 0.867 0.485 0.452 0.892 1.130 1.164 0.778 0.958 1.925
4 0.850 0.521 0.447 0.816 1.016 1.044 0.716 0.984 2.302
A more disaggregated perspective on factor supply (table 5.6) shows that, if skill choice
is modeled endogenously most of the human capital accumulated will be used for semi-
skilled and high-skilled labor provision, the relative provision of labor with only primary
skills decreases.
Factor prices (table 5.5) reveal that rents on capital increase relative to the wages of
unskilled labor but not to the level of high skilled wages. This is in reaction to the rela-
tive growth of labor in comparison to capital and land in combination with the assumed
increase in capital productivity. Most importantly, land rents increase relative to returns
to all other factors. This shows that land acts as a rationing factor for an overall pro-
duction response given its fixed supply and non-substitutability with other production
factors. This supports the arguments by other authors such as Schultz [1999] and Pritch-
ett [2001] that schooling investment does not provide high social returns because labor
is not equipped with enough complementary resources to be highly productive. In our
case land evolves as the rationing factor. However, for other countries or with lower cap-
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ital productivity capital might as well limit the productivity of additional skilled workers.
Child wages reflect the alternative costs of schooling. If children are not allowed to
work (scenarios 1 and 2), the opportunity cost of sending the children to school is very
low or even zero (in scenario 1). If schooling provision and demand for education rises,
but the outside option of working is in place as well, the opportunity cost of going to
school is positive and childrens' wages remain at a comparable level to unskilled adults'
wages.
Table 5.6 summarizes the employment effects of the different policies. Unskilled labor
employment grows faster than skilled employment due to lagged and costly provision
of high skilled labor. Interestingly, primary skilled labor employment shows a non-
monotonic development in most scenarios: during the first years a slight increase and
later on a decrease. The main reason for this phenomenon is that secondary schooling
requires primary schooling and thus in the first years additional primary skilled workers
enter the labor market.
While an above-average proportion of the new semi skilled labor works outside the
public sector, the opposite is true for high skilled labor. High skilled workers outside the
public sector grow slower than the overall employment of these workers. Hence, indeed
we find a diverting effect from other sectors to the public sector due to increased demand
for teachers.
A further important and very positive result is that, even if child labor is not prohib-
ited effectively, a sufficient school provision (scenario 4) reduces childrens' (endogenous)
employment by 50% compared to the baseline case in 2010. However, even in the high
investment scenarios 1 and 4, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor decreases over time
as human capital accumulation is slower than population growth.
At the sectoral level we find that not all sectors benefit from the general higher provi-
sion of labor. This mainly concerns export oriented agricultural sectors (coffee, cotton,
cashew nuts, sugar and the trade sector itself). These seem to be very sensitive to any
change in the structure of factor supply mainly due to their specific combination of land
intensity and rather high skilled labor demand compared to domestically used agricul-
ture. Hence, higher land rent and growing demand for high skilled labor in education hit
these sectors twice, while a higher supply of children and unskilled labor is not beneficial
to them.
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Table 5.6.: Results: Employment (benchmark = 1)
Factor cate-
gory
Sce-
nario
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Subsistence
composite
0 1.000 1.063 1.130 1.201 1.277 1.357 1.442 1.533 1.630 1.732
1 1.000 1.063 1.130 1.201 1.277 1.357 1.442 1.533 1.630 1.732
2 1.000 1.063 1.130 1.201 1.277 1.357 1.442 1.533 1.630 1.732
3 1.000 1.063 1.130 1.201 1.277 1.357 1.442 1.533 1.630 1.732
4 1.000 1.063 1.130 1.201 1.277 1.357 1.442 1.533 1.630 1.732
Child labor
0 1.000 1.112 1.199 1.293 1.397 1.510 1.634 1.769 1.915 2.073
1 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 1.000 1.118 1.211 1.324 1.306 1.337 1.450 1.606 1.777 1.962
4 1.000 0.458 0.375 0.441 0.514 0.595 0.686 0.787 0.899 1.022
Unskilled
labor
0 1.000 1.196 1.414 1.648 1.899 2.168 2.456 2.764 3.092 3.442
1 1.000 1.199 1.400 1.607 1.831 2.071 2.331 2.609 2.908 3.228
2 1.000 1.200 1.415 1.647 1.897 2.164 2.451 2.759 3.088 3.439
3 1.000 1.196 1.413 1.645 1.886 2.148 2.429 2.729 3.050 3.393
4 1.000 1.182 1.369 1.577 1.804 2.050 2.315 2.599 2.905 3.233
Labor - not
finished
primary
school
0 1.000 1.005 1.001 0.995 0.987 0.978 0.968 0.958 0.946 0.934
1 1.000 1.002 1.004 1.008 1.010 1.011 1.010 1.008 1.006 1.002
2 1.000 1.001 1.000 0.996 0.990 0.984 0.976 0.967 0.957 0.946
3 1.000 1.005 1.001 0.995 0.995 0.990 0.982 0.973 0.962 0.951
4 1.000 1.018 1.033 1.038 1.037 1.034 1.029 1.024 1.017 1.009
Labor - not
finished
secondary
school
0 1.000 1.021 1.045 1.069 1.094 1.120 1.146 1.174 1.202 1.231
1 1.000 1.019 1.047 1.078 1.111 1.145 1.180 1.216 1.253 1.291
2 1.000 1.019 1.042 1.067 1.092 1.117 1.144 1.170 1.198 1.225
3 1.000 1.022 1.045 1.070 1.099 1.127 1.156 1.185 1.216 1.247
4 1.000 1.029 1.056 1.086 1.117 1.150 1.184 1.218 1.254 1.290
Labor -
secondary
and higher
educated
0 1.000 1.027 1.054 1.083 1.114 1.145 1.179 1.214 1.252 1.291
1 1.000 1.032 1.071 1.114 1.160 1.209 1.259 1.312 1.368 1.426
2 1.000 1.033 1.061 1.089 1.118 1.149 1.181 1.215 1.250 1.287
3 1.000 1.026 1.055 1.086 1.108 1.141 1.181 1.223 1.266 1.312
4 1.000 1.006 1.045 1.091 1.138 1.187 1.238 1.291 1.346 1.403
Agricultural
capital
0 1.000 1.036 1.074 1.116 1.160 1.208 1.260 1.316 1.377 1.442
1 1.000 1.036 1.074 1.116 1.160 1.208 1.259 1.315 1.374 1.439
2 1.000 1.036 1.074 1.116 1.160 1.208 1.260 1.316 1.376 1.442
3 1.000 1.036 1.074 1.116 1.160 1.208 1.260 1.315 1.375 1.440
4 1.000 1.036 1.074 1.116 1.160 1.208 1.260 1.315 1.375 1.439
Non-
agricultural
capital
0 1.000 1.036 1.074 1.116 1.160 1.208 1.260 1.316 1.376 1.441
1 1.000 1.036 1.074 1.115 1.160 1.207 1.259 1.314 1.374 1.438
2 1.000 1.036 1.074 1.115 1.160 1.208 1.260 1.315 1.376 1.441
3 1.000 1.036 1.074 1.116 1.160 1.208 1.259 1.315 1.375 1.439
4 1.000 1.036 1.074 1.116 1.160 1.208 1.259 1.315 1.374 1.439
Land
0 1.000 1.035 1.071 1.109 1.148 1.188 1.229 1.272 1.317 1.363
1 1.000 1.035 1.071 1.109 1.148 1.188 1.229 1.272 1.317 1.363
2 1.000 1.035 1.071 1.109 1.148 1.188 1.229 1.272 1.317 1.363
3 1.000 1.035 1.071 1.109 1.148 1.188 1.229 1.272 1.317 1.363
4 1.000 1.035 1.071 1.109 1.148 1.188 1.229 1.272 1.317 1.363
Non-agricultural sectors are generally less sensitive to changes in schooling provision
compared to agricultural sectors. In agriculture and food processing we find significant
differences between the scenarios. Most agricultural products, as well as hunting, forestry
and fishing, experience an additional production boom in scenarios 1 and 4, whereas the
opposite is true for maize, other crops and other staple food which are better off in the
baseline without additional schooling. These are the main staple food sectors that suffer
from the relative scarcity of land.
From a distributional perspective we see that investments in the educational system
are clearly poverty reducing and lead to a more even income distribution (see table 5.7).
Rural households benefit because land rents increase and thus they earn more. House-
holds with a high-skilled head are better off in the baseline scenario and in scenario 2,
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Table 5.7.: Results: Household income, base year = 1
Household
group
Sce-
nario
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
rural, below
food poverty
line
0 1.000 1.038 1.081 1.127 1.176 1.229 1.285 1.346 1.411 1.481
1 1.000 1.026 1.076 1.125 1.178 1.234 1.293 1.356 1.422 1.492
2 1.000 1.031 1.076 1.122 1.171 1.224 1.282 1.343 1.409 1.480
3 1.000 1.037 1.080 1.127 1.182 1.234 1.293 1.354 1.420 1.490
4 1.000 1.036 1.083 1.131 1.183 1.238 1.297 1.359 1.425 1.495
rural,
between
food and
basic needs
line
0 1.000 1.036 1.077 1.122 1.170 1.221 1.276 1.335 1.399 1.467
1 1.000 1.025 1.073 1.121 1.171 1.225 1.282 1.342 1.407 1.474
2 1.000 1.030 1.073 1.118 1.166 1.218 1.273 1.333 1.398 1.468
3 1.000 1.035 1.077 1.122 1.175 1.225 1.282 1.342 1.405 1.474
4 1.000 1.033 1.079 1.125 1.175 1.228 1.285 1.345 1.409 1.476
rural,
uneducated
0 1.000 1.037 1.083 1.133 1.189 1.249 1.315 1.387 1.465 1.549
1 1.000 1.004 1.063 1.121 1.184 1.251 1.322 1.398 1.479 1.565
2 1.000 1.011 1.062 1.114 1.170 1.232 1.299 1.372 1.451 1.537
3 1.000 1.036 1.082 1.134 1.202 1.262 1.331 1.403 1.482 1.567
4 1.000 1.041 1.096 1.150 1.210 1.274 1.343 1.417 1.496 1.580
rural, not
finished
primary
school
0 1.000 1.034 1.074 1.117 1.164 1.214 1.268 1.325 1.388 1.454
1 1.000 1.022 1.068 1.110 1.157 1.206 1.258 1.313 1.372 1.435
2 1.000 1.028 1.070 1.114 1.161 1.212 1.267 1.326 1.390 1.459
3 1.000 1.033 1.073 1.117 1.164 1.212 1.267 1.324 1.385 1.451
4 1.000 1.031 1.072 1.114 1.160 1.208 1.260 1.316 1.375 1.438
rural, not
finished
secondary
school
0 1.000 1.032 1.068 1.106 1.146 1.190 1.236 1.285 1.338 1.394
1 1.000 1.026 1.065 1.103 1.143 1.186 1.231 1.280 1.332 1.387
2 1.000 1.030 1.067 1.105 1.145 1.189 1.235 1.285 1.339 1.396
3 1.000 1.031 1.067 1.106 1.146 1.189 1.236 1.285 1.337 1.393
4 1.000 1.031 1.067 1.103 1.144 1.187 1.232 1.281 1.333 1.388
rural,
secondary
or higher
educated
0 1.000 1.032 1.065 1.097 1.131 1.166 1.202 1.241 1.281 1.324
1 1.000 1.039 1.068 1.092 1.119 1.148 1.178 1.210 1.245 1.282
2 1.000 1.042 1.073 1.105 1.138 1.174 1.211 1.250 1.292 1.336
3 1.000 1.032 1.064 1.096 1.120 1.154 1.190 1.227 1.265 1.307
4 1.000 1.026 1.052 1.078 1.107 1.137 1.169 1.203 1.239 1.277
urban,
below food
poverty line
0 1.000 1.030 1.063 1.098 1.136 1.175 1.218 1.263 1.311 1.362
1 1.000 1.029 1.063 1.099 1.138 1.179 1.223 1.270 1.319 1.373
2 1.000 1.030 1.063 1.098 1.135 1.175 1.217 1.262 1.310 1.361
3 1.000 1.030 1.063 1.098 1.138 1.177 1.220 1.266 1.315 1.367
4 1.000 1.033 1.066 1.101 1.140 1.181 1.225 1.272 1.321 1.374
urban,
between
food and
basic needs
line
0 1.000 1.038 1.079 1.123 1.170 1.221 1.275 1.333 1.395 1.462
1 1.000 1.025 1.072 1.120 1.172 1.226 1.285 1.347 1.413 1.484
2 1.000 1.027 1.070 1.114 1.162 1.212 1.266 1.324 1.386 1.453
3 1.000 1.038 1.079 1.124 1.179 1.230 1.285 1.344 1.408 1.475
4 1.000 1.044 1.087 1.133 1.184 1.237 1.295 1.356 1.421 1.491
urban,
uneducated
0 1.000 1.027 1.059 1.094 1.133 1.174 1.220 1.269 1.322 1.379
1 1.000 1.011 1.048 1.089 1.132 1.179 1.230 1.284 1.342 1.403
2 1.000 1.013 1.046 1.082 1.120 1.162 1.207 1.256 1.309 1.366
3 1.000 1.027 1.059 1.094 1.141 1.184 1.231 1.281 1.336 1.394
4 1.000 1.037 1.073 1.111 1.153 1.198 1.247 1.300 1.356 1.417
urban, not
finished
primary
school
0 1.000 1.025 1.055 1.087 1.122 1.159 1.200 1.243 1.289 1.338
1 1.000 1.022 1.053 1.082 1.114 1.148 1.185 1.225 1.267 1.313
2 1.000 1.025 1.055 1.088 1.123 1.161 1.202 1.246 1.293 1.343
3 1.000 1.024 1.054 1.086 1.118 1.154 1.195 1.237 1.282 1.330
4 1.000 1.027 1.055 1.083 1.115 1.150 1.187 1.227 1.270 1.316
urban, not
finished
secondary
school
0 1.000 1.028 1.059 1.093 1.128 1.166 1.207 1.250 1.296 1.346
1 1.000 1.025 1.057 1.086 1.119 1.154 1.191 1.231 1.275 1.321
2 1.000 1.028 1.060 1.093 1.129 1.168 1.209 1.253 1.300 1.351
3 1.000 1.027 1.059 1.092 1.123 1.161 1.202 1.244 1.289 1.338
4 1.000 1.029 1.058 1.087 1.120 1.155 1.193 1.233 1.277 1.323
urban,
secondary
or higher
educated
0 1.000 1.031 1.070 1.109 1.149 1.192 1.237 1.284 1.335 1.389
1 1.000 1.027 1.064 1.088 1.116 1.146 1.177 1.211 1.247 1.286
2 1.000 1.034 1.075 1.114 1.156 1.200 1.248 1.298 1.352 1.410
3 1.000 1.030 1.068 1.106 1.131 1.172 1.216 1.259 1.305 1.354
4 1.000 1.021 1.050 1.075 1.105 1.137 1.170 1.205 1.243 1.284
142
5. How to model a child in school?
A dynamic macro-simulation study for Tanzania
where high skilled labor is relatively scarce, whereas poor and unskilled households are
better off in the high investment scenarios. These households, who start from a very
low endowment with human capital, accumulate relatively more human capital and thus
benefit more from higher school provision. Scenario 4 is the most beneficial for unskilled
and poor households. This scenario combines high schooling provision and the outside
option of child labor and thus allows households to accumulate more human capital while
still earning income from child labor as well.
5.6.2. Robustness
As we have a very high degree of disaggregation both in production sectors and pro-
duction factors, it is very important to test whether the results are robust with respect
to the assumed elasticities both in the production function as well as in the Armington
aggregation. In order to test this robustness, we have run a series of 1000 simulations in
which we have drawn these elasticities randomly from the intervals shown in table 5.8.10
Given the dynamic structure of the model as well as the high degree of disaggregation
these simulations produce a high amount of data. We focus here on presenting the results
for the macroeconomic aggregates. However, all results presented above lie within a 95%
confidence interval based on all 1000 simulations.
Table 5.8 shows the intervals from which the elasticities have been drawn. It is obvious
that we include a very high variation for the elasticities. We generate the elasticities using
a random number generator, we cannot allow negative numbers and in the Armington
function elasticities of 0 are not possible, either. Apart from these limitations we allow
any combination of elasticities.
Table 5.8.: Distribution of elasticities
Elasticity Value in simulations Min in Robustness
checks
Max in Robustness
checks
Production function
σcap 0 0.0 1.5
σva 0.5 0.0 2.0
σlab 0.5 0.0 2.0
σhskl 1 0.2 3.0
σlskl 2 0.5 5.0
σnon 8 2.0 16.0
Armington aggregation
ρs 0.2 - 2.0 0.00001 6.0
ρt 0.2 - 4.0 0.00001 6.0
Table 5.9 presents the relative deviation between our results reported in the respective
section and the maximum and minimum values retrieved for the respective variables in
the robustness checks. We calculate the deviation of the maximum (minimum) value from
the value reported in our result-section relative to the result value itself. Most results
10Jensen & Tarr [2011] follow a comparable procedure for robustness tests.
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spread only within an interval of less than 1% around the results originally presented
above. All results for the macro-economic aggregates lie well within a 95% confidence
band. Thus, we consider our results very robust with respect to the elasticity parameters.
The results for the Hicks equivalent welfare measure are slightly less robust than those
for GDP and educational production. GDP and educational production produce fairly
robust results, especially in the case of educational production where the scenarios differ
substantially, the deviation may be considered insignificant.
Table 5.9.: Relative deviation of results from maximum and minimum in robustness
checks
Variable Indicator Sce-
nario
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP
Max-dev
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004
Min-dev
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.012
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.013
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.009
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.013
Welfare
Max-dev
1 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004
2 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
3 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006
4 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007
Min-dev
1 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.014 0.016
2 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.019 0.024 0.030
3 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.017 0.018 0.021
4 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.024
Educa-
tional
produc-
tion
Max-dev
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Min-dev
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
On the macroeconomic level, we find noteworthy variance only for price variables not
for quantity variables. Hence, the changes in the substitutability between factors or
between markets are absorbed by prices and have only marginal real effects. Prices in
CGE models in general only reflect relative price evolution compared to a numéraire good
(the trade basket's price on world markets in our case). Thus, prices in general should
be interpreted with some caution. We do not interpret the price results here and the
quantity effects shown above seem to be quite robust concerning the choice of elasticities.
At one point in our model a price effect is crucial, though: the price for human capital
influences households' demand for education. However, the price for education is (also
in the robustness simulations) closely linked to the price for human capital and thus,
the demand-increasing effect of a specifically high price of human capital is compensated
by a demand-decreasing effect of the price for education. The educational production is
thus not affected crucially as shown in table 5.9.
We see from our robustness checks that the aggregate variable results are quite robust
with respect to massive changes in the elasticities in production and trade. However,
on the sectoral level, we find some sectors which are very sensitive to the elasticity set,
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namely coffee, fishing, hunting/forestry and private services. As the anomalies also oc-
cur in the base year before any schooling policy is in place and are also present in all
different counterfactuals, we are sure that this result is not specific to our policy simu-
lations and thus the other results for the different scenarios are still valid. However, the
non-robustness of disaggregate results on the sectoral level sheds light on the fact that
more reliable information on sector specific elasticities would be a valuable improvement
of most developing country CGEs with high degrees of disaggregation.
Table 5.10.: Summary sectoral robustness
Sector 95%-Criterion 5%-Deviation-Criterion
MAIZE + (+)
PADDY + -
OSTF + -
WHEAT + -
BEANS + -
CEREA + +
OILSE + +
COTTO + -
COFFE - -
TOBAC + -
TEAGR + -
CASHE + -
SISAL + -
SUGAR + -
OFRVE + -
OCROP + -
LIVES + -
FISHI - (+)
HUFOR - -
MININ + -
MEATD + -
GRAIN + -
PFOOD + +
BEVER + (+)
CLOTH + -
WOODP + -
CHEMI + -
RUPLA + -
GLASS + (+)
METAL + -
EQUIP + -
UTILI + +
CONST + +
TRADE + +
TRANS + -
ESTAT + -
ADMIN + -
PRIVS - -
Table 5.10 summarizes the sectoral robustness results. We report two criteria for ro-
bustness here: Whether or not the result of our simulations with the initital elasticity set
lies within a 95% confidence interval computed based on the robustness simulations and
whether our result does not deviate by more than 5% from the minimum and maximum
values found in the robustness simulations. A + in table 5.10 indicates that the crite-
rion is fulfilled for the respective sector in all scenarios, a (+) means that it is fulfilled
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in three out of the four scenarios.
5.7. Conclusion and policy implications
We have shown how human capital accumulation can be modeled in a detailed manner in
a developing country CGE model. By disaggregating skilled and semi-skilled labor into
the raw labor force and the human capital and by modeling schooling, i.e. educational
production, explicitly, we add a number of aspects that have so far been treated only
indirectly or left out completely in comparable studies. We are able to model the endoge-
nous choice of skill levels, educational demand, opportunity costs of sending children to
school and the effects of an increased pupil-teacher ratio.
Using our model to analyze different policy options we confirm a growth and welfare
increasing effect from school investments, even though it is rather small, like other au-
thors have shown before. However, a noteworthy effect on macro-economic variables is
only reached if increased enrollment is accompanied by both, higher schooling invest-
ment and a higher employment of teachers. If both are in place, the majority of children
are endogenously sent to school even if mandatory schooling is not enforced effectively.
The opposite is true for mandatory schooling without the required resources i.e. only
increasing the size of classes. In this case we do not find a growth or welfare effect as
the positive effect from human capital accumulation is compensated by a negative effect
from reduced childrens' production and income as well as reduced pass-rates.
In this study we used a dataset for Tanzania for 2001, which provided enough infor-
mation on labor and skill disaggregation. However, it could be used with more recent
datasets as well as other countries, if datasets with enough details were available. It
could then be used to simulate policies beforehand.
The schooling investment policies are especially beneficial for poor households and
those with very low skills. These households benefit overproportionally from increased
human capital accumulation and thus receive higher income.
We confirm, in accordance with other authors, that capital as well as land might act
as constraining factor on the growth effect from increased human capital. Even with
the assumption of increasing productivity of both capital and land, we find land to be
relatively scarce and thus being paid higher rents compared to all labor classes' wages.
This indicates that the new high and semi skilled labor could produce even more if it
were equipped with more land or if capital and land productivity would rise.
In a very elaborate robustness testing procedure we are able to show that a different
choice of elasticities has only a minor impact on quantity variables on the aggregate
level. The results presented above are robust across a very high number of iterations
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with different elasticities. Contrastingly, the elasticity set has a strong influence on price
variables and on the sectoral results. This highlights the fact that, if price variables and
wages are interpreted in a CGE study, more emphasis should be placed on the estimation
of appropriate sectoral elasticities.
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D. Appendix
D.1. Data description and parameters
Table 5.11.: Household and labor classes
Abbreviation Description Classification
Households
HRBFPL Rural, below food poverty line rural, poor
HRFBPL Rural, above food, below basic needs poverty line rural, poor
HRNFPS Rural, HH head has not finished primary school rural, non-poor, low-skilled
HRNFSS Rural, HH head has not finished secondary school rural, non-poor, low-skilled
HRSECP Rural, HH head has not finished primary school rural, non-poor, high-skilled
HUBFPL Urban, below food poverty line Urban, poor
HUFBPL Urban, above food, below basic needs poverty line Urban, poor
HUNFPS Urban, HH head has not finished primary school Urban, non-poor, low-skilled
HUNFSS Urban, HH head has not finished secondary school Urban, non-poor, low-skilled
HUSECP Urban, HH head has not finished primary school Urban, non-poor, high-skilled
Labor
Classes
FSUB Subsistence labor Unskilled
CHILD Child labor Unskilled
LNON Adult, no education Unskilled
LNFP Adult, not finished primary school Low-skilled
LNFS Adult, not finished secondary school Low-skilled
LSEC Adult, secondary or higher education High-skilled
Table 5.12.: Production sectors
IndexSector Description Classification
1 MAIZE Maize Agricultural, high share home consumption, tradeable
2 PADDY Paddy rice Agricultural, medium share home consumption, tradeable
3 OSTF Other staple food Agricultural, high share home consumption, tradeable
4 WHEAT Wheat Agricultural, low share home consumption, tradeable
5 BEANS Beans Agricultural, medium share home consumption, tradeable
6 CEREA Cereals Agricultural, medium share home consumption, tradeable
7 OILSE Oil seed Agricultural, medium share home consumption, tradeable
8 COTTO Cotton Agricultural, no home consumption, tradeable
9 COFFE Coffee Agricultural, low share home consumption, tradeable
10 TOBAC Tobacco Agricultural, no home consumption, tradeable
11 TEAGR Tea growing Agricultural, low share home consumption, tradeable
12 CASHE Cashew nuts Agricultural, no home consumption, tradeable
13 SISAL Sisal Agricultural, no home consumption, non tradeable
14 SUGAR Sugar Agricultural, low share home consumption, tradeable
15 OFRVE Other fruit and vegetables Agricultural, medium share home consumption, tradeable
16 OCROP Other crops Agricultural, medium share home consumption, tradeable
17 LIVES Livestock Agricultural, medium share home consumption, tradeable
18 FISHI Fishing Agricultural, low share home consumption, tradeable
19 HUFOR Hunting and forestry Agricultural, medium share home consumption, tradeable
20 MININ Mining Manufacturing, no home consumption, tradeable
21 MEATD Meat and dairy products Manufacturing, medium share home consumption, tradeable
22 GRAIN Grain milling Manufacturing, no home consumption, tradeable
23 PFOOD Processed food Manufacturing, low share home consumption, tradeable
24 BEVER Beverages Manufacturing, low share home consumption, tradeable
25 CLOTH Clothing Manufacturing, no home consumption, tradeable
26 WOODP Wood and paper Manufacturing, no home consumption, tradeable
27 CHEMI Chemistry, fertilizer and refinery Manufacturing, no home consumption, tradeable
28 RUPLA Rubber and plastic Manufacturing, no home consumption, tradeable
29 GLASS Glass Manufacturing, no home consumption, tradeable
30 METAL Metallurgy Manufacturing, no home consumption, tradeable
31 EQUIP Equipment Manufacturing, no home consumption, tradeable
32 UTILI Utilities Manufacturing, no home consumption, non tradeable
33 CONST Construction Manufacturing, no home consumption, non tradeable
34 TRADE Trade Services, no home consumption, non tradeable
35 TRANS Transport Services, no home consumption, tradeable
36 ESTAT Real estate Services, medium share home consumption, non tradeable
37 ADMIN Public services, administration Services, no home consumption, tradeable
38 PRIVS Other private services Services, no home consumption, tradeable
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Table 5.14.: Armington elasticities
XXXXXXXXXXsector
elasticity ρsi ρ
t
i τi
Import substitution Export transforma-
tion
Home-market trans-
formation
MAIZE 2.0 2.0 4.0
PADDY 2.0 2.0 4.0
OSTF 2.0 2.0 4.0
WHEAT 2.0 2.0 2.0
BEANS 2.0 2.0 4.0
CEREA 2.0 2.0 2.0
OILSE 2.0 2.0 4.0
COTTO 1.5 4.0 2.0
COFFE 1.5 4.0 2.0
TOBAC 1.5 4.0 2.0
TEAGR 1.5 4.0 2.0
CASHE 1.5 4.0 2.0
SISAL 1.5 4.0 2.0
SUGAR 1.5 4.0 2.0
OFRVE 1.5 4.0 2.0
OCROP 1.5 4.0 2.0
LIVES 0.5 0.5 4.0
FISHI 0.5 0.5 4.0
HUFOR 0.5 0.5 4.0
MININ 1.5 4.0 0.1
MEATD 0.5 0.5 4.0
GRAIN 1.5 4.0 2.0
PFOOD 1.5 1.5 2.0
BEVER 1.5 1.5 2.0
CLOTH 1.5 1.5 0.5
WOODP 1.5 1.5 0.5
CHEMI 0.2 0.2 0.2
RUPLA 1.0 1.0 0.2
GLASS 1.0 1.0 0.2
METAL 1.0 1.0 0.2
EQUIP 1.0 1.0 0.2
UTILI 1.0 1.0 0.2
CONST 1.0 1.0 0.2
TRADE 0.2 0.2 0.1
TRANS 1.0 1.0 0.1
ESTAT 0.2 0.2 0.2
ADMIN 0.2 0.2 0.2
PRIVS 0.2 0.2 0.2
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6. Concluding remarks
This thesis contributes in various dimensions to the state of the development economics
literature. It provides important advancements in the fields of methodology and model-
ing, paired with equally enriching contributions to the area of development policy. Since
the thesis comprises four papers on the aforementioned topics, a number of general final-
izing conclusions will now be derived from the presented analyses.
In the field of CGE modeling, this thesis presents two static and one recursive-dynamic
model implementations based on the structure of IFPRI datasets and written as mixed
complementarity problems in MPSGE modeling syntax. Despite the pre-existing pres-
ence of an MPSGE version of the standard IFPRI model, the applications outlined here
constitute possible enhancements, especially in regards to the government agent, the in-
clusion of proportional direct taxation and household savings, and the disaggregation of
private and public capital. To the author's knowledge, an MCP/MPSGE implementation
of a recursive-dynamic model based on the IFPRI data structure has not been previously
available.
The aid model in chapter two provides a very detailed implementation of governmen-
tal behavior. It sets a distinction between different public expenditure positions such as
public investment, transfers, subsidies to enterprises and public recurrent expenditure.
In addition, it includes (household-specific) proportional income taxation and income-
proportionality in private savings. Public and private investments are separated to allow
for different investment good bundles, effectuating in varied outcomes for public and pri-
vate investment, respectively. Unlike earlier aid-focused models, the model here covers
home consumed agricultural production and its distinct features, as well as sector-specific
factors.
The aid model has been already employed within a policy consultancy project at the
Amsterdam Institute for International Development. The model was utilized for judging
the probability of Dutch Disease effects from budgetary support in the special Zambian
circumstances. The flexible model setup, together with the detailed government account,
opens up a number of possible applications in the area of policy planning.
The infrastructure model in chapter three develops an explicit link between public
investment in roads, the availability of road transport and the trade and transport mar-
gins. Thus, it establishes a completely different, more realistic and detailed approach
to modeling road network improvements. It remains in a stark contrast to the general
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public capital stock models since infrastructure is regarded as a concrete means of trans-
port. Improved or new road networks provide an alternative for transport services and
therefore reduce the requirements for labor and capital in transportation. As a result, we
discover a direct relationship between the transport margin and the availability of roads,
which is often established in the theoretical papers but has not yet been transferred to the
CGE world. This transport margin approach is documented in a small theoretical model
which can be solved analytically. The procedure is then integrated into a full detail real
world CGE model. The model includes operation and maintenance costs and compares
different assumptions concerning the ownership of the public capital and consequently
the reception of returns to this capital stock.
The recursive-dynamic education model in chapter five combines features from differ-
ent models in the relevant literature while adding a considerable number of new features.
Aside from having a higher degree of disaggregation with respect to the number of sectors,
households and factors included in the analysis, it also directly models the educational
process itself. The model introduces human capital as an asset which is produced (in
formal schooling), accumulated by private households, and eventually demanded in the
production of goods and services. This is a new approach in the respective strand of
the model-based literature on education and it is a clear progress in this area of mod-
eling. The model explicitly includes the three-phase Tanzanian schooling system and
the educational requirements for the respective labor classes. It accounts for the costs
of the educational process in terms of staff, buildings and foregone labor force. Most
importantly, the model incorporates explicitly the households' decisions on the alloca-
tion of childrens' time for work versus education. It further introduces some elements of
forward-looking behavior with respect to educational choices into the recursive-dynamic
setup which has myopic agents in general. The simulations hence provide results for
endogenous educational attainment and endogenous enrollment. The modeling of the
alternative costs of education, i.e. the foregone earnings from child labor, grants an in-
sight to the inter-temporal income dynamics of private households as reactions to the
increased enrollment.
Particularly the last chapter contains very elaborate robustness checks. The robustness
of the model results is explored by drawing all elasticity parameters from random distri-
butions and running a very high number of repeated simulations. This procedure allows
to compute confidence bands and reveals that the obtained results for quantity variables
are very robust whereas price variables are rather sensitive with respect to changes in the
elasticities. These findings show that the interpretation of price results should be consid-
ered with some caution and that more information on elasticities of substitution, both
in production and in trade, is needed. Alike robustness testing techniques are generally
available in the GAMS syntax but are rarely applied in CGE studies in the development
economics literature. However, robustness checks and the calculation of confidence bands
supply useful insights concerning the reliability of CGE results. Such a procedure ensures
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a cautious interpretation of the results and allows for a better assessment of real world
effects. Furthermore, such sensitivity analyses may help to create a broader acceptance
of CGEs in economic research.
Regarding the policy implications of the articles included in this thesis, each study has
its merit in providing a disaggregate perspective on the analyzed problem. The papers
put emphasis on the household-, factor- and sector-level results and demonstrate that a
disaggregate perspective paired with an adequate detail in these aspects is an essential
value in CGE modeling. In brief, only a detailed analysis and interpretation of the sec-
toral and factor-level results allow to explain the macro-level effects.
The analysis of aid effects and different spending strategies in chapter two confirms
in accordance with the econometric literature that Dutch Disease is a legitimate con-
cern and a serious problem for African countries. The size of the Dutch Disease effect,
however, depends on the spending strategy of the receiving government which is a novel
insight compared to other CGE studies. Investment-focused strategies induce much lower
Dutch Disease effects than their consumption-focused counterparts. Nevertheless, Dutch
Disease effects are stronger if production factors are completely mobile across sectors,
whereas they are weaker if the main exporting sectors demand partly or completely
sector-specific factors. The export contraction and real appreciation might be reduced
if aid is invested in a way that fosters productivity as other authors have pointed out.
However, we only find a complete reversal of the real appreciation if we assume a very
high productivity response.
We ascertain that policy makers face a trade-off situation regarding the use of aid. An
investment-focused strategy will increase productivity and foster growth in the medium
run but it leads to lower immediate welfare effects. In addition, it can possibly bring
about undesired distributional consequences if high-skilled wages rise or agricultural ex-
ports suffer. The first is a relative gain for richer households and the second is a relative
loss for farmers and farm workers. This diagnosis might, to a certain extent, explain why
in reality we often observe a shifting of budget components rather than a sole expansion
of the investment budget after a positive shock of aid inflows into a certain country.
It is probable that governments tend to choose a mixed spending strategy, especially if
aid is given in a form of general budgetary support rather than program or project aid.
Hence, the inclusion of different uses of aid is a contribution with regard to more realistic
modeling.
The CGE analysis of infrastructure investment in chapter three confirms that an im-
proved transport network has a positive impact on production and growth. A confirma-
tion of the notion that a better access to markets will lead to a higher share of agricultural
production being marketed could not be found. Nonetheless, households use their surplus
income to buy non-agricultural marketed goods such that the importance of marketed
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goods grows in the consumption bundles.
In accordance with the first study, equally for infrastructure, quite substantially dif-
fering sectoral effects are discovered. While some sectors, especially in manufacturing,
experience a boost in their production, other sectors, mainly in agriculture and services,
have declining outputs. Therefore improved infrastructure might not be beneficial to
all households. Those who are employed in the declining sectors and especially the land
owners are worse off. A closer look at the distributional results, which is a specific feature
of this model implementation, reveals that the effect on distribution strongly depends on
the regional allocation of the public capital in infrastructure. If it is mainly located in ru-
ral areas (i.e. owned by rural households), the distributional outcome is positive, whereas
the distributional outcome is pro-urban if the government redistributes the returns to the
infrastructure through taxes. The model accounts for operation and maintenance cost
and emphasize that these have to be included in policymakers' decisions. The disaggre-
gation of infrastructure and other public capital provides new insights in the mechanisms
at work and enhances the sectoral results as sectors have very different transport require-
ments.
For the infrastructure model the elasticity of the trade and transport margin with re-
spect to changes in the road network density has been estimated from a cross-sectional
dataset based on input-output data. This approach is developed further in the paper
in chapter 4. Studies of the determinants of transport costs typically focus on distinct
countries and infrastructure projects like the construction of the East German motorways
after German reunification to give one example. Cross-country estimations are rare in
the literature as an internationally comparable measure of transport costs is hard to find.
Thus, based on country and case studies, it is not possible to draw definite conclusions
on the effectiveness of road construction that would apply to all different country groups.
The article presented in chapter four develops and applies a new proxy for the transport
costs which is available for a large number of countries. Based on aggregated input-output
data, sectoral transport margins, i.e. the share of transportation in total production costs,
were calculated. I established a panel dataset for sixty-four countries over three years
and regress the transport margin on a number of possible determinants. The estimation
generates some surprising results. The influence of the road network and most alike other
determinants of transport costs, such as climate and urbanization, differs strongly across
country groups and sectors. For the whole sample, I find that the transport network den-
sity, urbanization and population density have a strong influence on transport costs. A
division of the sample into two groups of countries reveals that the estimated relationship
for high-income countries is indeed not applicable for middle- and low-income countries.
For these countries, the regression identifies corruption together with climate conditions
as key factors for transport costs. In highly corrupt countries, the cost-reducing effect
from additional roads disappears completely, at least as far as agricultural goods are
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concerned. It can be concluded that the positive experiences from industrial countries
cannot be easily transferred to and implemented in the middle- and low-income states.
Substantially different settings in these countries impair the efficiency of roads in trans-
port cost reduction.
The analysis of educational investment in chapter five reveals that a positive outcome
for production and welfare through increased supply of skilled labor is only possible
if the increased enrollment does not come at the expense of class sizes and classroom
double-shifting. Provided that enough teachers and schooling facilities are available, a
high proportion of children is endogenously sent to school. In this case we observe high
welfare and growth effects in the medium- to long-term, in combination with a relatively
high short-term income effect, especially for the households with low-educated adults.
The opposite holds true if enrollment is increased without providing the required re-
sources. In this case we find a strong short-term negative effect on household incomes
and a lower welfare and growth effect in the medium- and long-term for the uneducated
households.
The educational model endogenizes the choice of the skill level as well as the time
allocation to school attendance versus labor. The human capital produced by increased
schooling might be transformed into low-skilled, medium-skilled or high-skilled labor, de-
pending on the demand and price for these respective skill classes. Consistently across all
scenarios, the model predicts a medium-term increase in medium-skilled workers employ-
ment and only later on an increase in high-skilled employment relative to the baseline
without schooling investment. It is important to mention that a high proportion of
the high-skilled labor professionals is employed in the public sector due to the need for
additional teachers. Hence, the rest of the economy benefits from a higher supply of
medium-skilled workers, whereas the public sector absorbs the additional high-skilled
employees. These dynamic labor market effects as well as the detailed results for child
labor supply go well beyond the state of the relevant literature and the respective models.
All of the investment strategies here-mentioned will only lead to noteworthy effects
in the medium- to long-run. It takes time to build a road, educate a child or bring
water to rural regions. In the short term most of the simulations presented here re-
veal the possibility of undesired adverse distributional effects. The direct effect from
increased governmental spending mainly occurs in some distinct sectors, namely public
administration and construction. Hence, the first round effect is mainly to the benefit
of those employed in these sectors. Thus, a short-term compensation for rural and poor
households might constitute a reasonable option, depending on the circumstances. This
is of outmost importance in the case of schooling. Foregone household income due to
educational attainment of the children is by no means negligible. We see that, if made
possible in the model's assumptions, the endogenous enrollment covers only for more or
less 60% instead of a 100% enrollment rate. Conclusively, compensation for foregone
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earnings from child labor could endogenously increase school attendance.
Nevertheless, providing sufficient resources for schooling and thus increasing the sup-
ply of skilled labor is not sufficient on its own. As shown in chapter four, a number of
other factors might limit the productivity of the additionally available skilled labor. If
capital and land are very scarce, or if their productivity cannot be increased, the higher
share of skilled workers will not lead to substantial increases in production in result of
the limited endowment with capital or land.
This last finding highlights the relevance of the first and second paper of this thesis
that call for aid spending being channeled into programs that allow to increase the total
factor productivity. A higher-skilled labor force needs highly productive capital and land
in order to be of value for the economy. Thus, the most general conclusion from the
different analyses summarized here is that an optimal use of developmental aid should
combine investment and recurrent spending in a way that leads to a balanced produc-
tivity response for all relevant factors of production. If aid is used to finance roads, they
will require maintenance and have to be built in the right regions for rural productivity
to increase. A longer road built in the wrong place or not adequately maintained will not
improve market access through lower transport costs for rural products. If aid is used to
build schools, these will only help to increase the supply of skilled labor, provided that
there are enough teachers employed. If the teachers are unavailable, a positive welfare
effect is unlikely. Even if the supply of skilled labor rises, additional resources in form
of the complementary factors of production, capital and land, are necessary to reach a
higher level of production.
The results of this thesis, taken together with the lessons learned from the history of
development cooperation, call for a cautious and balanced approach to development aid.
A sound analysis of the circumstances and requirements of a specified developing coun-
try, or even better: a concrete region within the country, should precede the programs'
planning. Instead of following a one-size-fits-all-approach, which was often the case in
the past, the international aid agenda ought to be flexible enough to comply with the
local requirements.
This thesis demonstrates the potential of the investment programs in question. How-
ever, cautious investment planning should consult other methods of economic research
in addition to CGE results. I have demonstrated that the results always depend on the
assumptions of the models. The reliability of a CGE model is dependent on the avail-
ability of reliable data and suitable model implementation. Thus, data work and the
estimation of reliable elasticities could improve the reliability of CGE model results for
developing countries in general. It needs to be highlighted that a sound understanding
of the underlying models is crucial for interpreting and using the results as well. Taken
with this pinch of salt, the obtained results provide many valuable and novel insights into
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the disaggregate effects of development policy. The respective models add to the state
of the art in the outlined aspects and could be applied to a variety of other comparable
problems and countries.
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